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PREFACE 
According to C. Wright Mills (1959) the promise of soci­
ology lies in its ability to make clear the connections be­
tween history, society, and the individual. There is perhaps 
no field of inquiry within sociology which takes this task 
upon itself moreso than that of alienation studies, From Marx 
to Seeman, sociological writers on alienation have made it 
their aim to understand these relationships. How do vast his­
torical events which transform entire social structures affect 
the individuals within them? Their answer: alienation, the 
severing of the social bond; and alienness, a feeling and 
cognizance of one's separateness from others, of one's power-
lessness in the face of monumental bureaucracies and political 
systems, of anomia and meaninglessness, of self-estrangement. 
Alienation studies make fascinating reading because they 
deal with such crucial issues. And in the reading, one comes 
away with an almost overwhelming wealth of insights and new 
perspectives on the interdynamics of socio-historical change 
and individual life and experience. 
One also comes away, however, with a sense of perplexity 
and confusion. Despite its ability to stimulate and excite, 
if, after one has read through some of the literature, one 
draws back and looks at the field, it can only be said to be 
in near chaos. The relations between the great socio-histori­
cal transformations and individual life become not nearly as 
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clear as once thought. The term "alienation" itself comes to 
be seen as encompassing historical, sociological and psycho­
logical phenomena. It refers to different subject-object re­
lationships, to both structure and process. In a word, a host 
of problems beset the alienation field in sociology. 
From the confusion that follows initial excitement in the 
reading of alienation literature grows a sense of frustration; 
and from this sense of frustration comes a host of criticisms 
of alienation studies and the suggestion that the term is 
scientifically useless and ought to be dropped. In the hue 
and cry that follows this, the importance of alienation stud­
ies is lost sight of and part of the promise of sociology is 
lost. 
This study is an attempt to bring order and scientific 
standing to the field of alienation studies in sociology. It 
does so first by attempting to solve certain semantical 
problems that surround the term. It does so secondly by 
attempting to solve certain substantive problems which them­
selves exist as a result of the semantic issues. These 
problems are problems of theory and so the first part of the 
study is an attempt to work out a theoretical framework. This 
part of the study constitutes the major effort and is viewed 
as its major contribution. 
An attempt is also made, however, to assess the empirical 
basis of the theory. This attempt addresses another major 
criticism of alienation studies, i.e., that they are "histori­
vii 
cally blind." This blindness is said to exist, moreover, de­
spite the fact that alienation theory has its roots in Marx's 
theory of dialectical materialism and that a major proposi­
tion in the theory is that alienation occurs in the transfor­
mation of traditional society to modern society. This problem 
of historical substantiation no doubt is related to the first 
set of problems, that is, to those of theoretical ambiguity 
and vagueness, to the diversity of usages and conceptualiza­
tions of the term and certain other substantive problems 
arising therefrom. Empirical and historical substantiation 
awaits, to some degree at least, the development of sound 
theory before they can be adequately undertaken. 
I do not profess to have empirically substantiated the 
theory put forward in this study. My attempts here are ex­
ploratory and illustrative. They do not meet the rigorous 
canons of scientific research. What I hope to have done is 
brought some order to the field by addressing certain theoret­
ical- issues and providing methodological guidelines by which 
the propositions of the theory may be tested. Otherwise, this 
study is mostly a personal journey into the field of individ­
ual and society, an attempt to unravel the complex ways in 
which an individual can become identified with society or, as 
seems to be more and more the case today, become alienated 
from it. 
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PART ONE: 
PERSISTENT PROBLEMS IN THE 
FIELD OF ALIENATION THEORY IN SOCIOLOGY 
2 
CHAPTER I: 
THE DIVERSITY OF ALIENATION LITERATURE IN 
SOCIOLOGY AND A PRELIMINARY FRAMEWORK FOR ITS ORGANIZATION 
Ours has been called the age of alienation. In America, 
Eric Fromm (1972) has been the person, perhaps, who has been 
most responsible for popularizing the term "alienation." Ac­
cording to Fromm, alienation is very widespread. Man is said 
to be alienated from others, from nature, from society and 
culture, and, perhaps most significantly, from himself. 
Although Fromm, a social psychologist, gave the term its 
greatest impetus in modern America, the subject of alienation 
has a long history in sociology as well. According to Nisbet 
(1966), the subject of alienation represents one of the major 
substantive areas of sociology. Deriving their concerns most­
ly from Karl Marx, the classical writers like Durkheim, 
Simmel, and Weber devoted much of their energies to it, both 
directly and indirectly. The indirect way in which these 
writers were concerned about alienation was through their 
analyses of the impacts of industrialization upon the social 
order of the European Feudal societies. To many of these 
writers, alienation was one result of the crumbling feudal 
system and its replacement by the capitalist system of the 
bourgeosie. Contemporary sociological writers have taken up 
this theme and have elaborated it in various ways. 
The subject of alienation, of course, has not been limit­
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ed to the fields of social-psychology and sociology. Indeed, 
as indicated above, it was introduced into social science 
generally via Marx (Israel 1971:5) who was a philosopher by 
training. Before Marx, Rousseau's (1915) and Hegel's (1970) 
works in philosophy were obviously about alienation. Today, 
also, contemporary philosophers like Marcuse (1964), Sartre 
(1956) and Schacht (1970), as well as many others, have con­
tributed to alienation studies. In religion, there is Tillich 
(1951; 1957; 1963). In literature, Camus (1946) and Kafka 
(1974) have made contributions among others too numerous to 
mention. In theatre, there is Pirandello (1952), Ibsen 
(1935) and Ionesco (1960). Alienation is a theme that per­
meates the humanities as well as social science. 
The Present State of Alienation 
Studies in Sociology 
Despite the fact that the subject of alienation has 
received so much attention, both within and without the field 
of sociology, the field of alienation studies can only be 
characterized as in chaos. Even in the confines of sociology 
a host of problems beset the attempts at understanding and 
explanation of this phenomenon. Most of the problems sur­
rounding this term in sociology stem from its ambiguity and 
vagueness. As a term derived from such a diversity of fields, 
alienation has been treated in a variety of ways, as a 
phenomenon of many kinds and dimensions. 
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One of the more volatile issues surrounding the aliena­
tion term in sociology has to do with whether it should refer 
to an objective condition of society or a subjective condition 
of the individual (Schweitzer and Geyer, 1981). While the trend 
in past sociological literature has been to treat alienation as 
a societal condition (Marx, 1959; Durkheim, 1964; etc.) con­
temporary literature tends to treat it psychologically (See-
man, 1959). This ambiguity in the reference of the alienation 
term has led to a continuing split between those writers of 
a Marxist orientation and those of a social-psychological— 
or of a so-called "empiricist"—orientation. The Marxist 
oriented writers argue that reduction of the term "aliena­
tion" to psychological dimensions transforms its meaning and 
severs it from its classical roots in Hegel and Marx. It 
thus shifts analysis away from historical-structural levels to 
social-psychological levels. This, in turn, robs the concept 
of much, of its critical and normative thrust. Of course, to 
strip the term of its normative definitions is precisely 
what the writers of a social-psychological orientation have 
tried to do. The issue of whether the term should refer to 
subjective or objective phenomena is perhaps one of the more 
crucial among the researchers in the alienation field. 
Recently, an attempt has been made to solve this problem 
by treating alienation as a social process (Twining, 1980). 
However, while this attempt is a step forward in many ways, in 
my opinion it raises another issue as to whether alienation is 
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to refer to static or dynamic phenomena in addition to whether 
it is considered psychologically or sociologically and 
historically. The problem of whether alienation refers to a 
structure or a process thus takes its place alongside that of 
the subjective-objective controversy. 
'As indicated, most contemporary sociologists tend to view 
alienation as a subjective condition of individuals. However, 
even when this position is taken the issue again arises as 
to just what the term should refer to. Seeman's (1959) work 
is an attempt to specify the psychological dimensions of the 
alienation phenomenon: powerlessness, meaninglessness, norm-
lessness, isolation and self-estrangement ; but the problem 
has arisen as to whether the term should refer to all of 
these traits as a set of interrelated dimensions (or as a 
"syndrome") or whether each is a type of alienation independ­
ent of the others. Most measurement scales (Srole, 1956; 
Nettler, 1957; Rotter, et al. 1962) tend to be only selective 
of these various dimensions. Seeman (1975) himself has tended 
to focus on the dimension of powerlessness. 
Another issue arising among those who treat alienation as 
a subjective condition of the individual is the choice of the 
type of object from which the individual is alienated. This 
is a problem of whether the term should refer to the relation 
of the individual to a particular object or a diversity of 
objects. As Schacht (1970:168-197) has pointed out, sociolo­
gists have conceived of the individual as being alienated 
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(1) from other individuals; (2) from work and its product; 
(3) from "events and structures which affect him;" and (4) 
from society and culture. Further differentiations of objects 
from which the individual is alienated are made within each of 
these categories. Of course, there are good reasons for these 
different functions to which the term is put in sociology for 
much of the variety of usages stem from the fact that the term 
is a relational one and can thus be applied to a multiplicity 
of subject-object relationships. Sociological usage merely 
reflects this relational aspect of the term. 
These semantical issues have led to another problem in 
alienation studies, i.e., the problem of substantiating the 
proposition, derived primarily from Marx's writing, that it 
is the emergence of the capitalistic societies which are the 
cause of alienation. The contemporary literature tends to 
substitute "modernization" in general for the variable of 
capitalism. It is modern society in general that brings about 
alienation. Still, there appears to be very little empirical 
substantiation of this problem. 
The existence of this problem in alienation literature is 
illustrated by the following criticism of Walter Kaufman 
(1970:xxviii-xxix): 
The question is whether the conditions that 
loom so large in the contemporary literature 
on alienation and in the seminal books pub­
lished in the fifties can be found in earlier 
periods and in non-capitalistic societies. 
One might suppose that those who deplore 
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alienation and blame it on modernity or, 
more specifically, on our economic system, 
would have considered these matters with 
some care. After all, there is no other 
way of establishing that their diagnoses 
are right; and if they are wrong, their 
prescriptions would scarcely merit much 
attention. 
What is needed is historical perspective. 
But although the vogue of "alienation" has 
its roots in the early writings of the 
founder of so-called historical material­
ism, one of the most striking features of 
the vast literature on alienation is its 
historical blindness. 
This problem persists because, as they focus on the indi­
vidual's subjective condition, the researchers in the social-
psychological (or empirical) tradition of sociology are 
". . . unable to make grounded judgments about the determin­
ing structural or material conditions of alienation in the 
larger society" (Schweitzer, 1981:13). Conversely, because 
they focus on social structure, the Marxists are unable to 
specify, in more direct ways, the linkages between this struc­
ture and its subjective manifestations. 
Both of these problems, i.e., the semantical as well as 
the empirical, are interdependent. Until the differences in 
conceptualization and terminology are resolved there will 
continue to be no uniform or cohesive theory of alienation. 
And until a theory is established empirical substantiation 
will remain unobtainable. The persistence of these issues 
insures that the field will continue to be split between the 
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Marxist oriented writers and those of a social-psychological 
persuasion and that the term will continue to function in a 
variety of ways. As long as these varied usages continue, 
any attempt at establishing empirical facts, even within the 
empirical tradition itself, will continue to be of somewhat 
dubious undertaking. Such "facts" will, of necessity, con­
tinue to be classified in their own special categories ac­
cording to the "kind" of alienation to which they refer, and 
the problem of the relation of these facts will continue to 
persist.^ The more substantive problem of the development 
of a theory of alienation will thus continue to exist also 
because each facet of the field will be dealing with its own 
area, oblivious, more or less, to the others. 
The Need for a Comprehensive Framework 
in the Field of Alienation Studies 
The chaotic nature of the field of alienation studies has 
led to rather severe criticism of the field. Some writers 
have called for the abandonment of the term altogether and 
the substitution of other, more direct, terms in its place, 
such as those by Seeman, i.e., powerlessness, meaningless-
ness, etc., or such as the term "reification" (Israel, 1971). 
^For example, Seeman's (1975) review of the empirical 
studies in the alienation field classifies such studies into 
his five categories of alienation and he rates the problem 
of ascertaining the unity between these various alienations 
as of top priority. 
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Perhaps the criticism of Feuer (1969:95-96) expresses the 
attitudes of many writers who at first, perhaps, entered the 
field with enthusiasm but soon found themselves enmeshed in 
the issues just enumerated. He writes; "Alienation lies in 
every direction of human experience where basic emotional 
desire is frustrated, every direction in which the person may 
be compelled by social situations to do violence to his own 
nature. 'Alienation' is used to convey the emotional tone 
that accompanies any behavior in which the person is compelled 
to act self-destructively; that is the most general definition 
of alienation, and its dimensions will be as varied as human 
desire and need." And in a further passage he states: 
"Alienation is the dramatic metaphor of the intellectual who 
has left the political Garden of Eden and projects his ex­
perience as the exemplar of all human frustrations." Apppar-
ently, according to Feuer, like the concept of "instinct" in 
early behavioral and social science, the concept of alienation 
seems to explain so much it ends up explaining nothing, seems, 
in fact, to merely be the projection of politically frus­
trated intellectuals. 
One can certainly sympathize with Feuer's criticisms. 
Even a cursory reading of the literature leaves one almost 
completely at a loss as to just what the essence of the field 
is. There is little doubt that such literature is dealing 
with a very important phenomenon, yet is so varied in its 
treatment that very little sense can be made of it. What is 
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wrong with the field, of course, is that there simply is no 
theory of alienation as such. That is, there is no overall 
framework which can tie the variety of studies together into 
a single, related whole. Although most sociological studies 
derive eventually from the Marxian tradition, in the course of 
the development of the field this tradition has become ex­
tremely variegated. This is due, in no small measure, of 
course, to the fact that Marxism itself gave the alienation 
term several possible interpretations. The situation has only 
gone from bad to worse. 
What is needed to bring coherency to the field of aliena­
tion studies is a clarification of conceptualizations and 
terminology and, building from this terminology, the construc­
tion of a system of propositions and hypotheses which relate 
these concepts and variables within an overall theoretical 
framework or format. This overall format, moreover, must be 
capable of comprehending the various usages and special con­
siderations of the various divisions and efforts in the field. 
These varied usages and the divisions within alienation 
studies are, it is true, formidable. As Schweitzer (1981:12) 
has said; "What is at stake here is a strategic choice be­
tween competing paradigms and departure points in the study 
of alienation—a choice which determines not only the way 
questions and answers about alienation are formulated and 
researched, but also the strategies for change, action and 
de-alienation." 
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However, I believe the issues that divide the field, even 
including that of the subjective vs. objective approaches, 
can be reconciled. My feeling is more in line with Peter Ludz 
who "... underlines the stress that Marx placed on both the 
objective conditions for, and the subjective manifestations 
of, alienation and points to many of the parallels between 
psycho-analytic concepts (i.e., Horney's 'neurotic personal­
ity,' Erikson's concept of 'identity crisis') and the psy­
chological elements of alienation in Marx's early works. Ludz 
shows that Marx's general theory of alienation contains state­
ments on many different levels, including what might be re­
ferred to as 'subjective' or 'psychological' ones" (Schweit­
zer, 1976:xv). Thus, while the variety of alienation studies 
is such that no theoretical framework can encompass them all 
(Schacht, 1970), nevertheless a framework that can capture 
most usages and can include most levels and types of phenomena 
alluded to by use of this term is, I believe, possible. 
At this point, then, I wish to present an overall 
theoretical framework, in outline form, for the purpose of 
bringing the alienation studies together within a common 
format. In doing so, I shall be attempting to provide a set 
of terms and concepts and a system of propositions that will 
tie these studies together in various ways, in turn providing 
solutions to the various issues already enumerated, thereby 
bringing order to an almost completely chaotic field. Only 
when this is done can the truly substantial problems remain­
12 
ing in the theory be ascertained and an attempt at empirical 
substantiation be undertaken. 
A Preliminary Theoretical Framework for the 
Assessment of Alienation Studies in Sociology 
To begin to establish an alienation framework, we must 
distinguish between alienation as a process and as a state 
and specify the objects of the alienated relationship. I 
shall adhere to the basic meaning of the term "alienation" 
by using it to refer to the process^ by which the individual 
2 becomes psychologically separated from others. , The state 
of the alienated individual, his subjective condition at the 
end of the process, shall be referred to as "alienness." 
Thus, the process of alienation results in the state of alien­
ness, the latter a psychological or subjective condition of 
separation of the individual from others. 
The opposite side of the coin, of course, is the process 
by which individuals become psychologically joined or bonded 
to others. I shall refer to the process by which an individ-
^"Process" is defined here as ". . . a series of inter­
dependent events that begin, operate, and conclude with cer­
tain defined and recognizable entities or properties" (Wil­
liams , 1972 ;1). 
2 While I use the term "other" to refer primarily to 
human individuals, the term is general enough to refer to any 
"object" of the individual's environment, including social 
groups, cultural values, artifacts, etc. By "object" I am 
referring to any symbolically designated phenomenon produced 
or created out of social interaction. These ideas are de­
veloped at greater length in this chapter and in the next. 
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ual is psychologically bonded to others as identification and 
the end state of this process as identity. Thus, through 
identification an individual achieves an identity with 
others. 
These processes, of identification and alienation, are, 
of course, more complex than these statements indicate. In 
order to develop a preliminary alienation framework for the 
assessment of the literature, therefore, I shall try to 
describe these processes and their collateral psychological 
states in some detail. 
The essential problem involved in understanding these 
processes is the nature of the "linkage" between individuals. 
For purposes of this study, the identification with or alien­
ation from others shall be theorized as involving a subsidi­
ary process of formation of the self. In this sense, identi­
fication more specifically will refer to the process of the 
merging of the self with others, i.e., to the process of the 
emotional and cognitive "attachment" of the self to others 
of the individual's society. Identity, concordantly, will 
refer to the state of such an attachment, i.e., to the psycho­
logical traits (affective and cognitive) that characterize 
an individual when this attachment or merger occurs. Con­
versely, alienation shall refer to the process of separation 
of the self from others, i.e., the process of the cognitive 
and emotional detachment of the self from others. Accord­
ingly, alienness shall refer to the set of traits, mental and 
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emotional, that characterize a person who has experienced this 
alienation process. 
These processes, of identification of the self with 
others and of alienation of the self from others—along with 
the corresponding states which are their outcomes—may be 
theorized to proceed by way of an interactional process as 
depicted in Figure 1. My view is that interaction is always 
embedded in a "situation"^ involving an exchange of sanctions, 
positive or negative (Romans, 1974) and in which the individ­
ual is often attempting to actualize the self. By "actualize 
the self" I mean the overt activity of the individual as he 
attempts to fulfill self needs. "Needs" here must be under­
stood as referring to both the subjective-self needs and the 
2 
objective-self needs. 
As is shown in Figure 1, two different outcomes occur for 
the individual depending upon the sanctions he receives from 
"another" with respect to actualization of self: if he is 
positively sanctioned self-fulfillment results; if he is 
negatively sanctioned self-disillusionment is the result. 
Self fulfillment will refer to either or both the affective 
and cognitive satisfaction of the individual whereas self-
situation is defined as ". . .an intersection of 
[ m e a n i n g f u l ]  t i m e  a n d  s p a c e  w i t h i n  w h i c h  p e o p l e  a c t  . . . "  
and which exists as a matter of social definition (Hewitt, 
1979:121). 
2 
These ideas, of "self" and "need" are developed at 
greater length in the pages following. 
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disillusionment shall refer to either or both the affective 
and cognitive dissatisfaction of the individual. These 
feelings (or emotions) and cognitions function as motivational 
factors and lead back into overt attempts to actualize the 
self in a continuous way. I have indicated this by the arrows 
running back to the self-actualization block. Each, however, 
when established as a mode of feeling concomitant with a 
pattern of positive or negative sanctioning produces two 
different psychological states, that of identity of the self 
Situational Context 
Interaction 
Self < > Other 
i 
> Self-Actualization ^ 
^ I A i 
Other Sanctions Self 
Positively Negatively 
4 i 
Self-Fulfillment Self-Disillusionment 
Identity of Alienness of 
Self with Others Self from Others 
Figure 1. The Interactional Basis of Identification/Aliena­
tion 
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with others or alienness of the self from others. In the 
former, the individual's self is defined by ego as "like" or 
"one of" the others; in the latter it is defined as "unlike," 
contradistinctive, or not one of the others. 
The formation of either of these states is not a short 
term process but one occurring over a considerable period of 
the individual's lifetime during which one or the other of 
these feelings and cognitive modes is established. Looking at 
the development of the self over the individual's life-cycle 
it appears that we may differentiate two major phases or 
stages of the alienation/identification process. The reader 
is referred to Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Stages of Self-development and Their Correspond­
ence to Identification/Alienation Processes 
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As shown, I have divided the process into two major 
phases with respect to identification/alienation: the infancy 
phase and the childhood phase. For purposes of brevity, I 
have referred to the process of identification/alienation 
during infancy as primary. By the same token I have called 
the identification/alienation process during the childhood 
phase as secondary. I shall try to make these distinctions 
clearer as follows. 
It is a well-established view in sociology that the 
infant does not possess a sense of himself as object when he 
is first born (Mead, 1934). Of course, this does not mean 
that he cannot perceive the difference between his own body 
and that of another person, or his own hand and that of the 
toy within it at least to some degree. But, on the other 
hand, he probably does not conceive of his body as "himself" 
and the other person and the toy as "other." Thus, it may 
be said that, in this sense, the infant probably does not 
separate himself from the rest of the world but is "one" 
with it. He exists, at first, in a state of psychological 
unity with his environment, i.e., a state of subjective 
identity. 
The identification/alienation process in its overall 
sense is the process of the individual's transformation from 
this original state of subjective identity to a state of 
either objective identity with, or objective alienness from, 
others. The primary phase of this process is marked by the 
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initial differentiation of the subjective self into the 
objective self, together with the development of an emotional 
mode accompanying such a differentiation. Both of these 
developments, i.e., of the objectification of the self and 
of the establishment of a concomitant emotional mode are 
brought about by the basic interactional process portrayed in 
Figure 1. Of course, in the primary phase of the identifica­
tion/alienation process, self-actualization can only refer to 
the attempts by the individual to fulfill the subjective self 
since the objective self has not yet fully developed. By 
"subjective self" I am referring to what Cooley (1967:137) 
calls the "my feeling or sense of appropriation." It is 
what Mead referred to as the "I" aspect of the self. It 
consists primarily in terms of a feeling state or ". . . 
personal emotion and sentiment." At the same time, this 
subjective self is ". . . set free by the act of communica­
tion" (Cooley, 1967:46). As Cooley says, the individual 
". . . needs to express himself" and this need ". . . is for 
something more than sensory or muscular activities." 
The objectification of the subjective self is accom­
plished as the infant learns symbolic speech. The subjective 
self becomes objectified by its representation in symbols, 
specifically personal names and personal pronouns. This ob­
jectif ication of the self, in my view, is the fundamental 
aspect of the primary alienation process because it estab­
lishes the basis for a conceptual differentiation between the 
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individual and his environment and thereupon produces the 
grounds upon which all the existential questions with respect 
to the self arise, i.e., of the meaning of being and exist­
ence, of the meaning of life and death, of good and evil, etc. 
All such questions presuppose a creature who is self-aware, 
who makes a distinction between himself and his environment 
in more than a mere perceptual sense, and who seeks to es­
tablish the meaning of his own existence in a variety of ways. 
The objectification of the self during the primary phase 
is insufficient, however, in and of itself, to result in 
alienness. It must be accompanied by the establishment of an 
emotional mode of fear and anxiety, of insecurity. Converse­
ly, the development of identity with others is accompanied by 
an emotional security. 
These emotional modes are established as a result of the 
pattern of significant other's sanctioning responses to the 
infant's actualization of self. If a pattern of negative 
sanctions develops, the infant comes to possess a relatively 
modal insecurity and basic anxiety. This is the alienation 
route. If a pattern of positive sanctions develops the 
infant builds up an emotional security. This is the route of 
identification. 
The end of the infancy phase is marked, therefore, by 
the emergence of the objective self, together with an emo­
tional security or insecurity, depending on the type of sanc­
tioning of self-actualization the individual has received 
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during this stage. These emotional states act as the condi­
tioning factors predisposing the individual toward either 
the development of an identity with others, or an alienness 
from them. They set the stage for the further development 
of the self in the next phase of the identification/aliena­
tion process. 
The secondary phase of the identification/alienation 
process is marked by the gradual emergence and "filling out" 
of the self-concept. This concept is formed largely upon the 
emotional base established earlier in the primary phase. The 
individual now begins to think of or conceive of himself as a 
certain kind of person. That is, he begins to conceive of 
himself as having certain identities, or, conversely, as not 
having these identities. The latter case, of course, is the 
essence of alienness. 
In the secondary phase of identification/alienation, 
self-actualization is more than the attempt to gratify sub­
jective self needs: it has become, in addition, the attempt 
to fulfill the needs of the more fully objectified, concep­
tualized self. Hence, it is as much a "presentation of self" 
as it is a subjective sense of gratification; it is, as well, 
an attempt to satisfy the acquired needs of the newly emerg­
ing objective self. At its base is an attempt to realize or 
fulfill an ideal self-conception through its actualization in 
a situation comprised of two interacting individuals. Thus, 
the basic interactional process depicted in Figure 1 still 
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pertains, but now both individuals are communicating symbol­
ically. Consequently, new dimensions are added. We depict 
the identification and alienation process at the secondary 
level, or childhood phase in Figure 3. 
The interactional process as it is now portrayed in 
Figure 3 involves two or more individuals whose interaction 
is based on each's interpretation of the meaning of the 
other's acts for themselves, and which meaning comes to de­
fine the individual negatively or positively with respect to 
some ideal self-conception. This ideal is drawn from the 
Situational-Context 
Individual (self) Interaction Individual (other) 
^Self-Presentation _ 
(Self-Actualization) 
"Other" Defines Presented Self 
Positive to Ideal Negative to Ideal 
Self-Fulfillment 
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Identity (Being Cognition) 
Self-Disillusionment• 
i 
Alienness (Defensive 
Cognition) 
Figure 3. The Interactional Basis of the Secondary Phase of 
Identification/Alienation 
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various status-roles which the society has to offer 
(Rosenberg, 1979). Each status-role of the society carries 
with it an idealized stereotype of the person who occupies 
the status and plays the role. Through socialization, in­
dividuals learn this ideal stereotype and when they assume 
the status-role this stereotype becomes the ideal to which 
they compare themselves and which, if they are committed to 
it (or if they fear negative sanction), they attempt to 
fulfill through actualization. 
The idealized conception of the self is composed of 
three major elements: the identity element, the image ele­
ment and the esteem element. The identity element "places" 
the individual in the social structure relative to others. 
It indicates to him who and what he is. The image element 
indicates the physical and psychological traits the indi­
vidual should ideally possess. The esteem element ranks the 
individual with respect to others. 
Within any situation every individual is usually not only 
playing a role of that situation specifically but is simul­
taneously playing a variety of other roles, e.g., with 
respect to sexual gender, age grades, racial or ethnic 
categories, etc, (depending on the complexity of the society). 
The individual thus, in playing these roles, conceives of 
himself as having not only a "situated" identity and image 
but a "general" identity and image as well (Lauer and Handel, 
1977:176), which provide sets of ideals which he more or less 
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compares himself to as he acts them out and with respect to 
which he more or less seeks confirmation from other persons. 
Confirmation consists in receiving a positive sanction in the 
interaction, "positive" being a response from the other per­
son perceived and interpreted (cognized) as defining his 
presented self concordant to his ideal-self. A disconfirm-
ing response would be the opposite. Any discrepancy between 
the presented self and the ideal self represents the individ­
ual's own level of self-esteem. In this study I conceive of 
self-esteem as purely a cognitive judgment. The emotional 
concomitants of this judgment, itself derived from the inter­
action, fill out and complete the experience of self-fulfill­
ment or self-disillusionment, i.e., states of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction, with these terms now referring to the ful­
fillment or disillusionment of the objectified self ^  well 
as the subjective self. 
Again, my conception is that the individual's self-needs 
are recurrent and so attempts to fulfill these needs are 
recurrent. The lines going back to self-presentation in 
Figure 3 represent the relatively continuous attempts by the 
individual to gratify these needs. It is the pattern of 
interaction, i.e., as confirming or disconfirming, that 
results in the different states of identity or alienness. 
In the childhood phase of self-development, if either a con­
firming or disconfirming pattern of interaction becomes 
modally established and, concomitantly, a modal state of 
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self-fulfillment or disillusionment prevails, then the out­
come will be a psychic state of identity or of alienness 
respectively. 
As indicated previously, these states may be described 
as a set of characteristic traits. The state of alienness, 
in addition to the trait of emotional insecurity left over 
from the infancy phase of alienation, is marked foremostly 
by what I shall later call a "negative essence." By "nega­
tive essence" I mean the individual's feeling and belief 
that he is somehow inferior or abnormal when compared to 
others. As a result of long-term self-disillusionment he 
secretly feels and cognizes himself not to be one of the 
others, i.e., he feels and believes himself to be contradis-
tinctive, or negatively different and separate from them. 
This is the essence of his alienness from them. The individ­
ual excludes himself from, does not identify himself with, 
others of his society. This contradistinction of the self 
from others in turn promotes an almost constant defensive 
orientation, signified by the D-cognition (Maslow, 1968) 
dimension indicated in Figure 3. The individual becomes 
acutely self-conscious, mostly concerned with defending the 
self against disillusionment, attempting to live up to an 
idealized self he has constructed from the social statuses 
and roles to which he has committed himself. His activities 
are an almost constant attempt at receiving confirmation from 
others that he is what he wants to be. This trait, of acute 
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self-consciousness, in turn leads to the set of other 
traits, or "dimensions," frequently iterated in Seeman's 
work, i.e., feelings of powerlessness, meaninglessness, etc.; 
but I shall not elucidate upon these at this time. 
In contrast to the state of alienness, identity is 
characterized as a feeling and cognizance of oneself as 
"like" or "one with" others. This feeling and cognizance, 
in turn, promotes a non-modal objectification of the self, 
i.e., an awareness in consciousness of the self as object 
only as a phase of the cognitive process (the internalized 
conversation of gestures between the "I" and the "Me"). 
This state is characterized by (using Maslow's terms again) 
a being-cognition (the being-cognition in Figure 3), a cog­
nition wherein the self as object is not constantly under 
protection but operates as part of a process within the 
individual's consciousness. The state of identity is thus 
characterized as a state of emotional security—still 
present from infancy—as well as a lack of self-consciousness. 
The individual is not so concerned with avoiding self-dis­
illusionment, and the actualization of his self-conceptions 
seems to occur without the conscious attempt to do so. His 
behavior is more spontaneous. As a result of long-term 
self-fulfillment, though he feels himself to be distinct from 
others, he does not feel different from them in any alien, or 
"negative," or contradistinctive sense. He recognizes him­
self to be one with humanity, i.e., he identifies himself 
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with his fellow men. 
With these conceptualizations laid out, the basic scheme 
of identification/alienation at the social-psychological 
level is essentially complete. However, the wider social, 
cultural and historical contexts within which this social-
psychological process occurs still remain to be conceptualized 
before a complete framework can be accomplished. 
I have indicated that the social-psychological process 
of alienation/identification, in both its primary and second­
ary senses, is imbedded within a situational context. That 
is, like all social interaction, the interaction involving 
the alienation of the individual from or identification with 
others takes place within a social situation. At this level 
of interaction within a context the analysis of alienation/ 
identification is social-psychological. 
However, in addition to the immediate situational con­
text, I identify a wider "socio-cultural" context within 
which the interactional process also takes place. By this 
term I am referring to successively wider social collectivi­
ties, groups, categories, classes, etc., i.e., to the succes­
sively more general systems of social-organization in which 
situations are more or less implicated. These systems, in 
turn, are accompanied by and reflect an underlying set of 
values, beliefs, knowledge and norms widely shared by the 
individual members, which I restrict the term "culture" to 
refer to. The term "socio-cultural context" will be used to 
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refer to both the social and the cultural context within 
which any individual acts. These two classes of phenomena 
shall constitute the purely sociological phenomena from which 
I shall later draw in an attempt to construct a fuller theory 
of alienation. 
Beyond the socio-cultural context there is a "socio-
historical context," that is, a phase of socio-historical 
development of society that may conceptually be delimited for 
purposes of analyzing any particular structural state of any 
particular society from the standpoint of the development of 
societies in general. These "socio-historical contexts" are 
merely structural configurations of the particular society 
that constitute a phase in its ongoing development within a 
framework of general social change and development. This 
idea will, of course, require further elaboration later in 
the study. 
These concepts, of "situation," of "socio-cultural con­
text" and "socio-historical context," may be thought of as 
successively larger and larger fields of space and time with­
in which causal factors may be sought with regard to the 
overall process of alienation/identification. Thus, the full 
explanation of this process requires analyses of the situation 
in which it occurs as well as the socio-cultural and socio-
historical contexts in which it occurs. While these analyses 
are not a study of the alienation and identification process, 
per se, they form a necessary adjunct to the overall theory 
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in the sense of tracing out socio-historical and socio-
cultural causes. 
Conclusion 
These comments constitute the essential features of my 
general theoretical framework which I shall use in this study. 
Four substantive areas within the theory of alienation have 
thus been delineated: (1) the area of the initial identity 
state of the individual at birth and until he acquires 
language, i.e., the state of subjective self-consciousness; 
(2) the area of the identification/alienation process by 
which this initial subjective self-consciousness is trans­
formed, either into a state of identity with or alienness 
from, society; (3) the area of the states of identity and 
alienness which are the products of the identification/ 
alienation process; (4) the area of the socio-cultural and 
socio-historical contexts of identification/alienation. 
Although some detail has been presented with respect to 
each of these substantive areas in the preliminary framework, 
introducing them at this time is not meant, obviously, to 
be anything more than a preliminary statement for the pur­
pose of providing a framework for organizing and assessing 
the sociological literature on alienation whether it be of a 
sociological or social-psychological nature. With this frame­
work in mind it will be easier to determine what part or 
parts of it any particular study is dealing with and how the 
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study differs from or resembles others. From these com­
parisons a more adequate assessment of the substantive 
theoretical problems remaining can then be made. 
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CHAPTER II: 
AN APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK 
AND AN ASSESSMENT OF PROBLEMS REMAINING 
With the foregoing framework in mind, I have conveniently 
divided the sociological literature basically into two parts: 
first there is the literature of a more sociological bent 
dealing primarily with socio-structural conditions and socio-
historical contexts of alienation. Secondly, there is the 
literature dealing primarily with the social-psychology of 
alienation. The classical literature stemming from Marx 
(1959), including Durkheim (1964), Simmel (1950), and Weber 
(1964), and the neoclassical literature of Mills (1956; 1959), 
Riesman (1977), White (1957), Goffman (1959) and Martindale 
(1963; 1966), may be classed in the first genre.^ The more 
recent and contemporary literature of sociology, stemming 
The inclusion of Goffman's studies within the socio­
logical or structural literature may be surprising to some 
readers. However, as I have indicated, the central principle 
underlying the alienness and alienation concepts is self-
objectification and self-exclusion, and the self-conscious 
anxiety and self-préoccupâtion which are produced in turn. 
Anxiety and self-préoccupâtion are thus the marks of modern 
man's alienness from his society, and it is the growth of 
this anxiety (over the self) and self-preoccupation that I 
shall particularly attempt to trace out in the review of 
the literature as well as the structural conditions giving 
rise to it. The attempt to do so thus brings Goffman's and 
perhaps others' studies as well under review which are not 
ordinarily associated with structural studies; but its rele­
vance, in light of our contention of the importance of self-
consciousness and self-préoccupâtion to alienness, is quite 
clear. 
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from Seaman (1959), and others may be classed in the 
second. 
An Assessment of Alienation Studies 
in Sociology within the Framework 
The classical literature 
It is Karl Marx (1959) who first introduced the concept 
of alienation to sociological analysis and whose works have 
thus become a major reference point. Marx viewed the indi­
vidual's alienation in several ways: (1) as an alienation 
from his self; (2) as an alienation from his labor; (3) as an 
alienation from his product; and (4) as an alienation from 
others. We are not so much interested in one through three 
as we are in four, i.e., the alienation from others, although 
the same basic self-processes are involved in all of them. 
Marx viewed the alienation process itself as a process 
of the detachment of something which was originally a part of 
human nature from it. He used the German word entausserung. 
Marx's view is that the human being is by nature a social, a 
communal being. Society in the early history of man was a 
communal society, or, in Tonnies's language, a gemeinschaft 
society, based on natural will. Thus, society had a "mechan­
ical" (to use Durkheim's phrase) solidarity and nature of 
which the individual was an integral part. Alienation from 
others, or from society, is hence the detachment of the in­
dividual from that which is part of his own nature, the 
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splitting of society into a mere set of individuals. 
Marx viewed this alienation from others as stemming 
from "egoism" which in turn produces the institutionaliza­
tion of private property. The private ownership of property 
divides society into two classes, the owners, or capitalists, 
and the workers or proletarians. The workers lose control 
over their labor and are forced to sell it to the owners and 
thus their labor is no longer their own and it too becomes 
alienated from them, as does the product of their labor. 
Furthermore, since labor, or work, and the product of it are 
no longer their own, they do not really express the self of 
the laborer; they are, in fact, expressions of the selves 
of the owners. The individual in this sense is "self-es­
tranged," also. 
Marx believed that private ownership of property, at 
least of that property which serves as the means of produc­
tion, transforms social relations between persons into 
economic relations in which each individual views and uses 
the other as a means to obtain wealth. In this way, too, 
persons are estranged from one another. For Marx, civil 
society, organized as it is around the institution of private 
property, causes persons to view one another as rivals, 
rather than as fellows, in a "war of all against all." Marx 
(1963:26) describes man in civil society as: 
. . .  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  s e p a r a t e d  f r o m  c o m m u n i t y ,  
withdrawn into himself, wholly preoccupied 
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with his private interest and acting 
in accordance with his private caprice. 
The only bond between egoistic men is 
natural necessity, need and private 
interest, the preservation of their 
property and their egoistic persons. 
(Italics mine.) 
Marx thus more generally, perhaps, anticipates later neo­
classical analysts who deal with the rise of narcissism and 
self-preoccupation as the major characteristic of modern 
man, and shows these to be major characteristics produced by 
alienation, which in turn is produced by certain structural 
conditions in society. 
Marx tries to account for the initial rise of egoism 
(which ultimately resulted in civil society and private 
property) by tracing it to Judaism metamorphised through 
Christianity, which produced a "spiritual egoism" which "in 
practice becomes a material egoism." Marx was not overly 
successful in this particular analysis and seems to have 
abandoned it (Schacht, 1970:118). I shall show later, how­
ever, how Max Weber elaborated this idea. 
To Marx, the materialist struggle between the classes 
represents the dialectical nature of social history and thus 
the essential dynamics of society. Only when the working 
class overthrows the bourgeoisie, abolishes private property 
and establishes communism, will man live in harmony and in 
unalienated relations with one another once again. 
Marx's analysis, in terms of my framework, is primarily 
structural in the sense that it describes the historical 
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transformation of society and the ensuing structural condi­
tions, namely capitalism, which bring alienation about. Al­
though Marx offers vital elements to the conceptualization of 
the alienation process and the state of alienness (which are 
incorporated into my own framework) he does not fully 
describe them, hence analyzes primarily at the sociological 
level. Nevertheless, the essential elements of these con­
cepts are provided by Marx and help to fill in the framework. 
At the same time, however, in terms of my framework, Marx's 
analysis poses several major problems that essentially render 
his theory inadequate. Basically, these problems stem from 
Marx's emphasis upon economic factors in alienation. Most 
writers since Marx have also emphasized the economic changes 
in society as the major factors. As I shall show later, this 
emphasis poses some problems but I shall indicate these prob­
lems more specifically later in this chapter. 
As previously said, other classical writers in sociology 
have not addressed the alienation phenomenon with anything 
like the directness of Marx, but they all addressed the 
problems emerging with the dissolution of traditional society, 
and their studies may be connected to Marx and to alienation 
in this way (Nisbet, 1966). 
Durkheim's work, for instance, especially his Division 
of Labor (1964) and Suicide (1951), deal with the structural 
transformation of society as it changes from a traditional 
form to a modern form, from gemeinschaft to gesellschaft, to 
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use Tonnies's terms again. 
Durkheim's (1964) work posits the division of labor and 
the resulting anomie, or a state of normlessness, as causes 
of alienation, though he does not use the alienation term. 
Contemporary writers usually refer to the subjective side of 
anomie as anomia. Presumably, with the increasing division 
of labor, a mechanical solidarity and integration, based on 
the sharing of values, beliefs and norms, is replaced by an 
organic solidarity and integration, based on functional inter­
dependence. If the division of labor occurs rapidly then 
anomie is a result, and the sense of sharing and participa­
tion in, and of belonging to, a common social and cultural 
life is reduced (anomia). Durkheim's work on suicide (1951) 
was ample illustration of the personal consequences of this 
lack of sense of sharing, belonging and participation. 
Durkheim uses the term moral anomie, and it is important 
in terms of the implications for alienation theory to point 
out the fact that Durkheim thus includes not only norms, per 
se, but also values and beliefs in this usage. Norms, as 
behavioral prescriptions or proscriptions, issue from values 
and beliefs; they translate them into action, so to speak. 
Thus, moral anomie denotes a condition in which the. very 
framework or structure of social life is rendered vague or 
non-existent and subjected almost purely to economic, or 
purely rational (in the Weberian sense), values. 
The degree of alienness under this condition, of course. 
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depends directly on the degree of division of labor and its 
consequent social differentiation and the reduction of the 
sharing, belonging and participation among individuals. It 
is impossible to ascertain this degree from Durkheim's 
writings for he does not describe the various divisions 
either in kind or in number. He only notes the fact that the 
economic sector of society is characterized by moral anomie. 
However, for anomie to produce the alienated state in which 
the individual feels himself not to belong to at least some 
social category or group it would have to result in absolute 
dissolution of all forms of social life which might provide 
this sense of belonging, including, even, the family. I 
shall later contend that a high degree of such family dissolu­
tion is precisely what has happened in modern, industrialized 
society and that it has, indeed, produced the more extreme 
forms of alienation previously described. Thus, Durkheim's 
theory provides us with a central causal process which ex­
plains alienation, and it will be elaborated later. Still, 
there are certain inadequacies in Durkheim's theory which 
I shall address later in this chapter. 
Simmel's (1950) theories relating to alienation (though 
like Durkheim he did not use the term) include several types: 
alienation of the individual from his work; alienation of the 
individual from culture; and alienation from others. Again, 
alienation from work and alienation from culture concerns me 
only to the extent that such forms also alienate the individ­
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ual from others. Simmel's ideas are not essentially differ­
ent from Marx's or Durkheim's in this regard, however. He 
too sees the division of labor splitting society, separating 
persons into socially isolated specialties within which they 
develop their own subcultures and life styles, therefore 
partaking of the larger "objective" culture only partially, 
and thus alienating themselves from the other subcultures. 
But to Simmel, the major form of alienness consists of the 
development of an emotional neutrality. In terms of our 
definition of alienness in this study, it consists of the 
lack of sharing any concern about the other person beyond a 
pecuniary relationship. Participation in society exists 
mostly in belonging only to a common economic market as 
producers and consumers, buyers and sellers. Underlying this 
form of alienness is the development of a money economy which 
replaces a barter economy. Emotional neutrality develops due 
to the lessening of demands that one of the parties to a 
social relationship can place upon the other when their ex­
change involves money rather than an exchange of goods or 
services or other exchangeables. The demands of a master 
upon the slave, for example, are much greater, extending as 
they do into the slave's very personality, than the demands 
of a landlord upon the tenant who gives the landlord only 
money. With the development of a money economy the demands 
and obligations of social relations become more and more 
neutral, thus the emotional connections between persons more 
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neutral. Men treat one another more as means than as ends, 
more as commodities themselves, as monetary exchange pervades 
more and more spheres of society, permeates more and more 
social relationships. 
Emotional neutrality is thus the basic form of alien-
ness to Simmel, resulting from the emergence of money as a 
medium of exchange. A monetary economy alienates people by 
substituting a strictly pecuniary relationship for a social 
one. The city, as a center for commerce and trade, and as 
the seat of the money economy, brings quite different people 
together who share very few social relationships hence share 
very little culture, hence their low sense of belonging and 
participation in a life beyond that of the marketplace. 
Like Marx and Durkheim, Simmel's theory does not include 
an account of alienness nor of the process of alienation per 
se. Once again the theory is primarily structural and socio­
logical in its analysis, and, also like these other writers, 
its emphasis is primarily economic. 
Max Weber (1964) offers another "variable" as a cause of 
alienation. For Weber, capitalism and the increasing 
rationalization, by which he means the increasing application 
of quantitative calculation^ to behavior, results in competi­
tion between persons, or as he puts it, " . . . the battle of 
^Weber distinguishes this kind of rationality, which he 
terms "formal rationality," from "substantive rationality." 
The latter form does not concern us here. 
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man with man" (p. 93). This is the kernel of Weber's con­
tribution to the theory of alienation, though he did not 
formulate it as such. The application of statistics, mathe­
matical models, double-entry bookkeeping, etc., are examples 
of formal rationality by which precise calculations are made. 
Derivatives, however, are also the legal norms (the law) and 
the bureaucratic structure, which also afford calculability 
and precision of behavior. Thus, capitalistic, formal 
rationality begins to permeate the whole of society, forming 
the context of social relations, characterized basically by 
competitive struggle. Men are estranged from one another, 
left feeling isolated from one another, competitors rather 
than comrades. 
Weber's analysis also includes an account of the rise of 
rational capitalism on the basis of the Protestant movement 
and ethic. In this sense, Weber's analysis is connected to 
the attempt by Marx to account for the rise of "egoism" and 
complements what Marx was attempting to do. One way in which 
the Protestant Ethic promoted egoism was to create a concern 
on the part of the individual for a sign of his predestina­
tion to heaven or hell. One such sign was success in his 
calling, success being equated with, among other things, 
material wealth. The way in which protestantism underlies 
the whole development of capitalism is, of course, a familiar 
part of the sociological literature and need not be recounted 
here except to point out its relationship to Marx's ideas. 
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Weber's theory, like Simmel's, accounts for the struc­
tural bases of alienation and alienness. It does not tell us 
about these latter concepts in much detail. It does not, 
therefore, extend, either, into the subjective state of alien­
ness or the social-psychological process of alienation. We 
may say of Weber's theory of alienation that it, like the 
others, is primarily a structural, sociological analysis, and, 
again, places heavy emphasis upon economics, at least in­
directly, through religion. 
Weber's idea of the effects of rationality has been 
carried further by Karl Mannheim (1970), and Mannheim's 
treatment not only tries to account for the structural causes 
of alienation and alienness but to connect this structure to 
one of the major psychological characteristics of alienness 
as we have described it: "D-cognition" or self-preoccupation. 
Mannheim's work, therefore, constitutes a bridge between the 
classical and neoclassical writers. 
Mannheim (1970:509) distinguishes between "functional 
rationality by which he means that "... a series of 
actions is organized in such a way that it leads to a pre­
viously defined goal, every element in this series of actions 
receiving a functional position and role," and "substantial" 
rationality by which is meant the intelligent thought of in­
dividuals . 
He states further (1970:510): 
Now that we have made these distinctions, we can 
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safely make the following statement. The 
more industrialized a society is and the 
more advanced its division of labor and 
organization, the greater will be the num­
ber of spheres of human activity which will 
be functionally rational and hence calcula­
ble in advance. Whereas the individual in 
earlier societies acted only occasionally 
and in limited spheres in a functionally 
rational manner, in contemporary society 
he is compelled to act in this way in more 
and more spheres of life. This leads us 
directly to the description of a particular 
type of rationalization which is more in­
timately connected with the functional ra­
tionalization of conduct, namely the phe­
nomenon of self-rationalization. 
By self-rationalization we understand the 
individual's systematic control of his 
impulses—a control which is always the 
first step to be taken, if an individual 
wants to plan his life so that every action 
is guided by principle and is directed 
toward the goal he has in mind. 
Mannheim thus points out the way in which the highly 
rationalized societies set the conditions for man to begin to 
become highly self-conscious. Such self-consciousness con­
stitutes, in Mead's terminology, a dominancy of the "Me" 
phase of the self-process whereby the individual monitors his 
own behavior for the purpose of fitting it to a line of action 
that will lead to a specific goal. Simmel, too, believed that 
man became much more intellectual in modern societies, using 
his head more than his "heart." 
In the discussion of Mannheim's thesis of increasing 
self-rationalization, the work of Erik Erikson (1963) must 
be mentioned. Although he is not a sociologist, Erikson's 
work is so important to our topic it cannot be ignored. He 
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may be considered one of the giants in the development of the 
identity concept and therefore, by extension, of alienness. 
Erikson's intellectual background was in the psycho-analytic 
school of psychology. Using an eight-stage theory of psycho­
social development of the individual, he studied the sociali­
zation of children in both preliterate and modernized so­
cieties . 
Erikson also emphasizes the rationalization of society 
as the basic cause of problems of identity. Contrasting the 
way in which children are socialized in preliterate societies 
(he was using the American Sioux as an example) with that in 
modernized societies, he writes: 
The developmental principle in this system 
holds that a child should be permitted to 
be an individualist while young. The parents 
do not show any hostility toward the body 
as such nor do they, especially in boys, 
decry self-will. There is no condemnation 
of infantile habits while the child is de­
veloping that system of communication be­
tween self and body and self and kin on 
which the infantile ego is based. Only 
when strong in body and sure in self is he 
asked to bow to a tradition of unrelenting 
shaming by public opinion which focuses on 
his actual social behavior rather than on 
his bodily functions or his fantasies (1963: 
154) . 
Speaking of the modernized Western cultures, Erikson 
writes further; 
In contrast, . . . Western civilization 
. . . [has] been guided by the conviction 
that a systematic regulation of functions and 
impulses in earliest childhood is the surest 
safeguard for later effective functioning in 
society. They implant the never-silent 
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metronome of routine into the impression­
able baby and young child to regulate his 
first experiences with his body and with 
his immediate physical surroundings. 
Only after such mechanical socialization 
is he encouraged to proceed to develop 
into a rugged individualist. He pursues 
ambitious strivings, but compulsively re­
mains within standardized careers which, 
as the economy becomes more and more 
complicated, tend to replace more general 
responsibilities. The specialization 
thus developed has led this Western 
civilization to the mastery of machinery, 
but also to an undercurrent of boundless 
discontent and of individual disorienta­
tion. 
Erikson's message is thus quite similar to Mannheim's, 
i.e., that it is the rationalization of society which brings 
about problems of identity, or alienness. The differences 
are that Erikson places emphasis upon how this rationaliza­
tion becomes imposed upon the socialization process, especial­
ly in early infancy and childhood and how such "mechanical 
socialization" interferes with the spontaneous, natural 
development of the ego (or self). These points are well 
taken and much of what Erikson has to say will become incor­
porated into this study, especially with respect to his ideas 
of the earliest phases of psycho-social development and the 
development of the rational control over impulse. This de­
velopment, in my view, is basically the same phenomenon as 
the growth of self-consciousness. 
Although the forms of self-consciousness spoken of by 
Mannheim and alluded to by Erikson are not quite the equiva­
lent of my alienness per se, these men's works, in addition 
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to providing theoretical ideas for the structural causes of 
alienness, were among the first to emphasize this growth of 
rational and self-conscious control over behavior as a 
characteristic of modern personality. 
It remained for other writers, however, to point out the 
further development of self-consciousness of this sort into 
seIf-préoccupâtion and eventually into the form of narcissis­
tic self-preoccupation which I have referred to in Maslow's 
terms as "D-cognition." 
The neoclassical literature 
Later writers have, indeed, remarked upon this particular 
character trait and have made it the core of modern personal­
ity. Thus, although the particular body of literature I 
shall review next is not ordinarily linked to alienation 
studies, per se, its concern with the individual's increas­
ing focus upon the self.places it within the overall frame­
work. This focus, furthermore, becomes more and more involved 
with the concern for the presentation of self in an idealized 
way, in this literature. 
C. Wright Mills (1956), although basing his work on the 
Marxian model and method, extended the analysis of alienation 
more explicitly in the social-psychological direction to 
include ideal-self-preoccupation. Using Marx's idea of the 
"fetishism of commodities," Mills argued that in a capitalis­
tic society dominated by exchange relations, even one's per­
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sonality becomes a salable item and often determines the 
successful sale of other items. The individual salesperson 
begins to treat his own personality as a merchandisable 
commodity in the exchange. Such a process obviously brings 
about a greater self-consciousness and control over one's 
spontaneous impulses, and a concern with presenting the self 
in a certain light. 
Teaming up with Hans Gerth, Mills (1964) formulates a 
theory of motive that portrays the individual as extremely 
self-conscious and self-controlled. In their "vocabulary of 
motives," for example, the individual is portrayed as having 
this vocabulary readily available for the purpose of ex­
plaining his behavior to others in a socially acceptable way. 
This vocabulary of motive may or may not reflect his true 
motives. The control of impulse and its supplantation by 
rational, self-conscious control in an ideal way has here be­
come highly developed. 
Riesman's book (1977) also attempts to account for the 
increasing tendency of individuals to consciously control and 
monitor their own behavior and to present an ideal self. 
Riesman describes three stages of character development, each 
of which displays increasing levels of self-consciousness. 
Each type is related to developments of social structure. In 
the "tradition-directed" character type the individual acts 
in reference to a rather stable set of institutions, tradi­
tions and customs to which he has been rather thoroughly 
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socialized. When society changes, these customs no longer 
exist and the individual must rely on an inner set of prin­
ciples (the inner directed type) that guide him through the 
turmoil. The last stage, that of "other direction," is a 
state of heightened self-consciousness, presumably connected 
to bureaucratization, where personality becomes, as with 
Mills, a product to be sold. Instead of behaving with refer­
ence to an inner set of principles and ideals or to tradi­
tional norms and institutions, the individual adapts his 
behavior to the cues of others around him. To rise in 
status within bureaucracy, the individual's own personality 
and his adjustment to his peers are his most valuable assets. 
The result is a constant self-préoccupâtion and a prevalent 
attempt to direct one's behavior in accordance with the re­
quirement of the ideals of immediate contemporaries. 
In his book. The Organization Man, William H. Whyte 
(1957) has also aptly described a dominant, emerging character 
type that seems to be an adaptation to the growth of such 
large-scale bureaucratic structures. 
Whyte (1957:6) writes: 
When a young man says that to make a living 
these days you must do what somebody else 
wants you to do, he states it not only as 
a fact of life that must be accepted but 
as an inherently good proposition. If the 
American Dream deprecates this for him, it 
is the American Dream that is going to have 
to give, whatever its more elderly guardians 
may think. People grow restive with a myth­
ology that is too distant from the way things 
actually are, and as more and more lives 
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have been encompassed by the organization 
way of life, the pressures for an accom­
panying ideological shift have been 
mounting. The pressures of the group, 
the frustrations of individual creativity, 
the anonymity of achievement: are these 
defects to struggle against—or are they 
virtues in disguise? The Organization 
Man seeks a redefinition of his place on 
earth—a faith that will satisfy him that 
what he must endure has a deeper meaning 
than appears on the surface. He needs, in 
short, something that will do for him what 
the Protestant Ethic did once. And slowly, 
almost imperceptibly, a body of thought has 
been coalescing that does just that. 
Whyte refers to this body of thought as the "social 
ethic." Its function, as indicated in the previous quote, 
is to provide a definition of the self by which conduct may 
be carried out and self-fulfillment thus occur. Whyte 
(1957:7) writes further: 
By social ethic I mean that contemporary 
body of thought which makes morally legi­
timate the pressures of society against 
the individual. Its major propositions 
are three: a belief in the group as the 
source of creativity; a belief in "belong-
ingness" as the ultimate need of the in­
dividual; and a belief in the application 
of science to achieve this belongingness. 
Whyte's "Organization Man" would appear to be equatable 
with Riesman's "other directed" type and Mill's type who 
utilizes the vocabularies of motive. It appears also as the 
prototype of Goffman's individuals who seem to be preoccupied 
with self-presentation. 
It is Erving Goffman's (1959) work, indeed, that is the 
most detailed analysis of this constant preoccupation with 
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self. His work is not so much an attempt to account for the 
rise of such self-preoccupation, however, as to describe it 
in minute detail and to show its relation to social struc­
ture in face to face encounters. For Goffman, self-preoccu-
pation is taken as a starting point of analysis, but the 
fact that he does so, and the extent to which his theories 
have become quite influential, serve to underscore the fact 
of the prevalence of self-conscious manipulation and control 
of one's behavior. Goffman*s "dramaturgical" approach thus 
emphasizes the conscious management of impressions "given" 
as well as "given off" in the company of other persons and 
the "presentation of self" to these others. Goffman points 
out, furthermore, a connection, previously mentioned, be­
tween self-preoccupation and alienness. He writes (1959:237): 
. . .  t o  t h e  d e g r e e  t h a t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
maintains a show before others that he 
himself does not believe, he can come 
to experience a special kind of aliena­
tion from self and a special kind of 
wariness of others. 
Goffman (1959:236-237) quotes a college coed who says: 
I sometimes "play dumb" on dates, but it 
leaves a bad taste. The emotions are 
complicated. Part of me enjoys "putting 
something over" on the unsuspecting male. 
But this sense of superiority over him is 
mixed with feelings of guilt for my hypoc­
risy. Toward the "date" I feel some con­
tempt because he is "taken in" by my tech­
nique, or if I like the boy, a kind of 
maternal condescension. At times I resent 
him! Why isn't he my superior in all ways 
in which a man should excel so that I could 
be my natural self? What am I doing here 
with him, anyhow? Slumming? 
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This quotation indicates the girl's self-consciousness 
and her ambivalence about her own motives and behavior. She 
is aware of role requirements (her perceptions of girls being 
expected to be "dumber" than boys and boys being therefore 
superior) but she is also aware of the stereotypic nature 
of these norms and that in actual interaction they break down. 
Her normatively imputed self (her ideal self) is not ful­
filled in the actualization of it and her consciousness is 
focused upon her own feelings and behavior. Her self, in 
that moment, has become objectified, and its definition has 
to be renegotiated. She indicates this process by referring 
to her "natural self." 
This alienation from oneself, as Goffman phrases it, 
i.e., of being an outside observer of one's own behavior, such 
as an actor's must be while on stage, is the especially 
salient aspect of the alienated state as has already been 
said. On the other hand, the feeling that one is merely per­
forming, and, concomitantly that one's actions are not one's 
"own," is not an inevitable outcome of modal self-conscious­
ness, though it may often accompany it. I shall have more 
to say about this aspect of alienness later. 
Don Martindale's study (1966) of the impact of the 
growth of large-scale organizations on society is another 
outstanding attempt to deal with the modern preoccupation 
with self. It goes further in theoretical formulations, how­
ever, in that it relates self to society by positing specific 
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character types with specific community configurations. It 
also provides a theory of the formation of the community 
within which these character types emerge. Martindale 
(1966:543) writes: "Social Behavioristic theory assumes 
that personality, like human society, is a social creation. 
The same absence of instinctive commitments of behavior 
which delivered society into man's own hands simultaneously 
delivered his own nature to his own construction." Martin-
dale sees community formation as a process of the gradual 
emergence of "instrumental" institutions as solutions to 
collective problems. Such institutions occur primarily in 
three areas of collective life: mastery of nature, social 
control and socialization. When the institutions in each of 
these areas become stable, consistent, and complete with 
respect to one another, a community is formed that provides 
a total way of life for the people. A community forms a 
complex set of institutions that tend to create relatively 
specific character types from which men draw their self-
ideals . 
The earliest form of community according to Martindale 
was the tribe,^ based on hunting and gathering. Its charac­
ter type was what Martindale refers to as the "Tribesman," 
i.e. a relatively specific set of character traits linked to 
^Actually, the earliest form is known, more technically, 
as a band (see Chapter VI). 
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the roles available to individuals in the tribal community. 
Villages based on agriculture arose next, then cities based 
on trade. Each of these, too, produced its distinct charac­
ter types. Ancient civilization arose as cities became 
imperial empires or states. Cities or imperial states then 
began to decline but cities per se were to reemerge somewhat 
during the end of the medieval period. Martindale writes 
that with the decline of the City-States during the medieval 
period "... three major types of rural subsistence communi­
ties took shape concomitantly with the disappearance of 
ancient society. These rural subsistence societies were: 
manorial communities to sustain the pursuit of religious 
values; peasant villages; and manorial communities consisting 
of one or more peasant villages reduced to a condition of 
serfdom for the sustenance of a conquest stratum of landlord 
knights." According to Martindale each of these three 
communities produced distinctive character types in the monk, 
the peasant and the knight. The autonomous city community, 
too, when it reemerged, formed its particular character types 
in what Martindale refers to as the "humanistic" and the 
"religious" types, i.e., the "man of taste" and the "man of 
conscience" respectively (Martindale, 1966:548-549). 
The relevance of Martindale's formulations to the theory 
of alienation is that these character types become the 
generalized self-ideals typical of their accompanying commu­
nity forms and of certain segments or classes within these 
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communities. As such, each type becomes a reference for each 
individual's self-expression or presentation, a model for the 
development of selfhood. Each type, furthermore, is particu­
larly fitted to its particular social milieu, is, in fact, a 
product of it. Martindale casts the crisis of alienation in 
terms of this relationship. He writes: "One fundamental 
source of contemporary man's sense of lost identity has been 
the decay of the religious and humanistic personality types, 
while they have been retained as ideals of authentic self­
hood" (1966:555). And, further: "Contemporary man's individ­
uality is in crisis partly because he takes his personality 
ideals from traditions that no longer correspond to his life 
conditions, and he has not yet made a satisfactory transition 
to the new forms of individuality required by the large-scale 
organization" (1966:560). 
In an insightful passage, Martindale (1966:651) points 
out the relationship of man's contemporary crisis of "self-
estrangement" to social structure: 
It is sometimes difficult to ascertain 
which precipitates the deeper crisis, 
the sudden contraction or the sudden ex­
pansion of the scope of individuality. 
A major expansion invariably means that 
collectively defined channels of behavior 
have disappeared. To many persons this 
is a chilling experience, as if they had 
suddenly been transported to an uncharted 
wilderness. They are lost, bewildered, 
perhaps even terrified by the experience. 
The sudden narrowing of the scope of in­
dividuality, on the other hand, has the 
properties of a virtual imprisonment. 
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Taking up the theme of these earlier writings, the 
authors of the most recent sociological analysis of the 
phenomenon have labeled American culture as "narcissistic," 
implying that self-consciousness has been carried to an ex­
treme. In his widely acclaimed book, Christopher Lasch 
(1979:32) writes: 
Studies of personality disorders that 
occupy the borderline between neurosis 
and psychosis, though written for clini­
cians and making no claims to shed light 
on social or cultural issues, depict a 
type of personality that ought to be 
immediately recognizable, in a more sub­
dued form, to observers of the contem­
porary cultural scene: facile at manag­
ing the impressions he gives to others, 
ravenous for admiration but contemptuous 
of those he manipulates into providing 
it; unappeasably hungry for emotional 
experiences with which to fill an inner 
void; terrified of aging and death. 
Here, again, we meet with the other-directed type of 
Riesman, the user of vocabularies of motive of Girth and 
Mills, the Organization Man of Whyte, and the self-presenter 
of Goffman. To Lasch he is the "narcissist," the empty man 
in search of something he can't define, absorbed with himself. 
How does Lasch account for the rise of narcissism? Ac­
cording to him it ". . . derives from quite specific changes 
in our society and culture—from bureaucracy, the prolifera­
tion of images, therapeutic ideologies, the rationalization 
of the inner life, the cult of consumption, and in the last 
analysis from changes in family life and from changing pat­
terns of socialization" (1979:74). But the most telling 
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causal variable of all, according to Lasch, is a diminished 
expectation that the future holds improvement. He writes; 
"Having no hope of improving their lives in any of the ways 
that matter, people have convinced themselves that what 
matters is psychic self-improvement: getting in touch with 
their feelings, eating health food, taking lessons in ballet 
or belly dancing, immersing themselves in the wisdom of the 
East, jogging, learning how to 'relate,' overcoming the fear 
of pleasure" (1979:29). 
Lasch thus introduces a host of concepts to account for 
the rise of self-absorption, most of them being those already 
mentioned by other writers, but one of them new. Since Lasch 
writes discursively it is sometimes difficult to ascertain 
exactly what is meant by these concepts and how he sees them 
as related, but by a "proliferation of images" he apparently 
means the increased use of advertisement to portray certain 
ideals and to the personality-selling techniques emphasized 
by writers like Mills, Riesman, and Whyte. Thus, like bureau­
cracy, rationalization, and consumption (translated loosely 
as Marx's "Fetishism of Commodities"), this variable is not 
new. Neither are Lasch's references to changes in family and 
socialization new, though, like other writers, he fails to 
specify what specific changes he is referring to. Lasch's 
contribution to the attempt to account for the rise of nar­
cissism in American society thus introduces only one new 
variable, that of diminishing expectations for the future. 
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Since the future offers no hope, there is, apparently, only 
the recourse of focusing upon the here and now and upon one's 
self. 
Another sociologist, Edwin Schurr (1977) deals with the 
rise of self-preoccupation, but only attempts to account for 
it in a tangential fashion since his main concern is to warn 
against such self-absorption and its related therapies as a 
diversion from the attempt to deal with the problems of 
modern society realistically. Schurr seems to argue that 
such self-absorption is primarily a phenomenon occurring 
among the affluent who have time for it. 
This kind of self-absorption is not, however, the kind 
that I am dealing with in this study, which has as its most 
distinguishing mark a modal self-consciousness and contra­
distinction of the self and the attempt to live up to and 
defend an idealized image. It is difficult to see how mere 
affluency can account for these particular features, so 
apparently widespread in contemporary society. It is this 
particular component of alienation that is caught up in all 
the various "dimensions" terms of empirical alienation theory 
such as self-estrangement, isolation, meaninglessness, norm-
lessness, powerlessness, etc., to which we now turn. 
The social psychological literature 
Unlike the writers of the classical and neoclassical 
vein, certain contemporary sociologists have been primarily 
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concerned with operationalizing the alienness concept as a 
psychological state and making it researchable. Most of this 
writing stems from the work of Seeman (1959), whose work, in 
turn, is drawn primarily from Marx and Durkheim. 
Seeman views the term "alienation" as referring to a 
psychological state and defines this state as an individual's 
subjective feeling of powerlessness, meaninglessness, norm-
lessness, isolation and self-estrangement. This definition 
of alienation as a multi-dimensional phenomenon has occupied 
a host of writers who have attempted to establish the rela­
tionships between these dimensions, in the process either re­
jecting the scientific utility of the concept (Israel, 1971: 
259), or elevating certain dimensions to prominence over the 
others, or eliminating certain dimensions entirely, etc. 
These attempts involve the construction, usually, of state­
ments on questionnaires or interviews to which individuals 
are asked to respond. Statistical techniques of various 
sorts are then used to analyze these responses and to test 
for common factors, scalability, etc. 
When these attempts are not strictly definitional they 
are sometimes also connected to the more truly sociological 
endeavor to discover the social and cultural conditions that 
give rise to these subjective states. The work of Blauner 
(1964), Goldthorpe (1966), and Mizruchi (1961) are represen­
tative of this kind of work. 
A complete review of this type of literature is not con­
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sidered necessary at this point since Seeman's (1975:115) 
own review and summary is sufficient. Seeman concludes his 
review and reiterates what he believes to be the major 
problem remaining as follows: 
There is perhaps no better way to conclude 
this review than by a return to the issue 
of the unity of the so-called dimensions 
of alienation, for that issue generates a 
continuing empirical and theoretical de­
bate. The "empirical cluster or 'aliena­
tion syndrome'" described by Keniston 
(1968:327 ff) includes all the variants 
discussed above, while others, as we 
have seen, find the absence, the modesty, 
and the situational specificity of the 
interconnections of these alienations 
impressive. Some of this difference in 
viewpoint is a direct function of method­
ological differences, but some of it, too, 
is a matter of philosophy of science and 
of theory. Thus, the dimensions discussed 
above become the instigation of a steady 
search for a better grounded theory of 
alienation (e.g., Sevigny, 1969; Geyer, 
1974), one that can rationalize more satis­
factorily why these six categories have 
emerged, what ties them together, and how 
their sources and consequences should be 
conceived. Despite Marx and the modern 
exegesis inherited from his work, such a 
theory remains only a prospect for the 
future. (Italics mine.) 
Summarization of the Literature 
The overall theory of alienation as comprised of these 
various studies, both sociological and social-psychological, 
may thus be summarized very generally as follows: 
Alienation occurs via a disruption and change (primarily 
economic in origin) in the structure of society through 
which people are socially, culturally and psychically bound 
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together. In this view, of which Marx's is exemplary, soci­
ety becomes "atomized" into a "mass" of solitary, depersonal­
ized, powerless individuals, each pursuing his or her own 
goals. This mass, furthermore, coheres on the basis of an 
"organic solidarity," while moral anomie abounds. Individuals 
become related to one another in vast, impersonal, rational 
bureaucracies, as other-directed, organizational men, and 
treat one another and themselves as categories, numbers and 
commodities in a monetarized marketplace. Work, and even 
leisure, become only a means to conspicuous consumption in a 
rat race to the illusory top, all of which is basically mean­
ingless. History and tradition fades, becomes irrelevant, as 
does the future. The now generation does its own thing. A 
kind of rampant focusing of consciousness upon the self pre­
vails, a cult of self-exploration and narcissism develops. 
Man's selfhood, said to be anchored in and nurtured by social 
relations, is purported to be in grave states, for society no 
longer sustains it as a stable configuration. Man is now 
said to be an actor of roles in which spontaneity is negated 
and replaced by self-conscious control and direction of be­
havior in accordance with an idealized self-conception. 
In his own review, Martindale (1966:561) has written: 
Ih their various ways, Riesman, Gerth and 
Mills, and Goffman have rejected both the 
religious and the humanistic views of man 
and the theories that account for them. 
They presuppose a world of large scale or­
ganizations concerned with the individual's 
external characteristic but indifferent to 
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his inner being. In various ways they all 
insist that contemporary man is a sort of 
hollow shell: in place of shame or guilt, 
the operation of diffuse anxiety (Riesman); 
instead of being viewed as the mainsprings 
of action, motives are treated as "vocabu­
laries" operative in strategies of deceit 
(Girth and Mills); conscience and taste 
are not found in man's nature, only in 
appearances of morality (Goffman). 
The hypothesis that the world of large-
scale organization has introduced a major 
crisis in contemporary man's self-concep­
tion and the theories of personality seems 
to be overwhelmingly confirmed. 
Contrasted to this view of man in the modernized, or 
gesellschaft, society and culture, is that of man in the tra­
ditional, folk, or gemeinschaft society and culture. Here, 
social relationships are primary and personal. Social cohe­
sion is based on a "mechanical solidarity." Moral norms are 
intact in a stable culture and people are related socially 
rather than economically. The individual exists fundamentally 
as an integral part of a group, his own consciousness being 
practically coincidental with the collective consciousness. 
History is the extension of time and tradition backward 
through the individual's ancestors; and the future is the 
extension of time and tradition forward through his off­
spring. The individual is not an atom in a mass pursuing his 
own needs irrespective of others but is implicated firmly in 
a stable social structure, giving him a sense of meaning, 
place and direction, both in time and space. The individual 
and his society are essentially one, each a facet of the other. 
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Problems Remaining in the 
Field of Alienation Studies 
Although the literature reviewed serves as an important 
fund of ideas and propositions which will be incorporated in 
this study, there are several major problems in this litera­
ture that remain to be worked out. I shall list these prob­
lems first as problems of theory and secondly as the problem 
of historical substantiation of the theory. 
One major problem to emerge from the analysis of the 
literature within the framework is the complete lack of any 
description or conceptualization of the initial state of 
identity or of the primary identification/alienation process. 
As indicated, my conceptualization of identification/aliena­
tion is one of the processes by which the individual becomes 
bonded to or separated psychologically from others. In my 
view, this process begins early in life—at birth, in fact— 
and continues into late adolescence. This view is basically 
different from that presented in the majority of sociological 
literature. As my coadvisor. Professor Robert Richards, has 
stated: ". . .to emphasize the fragmentation of modern 
life which confronts adults to be the essential source of 
such a personality characteristic as (alienness)—as most 
literature does—flies in the face of all contemporary so­
cial-psychological knowledge about the importance of primary 
socialization in character formation. . . ." 
The overriding need here as I see it is to describe the 
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initial state of identity and the primary identification/ 
alienation processes as fully as possible.^ This description 
will serve to counter the emphasis on adult alienation and 
alienness in the literature (with the exception of some 
writers but Erik Erikson especially) and, in addition, 
will provide a characterization of the original state of the 
individual's consciousness out of which the self is gradually 
differentiated. Such a characterization will provide a basis 
upon which to contrast the states of secondary identity and 
alienness in later life. Although it is probably technically 
improper to speak of an original state of "identity" from 
which the individual is alienated—because to do so would 
presuppose an objective self-consciousness—it technically 
necessary to presume some prior state out of which alienation 
or identification may proceed (Schacht, 1970:258). I have 
called such a state "subjective consciousness" to contrast it 
with the objective consciousness of the secondary phase of 
alienation. Such a state, as I hope to show, provides a 
valuable ideal-typical contrast to the states that follow it. 
A second major problem addressed is the problem of de­
scription of the identification/alienation process during 
It is necessary to avoid confusion in terminology 
here, however, to point out that I do not equate primary nor 
secondary identifieation/alienation with primary and second­
ary socialization. I use "primary" and "secondary" to denote 
stages in the alienation process and not to the different 
loci of socialization. 
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childhood. Like the process of identification/alienation in 
infancy, there is an almost absolute absence of attention to 
this secondary alienation process, qua process, in the alien­
ation literature. Certain steps in this regard have been 
taken by Twining (1980) though I believe he errs in several 
ways. Twining's efforts are helpful, however, in that they 
at least point out the problem and, in addition, provide an 
important contribution by way of centering the alienation 
process upon the self-society dynamic. It is in the way in 
which the self-other difference continues to develop after 
primary alienation that offers the key to the understanding 
of the alienation process in its overall sense. Secondary 
alienation is that phase of the process in which self-con­
sciousness becomes modal and the self-concept forms in 
contradistinction to others. Secondary identification is 
the phase of the process by which the self-concept converges 
with others. The task of describing the identification/ 
alienation process during childhood, of isolating the social-
psychological dynamics involved, is a second major task of 
this study. 
A third major problem is the description and conceptual­
ization of the resulting states of alienness, as well as of 
identity. This problem is the one which has been most 
addressed by contemporary sociologists but only on the alien­
ness side. Beginning with the seminal work of Seeman (1959), 
alienness as a psychological state was described as consisting 
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of several dimensions of powerlessness, meaninglessness, 
normlessness, isolation and self-estrangement. As indicated 
in the review of literature, however, the problem of descrip­
tion remains, primarily because of the inability to theoretic­
ally or empirically tie the various dimensions together. Ex­
cept as it exists implicitly the state of identity has been 
totally ignored. 
The problem of tying the various dimensions of alienness 
together continues to exist, I believe, as a result of a 
rather fundamental confusion of these dimensions with alien­
ness itself. In my own view these "feelings" or "expecta­
tions" (powerlessness, normlessness, etc.) are separate and 
distinct from the concept of alienness per se ; they point to 
different things. However, it is my contention that these 
feelings can be shown to be logically and causally related to 
alienness as derivatives of it. Thus, while they are not 
alienness per se they are among the most frequent products 
of alienness and, even though the distinction between these 
and alienness must be kept intact, it is perfectly permiss-
able to continue to refer to them as an alienness "syndrome." 
The description of the way in which these feelings form a 
system, with an inner coherency formed around alienness, 
along with the description of the state of identity, will be 
a major effort in this study. 
A fourth major problem is the isolation, in a full, 
clear and direct fashion, of the structural causes of alien­
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ation. While the classical writers have provided us with 
invaluable insights into the possible ways in which a change 
from traditional society to modern society alienates people 
from one another, there is still a great need for the speci­
fication of the variables and of the explication of their 
causal relations. 
For a quick summary of the structural causes explicated 
in the literature reviewed, the reader is referred to Table 1. 
As is shown, Marx's theory has provided the initial impetus 
and major framework for sociology in this respect. Yet 
there are several major difficulties with this framework, 
stemming primarily from its emphasis upon economic structure 
as the cause of and the arena for alienation. More specif­
ically, these difficulties stem primarily from Marx's assump­
tions of the importance of the productive process to the self-
expression of the individual. 
Marx's claim is that man fulfills himself through "pro­
ductive activity," i.e., he objectifies himself and repro­
duces himself in his labor and in the "reappropriation" of 
its product. It is upon this claim that Marx's theory is 
often labeled "essentialist." This essentialist idea of the 
nature of man, however, presents several difficulties. 
The first major difficulty is that such a view seems to 
unnecessarily eliminate much human activity as a context for 
alienation. Of course, Marx's use of the concept of "pro­
ductive activity" is very broad and he allows the term to 
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Table 1. A list of the structural causes of the rise of 
self-preoccupation, by author 
Structural 
Author cause Effect 
Karl Marx (1963) 
Max Weber (1964), 
Karl Mannheim (1970), 
Erik Erikson (1963) 
Institutional­
ized private 
property 
Competitive 
capitalism/ra­
tionalization 
Georg Simmel (1950) Money economy 
Emile Ourkheim (1964) 
C. W. Mills (1956), 
David Riesman (1977), 
William Whyte (1957) 
Don Martindale (1966) 
Division of 
labor 
Salesmanship, 
growth of bu­
reaucracy 
Lack of corres­
pondence between 
traditional per­
sonality-ideals 
and the reality 
of Big Organiza­
tion 
Divides society into 
worker and capitalist 
and renders each in­
dividual a competitor 
with others 
Sets men against one 
another in pursuit of 
profit/extends to a 
, self-rationalization 
imposed upon the nat­
ural developmental 
cycles 
Produces emotional 
neutrality in social 
relations 
Reduces cultural shar­
ing, promotes differ­
ence, anomie 
Promotes the use of 
one's own personality 
as a selling tool, 
thus heightens self-
consciousness 
Promotes self-dis­
illusionment and a 
sense of crisis in 
self-conceptions 
Christopher Lasch 
(1979) 
Loss of'sense of 
history; dimin­
ished expecta­
tions for the 
future 
Psychological focus 
upon the here and now 
and the self 
Edwin Schur (1977) Material afflu- Allows more time to 
ency address to self 
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refer to any activity, in any context, which yields a product. 
Still, such activities as those occurring in play, games, 
sports, entertainment, religion, politics, family, etc., 
would apparently be ruled out. 
But self-fulfillment doesn't depend on productive ac­
tivity alone. The actualization of self occurs in and 
through any activity and thus self-fulfillment, or conversely 
self-disillusionment, may take place accordingly. Indeed, as 
I shall later show, self-fulfillment or seIf-disillusionment 
may occur not only by overt activity but by covert comparison 
of the individual's self with others as well. 
A second difficulty arising from Marx's emphasis on 
productive activity is that it is allowed to explain too much. 
It is difficult to agree, for example, that the alienation of 
labor and its product can have the array of effects presented 
by Seeman in his alienness syndrome, i.e., normlessness, 
powerlessness, etc. To attribute all these effects to a loss 
of ownership or control of one's labor and product is to in­
vest this activity with tremendous importance to the indi­
vidual. There is no doubt that productive activity is im­
portant to the individual's seIf-actualization, but it just 
doesn't seem to be capable of producing such results from a 
logical point of view. Such a view would, for instance, 
apparently rule out the Freudian notion of "sublimation" 
and the notion of how the whole of society can rest upon 
this defense mechanism. To make this claim is once again to 
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appeal to an essentialist notion of man. Again, productive 
activity is only a part of activity in general. Man shapes 
himself in all activity. Productive activity's importance 
to him will vary with the degree to which his society utili­
zes such activity as a measurement of his self. It is the 
damage to the self incurred through its disillusionment in ac­
tualization general that accounts for the complex psycho­
logical effects listed by Seeman. 
A third major difficulty inherent in the Marxian frame­
work, and one which follows from the above, is that it 
restricts alienation and alienness to the adulthood phase of 
human life since it is only during this phase of the life 
cycle, ordinarily, that productive activity occurs, at least 
in the sense in which Marx seemed to intend. In doing this, 
however, the Marxian framework must assume an "over-social­
ized" conception of man (homo-sociologicus) and to thus 
impart to him a higher degree of malleability and suscepti­
bility to social structure than is probably warranted. Such 
a conception fails to take account of the fact that character 
structure, once formed, is a deeply imbedded system of 
traits and as such possesses a certain autonomy, independence, 
and dynamic of its own quite apart from social structure. The 
omission of the conceptualization of character-structure and 
of a theory of its development has been pointed out as one of 
the more serious weaknesses in the Marxian framework (Oilman, 
1976). This same criticism is implied by Mills (1956) when 
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he points out that the alienating effect of capitalistic 
labor presumes an ideal of labor in the mind of the worker, 
one that resembles that of the artisan in the crafts and 
guilds of medieval society, against which he compares his 
actual working conditions. It is questionable whether such 
an ideal exists among workers who have never known it, again 
signifying the importance of character structure and its 
formation. 
For all these reasons, the structural causes of aliena­
tion as being located in economic institutions, and in the 
other institutional areas indicated in Table 1, has to be 
rejected. Alienness as a deeply imbedded psychological trait 
is not merely a situational response; it is a complex syn­
drome of traits and dimensions that starts early in character 
formation and is formed over a period of time. If this is 
true then the possible areas of structural causes of aliena­
tion and alienness must be expanded beyond the economic to 
include other institutional areas. Character structure is a 
result of the interaction process beginning as early as in­
fancy and continuing through childhood and adolescence. It 
is, for the most part, formed by adulthood. Such a view 
places the structural causes of alienation, not in the 
economic institution, but primarily in that of the family. 
A whole new area is thus opened up in the attempt to account 
for the structural causes of alienation and alienness and the 
family takes center stage. A major question then arises as 
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to how the family does this and to how, or whether, aliena­
tion in the family is produced by structural factors outside 
it. As I have already said, this is an entirely different 
approach than traditionally taken in the field of sociology. 
If economic and other institutional factors (such as the po­
litical) do play a part in alienation, then it is through 
their indirect effects on the institution of the family and 
thus upon the individual only in an approximate way. But the 
description of such a causal process remains essentially to be 
done and this is a major problem area addressed in this study. 
These four major problems pose themselves first as 
problems of theory and they must be clarified. The task 
ahead is to first describe the initial state of identity and 
the succeeding processes of identification and alienation be­
ginning at birth and moving through an infancy phase within 
which the self becomes differentiated, and then through a 
childhood phase in which the self is more or less fully con­
ceptualized, either as identical to others or contradistinc-
tive to them. We must further describe the ultimate states 
resulting from these processes and, finally, we must theoret­
ically specify and isolate the structural causes of aliena­
tion. 
The problem of historical substantiation of the theory 
Once these problems of theory are worked out, however, 
the problem of the substantiation of the theory arises. Thus, 
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another major effort in this study will be to attempt an em­
pirical grounding of certain key propositions. The major 
proposition, as indicated, taken over from the classical 
and neoclassical literature, is that modern society and its 
structure, whether through economic or other social change, 
brings about the alienating process. Are there, in fact, 
different degrees or incidences of alienness in modern socie­
ties as compared to traditional societies? This is a key 
proposition which, if false, seriously discredits the theory. 
This and other key propositions, to be introduced in Part Two, 
must be selected and confirmed or disconfirmed. 
Organization of the Study 
Both of these problem areas, that of constructing a 
clear and detailed theory of alienation and then empirically 
substantiating, the theory, are addressed in this study. 
The present study is thus divided into two major parts 
addressing these problems. Part Two presents a social-
psychological theory of alienation. Although the tentative 
descriptions given in Part One, Chapter I, serve to present 
this theory in outline form, it seems necessary nevertheless 
to present a fuller version of the total range of concepts, 
variables and their relations, and to seek to tie the various 
propositions together more extensively in order to address the 
problems remaining. The theory overall is presented in 
Chapters III through VI. Chapter III addresses the problem 
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of the description of the original state of subjective 
identity and of the primary phase of identification and 
alienation. Chapter IV describes the secondary phase of 
identification/alienation and the state of secondary identity. 
It also describes the alternate state of alienness. Chapter 
V further describes the state of alienness as a "syndrome" 
of traits that emanate from the feeling of self-difference 
and contradistinction. This chapter seeks to tie the seem­
ingly otherwise disparate dimensions of Seeman's alienation 
syndrome together into a coherent and dynamic system. Chapter 
VI addresses the problem of the isolation of the socio-
structural causes of the alienation process. Here, the so­
cial-psychological process of alienation is tied to the struc­
ture of the larger society. 
Part Three of the study is a cross-cultural examina­
tion of the theory and is presented in Chapters VII through 
VIII. Chapter VII presents comparative data on three varia­
bles in eight societies ordered according to structural com­
plexity. These data are presented to examine and substan­
tiate three key hypotheses drawn from the theoretical system 
presented in Part Two. Chapter VIII analyzes these data. 
Part Four summarizes and concludes the study. 
72 
PART TWO: 
TOWARD 
A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 
OF ALIENATION 
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CHAPTER III: 
IDENTIFICATION AND ALIENATION IN INFANCY: 
THE PRIMARY PHASE 
As indicated in Chapter I there are two main stages or 
phases of the identification/alienation process; the primary 
and secondary. The primary stage coincides with the infancy 
period of the life-cycle, while the secondary stage coincides 
with childhood and adolescence, and extends perhaps even into 
adulthood. The subject of this chapter is the primary stage. 
The primary stage of identification/alienation consists 
essentially of the differentiation of subjective self-con-
sciousness into objective self-consciousness along with the 
concomitant formation of certain emotional states as modali­
ties of the personality. The emergence of the objective self 
inevitably separates the individual cognitively and concep­
tually from his environment, but if this separation is ac­
companied by emotional security, a feeling of alienness from 
others will not likely develop. If self-differentiation is 
accompanied by emotional insecurity, however, then the de­
velopment of a feeling of alienness likely. 
Developing concomitantly with the self-as-object, these 
emotional modalities predispose the individual to alienness 
from others or identity with them. The emotion of fear of 
others or of anxiety in their presence, i.e., the experience 
of insecurity, is the forerunner of the state of alienness 
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for it brings on an increasing control of the subjective self 
by the objective self which is the basis for the contradis­
tinction element of the self to develop later. The primary 
stage of the identification/alienation process is thus the 
foundation upon which alienness is built since it not only 
establishes the initial distinction between the self and 
others but, in addition, establishes the basis upon which the 
development of a contradistinction between the self and 
others may develop. 
In this chapter, I shall describe as much as possible 
the initial state of consciousness of the infant; that is, 
I shall describe the state of subjective consciousness from 
which the objective self becomes differentiated. Such a 
description is essential as an ideal-type with which to com­
pare the objective consciousness of alienness later in this 
study. Next, I will discuss the primary alienation process 
in which subjective self-consciousness is being transformed 
into objective self-consciousness accompanied by the emer­
gence of emotional insecurity. Following this, I shall dis­
cuss the primary identification process. In both of these 
discussions the emphasis shall be on how negative and positive 
sanctions and their concomitant experiences of self-fulfill­
ment or self-disillusionment become the basis upon which 
alienation may proceed further into childhood and a contra­
distinction of the self may develop. 
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The Psychic Identity of the Infant 
and Others; Subjective Consciousness 
"Subjective consciousness" refers to a state of con­
sciousness wherein the self as an object to consciousness has 
not emerged. Indeed, it refers to a state of consciousness 
in which a subject-object dichotomy does not exist at all. 
In this state of consciousness, the individual does not make a 
distinction between himself and his environment in an "object" 
sense. Thus, he exists in a kind of psychic unity with his 
environment in which his consciousness simply mirrors, or 
maps, this environment directly. 
To understand the alienation process in its most funda­
mental sense, i.e., as the breaking of this original psychic 
unity, the subjective consciousness state must be described 
as much as is possible. In the discussion that follows, the 
reader is referred to Figure 4. This figure represents the 
phases of consciousness characteristic of the state of sub­
jective consciousness. I shall comment briefly upon each 
phase. 
First, I take subjective consciousness to include as its 
major component the various modes of sensitivity of a living 
organism to the stimuli of its environment. "Environment" 
here refers to any surrounding context of the nervous system, 
including the organism's own body exclusive of the nervous 
system. Subjective consciousness in this usage is like the 
ray of a flashlight illuminating or "picking out" aspects of 
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the environment. In actuality, living organisms possess 
differential modes of sensitivity in various combinations 
rather than a single visual one. Hence, an organism may 
experience, or is conscious of, the stimuli of the external 
world through its various complements of visual, tactile, 
auditory, olefactory and gustatory sensitivities according 
to its level of phylogeny. Human subjective consciousness 
apprehends the external world in all these sensory modes. 
These sensory modes are themselves only the "raw data," 
however, the punctate sensory "impressions" received from the 
external world. Subjective consciousness is also a perceptual 
consciousness, i.e., a consciousness of form wherein the punc­
tate impressions are "assembled" into or registered as pattern 
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Figure 4. Phases of Subjective Consciousness 
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or design or gestalt. Forms, patterns, designs or gestalts 
are products of both the innate sensory/perceptual apparatus 
of the organism (Merleau-Ponty, 1967) and of learning. Sen­
sation and perception are thus closely related, i.e., occur 
more or less simultaneously, so that it is best to treat them 
as unitary phenomena, which I shall do in this study. Percep­
tion in this usage, then, refers to the "organization" of 
sensations into patterns, forms, or gestalts. 
A single pattern or form perceived by the organism we 
shall call a "percept." Percepts are psychological "units" 
derived from the external flux of the environment. Percepts, 
in turn, comprise the larger psychological unit of "image," 
a term which I shall use to denote the total perceptual field 
of the organism at any given time, and which includes all the 
sensory modes. Images are neural reproductions of the sen­
sory-perceptual field and its component percepts by the 
organism within its nervous system. The organism's con­
sciousness, therefore, is a map or mirror of its environment, 
registered as images in the nervous system. 
The mapping of the environment in the form of images 
is basically of two types: short-term and long-term. The 
retention in memory of an image for only a brief period after 
the stimulation is often referred to as the "after-image." 
However, images may be stored for somewhat longer or, indeed, 
much longer, periods of time in "long-term" memory, and thus 
become more or less permanent features of the nervous system. 
78 
These more or less permanently stored images may be "recol­
lected" in consciousness but until then they are not con­
sidered as part of it. 
When an organism recalls or recollects (brings into con­
sciousness) stored images as means of associating a stimulus 
with a response, the process is referred to as "apperception" 
(Fancher, 1979). This process of apperception will be con­
trasted later with cognition. Apperception, in my view, is 
a phase of "mental chronometry" which precedes cognition and 
utilizes images only, as opposed to symbolic representations. 
These images, as said, consist of the percepts, which consist 
in turn of the sensory impressions received during any 
initial experience, including the emotions and behavioral 
responses of the organism to this experience at the time of 
occurrence. They are recalled to consciousness usually by 
the reoccurrence of the original situation in which they were 
initially formed, and the "successful" response emitted at 
that time is then repeated. 
Figure 4 also shows emotion to be a component of sub­
jective consciousness. By "emotion" I am referring to 
phenomena indicated by such terms as fear, anger, grief, joy, 
etc. These emotions enter the individual's consciousness 
as concomitants of his sensory-perceptual and apperceptual 
experiences. They also feed into the behavioral response 
and may act as an additional motivational force. I say "may" 
and "additional" because it seems to me theoretically possible 
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(although quite rare in human behavior) for a behavioral 
response to occur without emotion, i.e., purely as a sensory-
motor reflex or even as a more complex cognitive motor form 
based solely on sensational stimuli. By emotion, too, I am 
referring to more primitive feeling states of the organism 
than is connoted by such terms as patriotism, pride, revenge, 
etc. To me, these latter terms refer to feelings that are 
only possible for man as a self-aware member of a culture 
bearing society. This, however, is an idea which I shall 
develop later. 
Subjective consciousness is also a consciousness of the 
behavioral response, i.e., a kinesthetic sense. By behavior­
al response I refer to the purely motor activity of the 
organism: running, jumping, biting, scratching, kicking, 
etc. Once emitted, these too become part of subjective con­
sciousness, fed back into subjective consciousness as sen­
sation and perception, and the process begins again as a 
continuous cycle in this way. 
Aside from these "contents" of subjective consciousness, 
we may conceive of it in other ways also. Thus, another 
aspect of subjective consciousness, related to this con­
tinuous cycling process, is that it is like a stream. For 
as the organism moves it shifts its sensory and perceptual 
fields. At the same time, the environment itself changes. 
Thus, the content of consciousness is always a flux of images 
and their component percepts, as well as the concomitant 
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emotions (if any), being quickly shunted through and away, 
others retained a little longer. The percepts within these 
images may exist only on the "periphery" of consciousness, 
while others are at its center. Other percepts may be vivid 
and clear while others are "pale" and "vague." 
When a particular percept of consciousness is held for 
a time, is particularly vivid and is centrally "located," it 
is common to speak of such a percept as being in the focus 
of "attention" of the organism, or of the organism as being 
in a certain "attitude" or "orientation" toward the percept. 
Consciousness thus also hafe a selectivity aspect and the term 
is often used in this sense, e.g., to be conscious of some­
thing or to be unconscious of something means that we have 
focused our attention upon it. The selectivity dimension of 
consciousness provides a central function over the organism's 
behavioral responses. That is, operating through the atten­
tion mechanism, consciousness selects its stimuli, inhibits 
"inappropriate," and releases "appropriate" responses to 
these stimuli (Mead, 1972:173). 
We may further describe subjective seIf-consciousness 
then as a form characterized by an unbroken stream of sensa­
tions, perceptions and images; "unbroken," that is, in the 
sense of this stream being a continuous, multiphasic, uni­
directional, irreversible process, rather than a series of 
discrete, bidirectional experiences. 
These qualities are brought out by Schutz (1967:45), 
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who, borrowing from Bergson, conceptualizes the dureë, which 
I take to be equivalent to subjective consciousness, as 
follows : 
Let us begin by considering Bergson's 
distinction between living within the 
stream of experience and living within 
the world of time. Bergson contrasts 
the inner stream of duration, the 
dureë—a continuous coming-to-be and 
passing-away of heterogeneous quali­
ties—with homogeneous time, which has 
been spatialized, quantified, and ren­
dered discontinuous. In "pure duration" 
there is no "side-by-sidedness," no 
mutual externality of parts, and no 
divisibility, but only a continuous 
flux, a stream of conscious states. 
Schutz (1967:47) states further; 
. . . when I immerse myself in my 
stream of consciousness, in my duration, 
I do not find any clearly differentiated 
experience at all. At one moment an ex­
perience waxes, then it wanes. Meanwhile 
something new grows out of what was some­
thing old and then gives place to some­
thing still newer. I cannot distinguish 
between the now and the earlier, between 
the later now and the now that has just 
been, except that I know that what has 
just been is different from what now is. 
For I experience my duration as a uni­
directional, irreversible stream and 
find that between a moment ago and just 
now I have grown older. 
Describing the dureë further, Schutz (1967:51) states 
also that: 
Within the flow of duration there is 
o n l y  a  l i v i n g  f r o m  m o m e n t  t o  m o m e n t  . . . .  
Then, as Husserl says, I live my acts 
.... From the point of view of being 
immersed in duration, the now is a phase 
rather than a point, and therefore the 
different phases melt into one another 
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along a continuum. The simple experi­
ence of living in the flow of duration 
goes forward in a unidirectional, ir­
reversible movement, proceeding from 
manifold to manifold in a constant run­
ning off process. Each phase of exper­
ience melts into the next without any 
sharp boundaries as it is being lived 
through. 
In this description of the duree two characteristics, 
as indicated, thus stand out; (1) the indiscrete character; 
and (2) the unidirectional, irreversible character. These 
characteristics I take to be the major distinguishing char­
acteristics of subjective consciousness and therefore require 
further comment. 
To say that subjective consciousness has an indiscrete 
character is to say that it has a non-categorical quality and 
is thus characterized as sensory-perceptual in nature rather 
than conceptual, and that these sensations and perceptions 
are not thus homogenized into classes or typifications, 
lumped together, so-to-speak, but are experienced in their 
entire variety of sensory-perceptual characters. One gets 
the impression that this form of experiencing is a very 
"rich" form, of great detail, contrasting directly with the 
experiencing in the state of alienness to be described in the 
next chapter. 
To speak of subjective consciousness as unidirectional 
means it is not or cannot be turned back upon itself. The 
organism does not, therefore, perceive itself as an object 
of its own consciousness. While subjective awareness does 
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not preclude such conscious experiences as the sensation 
and perception of the organism's own body, e.g., of visual 
or tactile sensations and perceptions of one's hands, feet, 
torso, face, etc., or the kinesthetic sensation and percep­
tion of one's bodily movement or functions, and the sense of 
these as distinct from the environment, these experiences 
of consciousness are not those of consciousness of the 
object-self. For, as yet, consciousness is only a flow 
of sensory-perceptual images, of the external or internal 
world of things, of their movements, their shapes, their 
colors, their smells, their textures, etc. In subjective 
consciousness, there is at first no categorical attitude, no 
concept of time, nor space, nor substance, no consciousness 
of the self as object, only a moment to moment existence. We 
quote Schutz (1967:47) in this regard: "As long as my whole 
consciousness remains temporally unidirectional and irrever­
sible, I am unaware either of my own growing older or of any 
difference between present and past." 
Thus, while it is difficult to imagine, subjective con­
sciousness is at first a state of consciousness in which 
there are no objects and therefore no categories. By the 
same token there is no self-reflexive existence, only a uni­
directional consciousness, in which man does not experience 
himself as an object. In subjective consciousness, there is 
no reflexive awareness of his own being and existence, only 
a being and existence. In such a state, there is no differ-
84 
ehtiation—in an "object" sense—of the individual from his 
environment. They are a psychic unity. 
Breaking the Psychic Identity of 
the Infant and Others; Primary Alienation 
Primary alienation is the social-psychological process 
through which the psychic unity of the individual and environ­
ment is broken. It proceeds by way of the interactions be­
tween the individual and others through which the individual's 
subjective consciousness is transformed into objective con­
sciousness. At the same time, however, this process is ac­
companied by the development of a modal fear or anxiety pre­
disposing the individual to withdraw, emotionally and inter-
actionally from others, to enclose himself off from them. 
This modal fear and anxiety, too, is the product of the inter­
actions between the individual and others. (It is on the 
basis of this emotional fear and anxiety that I use the term 
alienness because this term connotes more than mere objective 
distinction.) Although these two aspects of the alienation 
process occur together I shall treat them separately in this 
section, beginning with the transformation of subjective con­
sciousness into objective consciousness. 
The emergence of the subject-object dichotomy 
The essence of the alienation concept is a separation of 
the individual and something else. This separation refers to 
more than the mere perceptual separation of the individual 
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and environment described in the discussion of subjective 
consciousness. As I use the term its primary sense, it 
refers to the separation of the individual from others by the 
development of the objective self. To develop a self as ob­
ject is to distinguish it from other objects, hence to sepa­
rate it, or alienate it, from other objects. ^ the root of 
primary alienation, then, is the transformation of subjective 
consciousness into objective consciousness and the gradual 
emergence of the object-self as separate and distinct from 
other objects, including other persons. 
The transformation of subjective consciousness into 
objective consciousness is accomplished through learning to 
communicate by use of symbols. By acquisition of symbols, 
the individual's consciousness is made discrete, or discon­
tinuous. Through language, percepts are named and are thus 
loosed from their embeddedness in images; they are freed, not 
only of their image context, but from one another by being 
transformed into a symbol. It is in this fashion that these 
percepts become discrete. At the same time, symbolization of 
a percept objectifies it, makes it external, possible of be­
ing shared with others, which enhances its discreteness. 
George Mead (1934) refers to this process of designating 
percepts as "indication." Human beings can indicate things in 
their environment (registered as percepts in their conscious­
ness) by symbolizing them. The development of language has 
the consequence of allowing organisms to share their experi­
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ences through the designation of such experiences by symbols. 
The designation of a thing in our environment by a symbol 
transforms the thing, registered in our consciousness as a 
percept, into an object, for the thing is now no longer a 
private affair but has become objectified. "Objects" are 
images or percepts that we indicate symbolically to one 
another and are thus socially created. We shall utilize 
"object" in this way, i.e., to indicate a distinction be­
tween the purely private image or percept and the image or 
percept that has become symbolically designated and socially 
shared. 
"Objects" are not merely the perceptual replicates of 
things, however, for symbolization gives rise to another type 
of object whose reference may not be to any particular tangi­
ble thing but to a class of things, or, also, to what we term 
ideas, or concepts. E. A. Gellner (1964:120-121) has defined 
a concept as ". . .an aspect of thought. . . a kind of unit 
in terms of which one thinks: a unit smaller than a judgment, 
a proposition, or theory, but one which necessarily enters 
into these." At the same time, Gellner links conceptualiza­
tion to language although there may not be a complete identi­
ty of the two: "Concepts correspond to or 'are the meaning 
of all meaningful words, with certain qualifications: (a) 
only one concept corresponds to two or more words with the 
same meaning; (b) there is a tendency to speak of concepts 
only with regard to words which do, or at least can, refer 
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either to something that can exist or be imagined or to an 
operation that can be performed, and not in connection with 
words whose role is grammatical rather than designative . . .; 
(c) there is a tendency to speak of concepts in connection 
with general rather than singular terms. . . " 
For our purposes, the distinctions between language 
symbols per se and concepts emerging from Gellner's compari­
sons are that symbols may stand for images and percepts as 
well as concepts. However, we may subsume all these units 
under the term "object." An object, once again, in our mean­
ing, is anything which the organism can designate or indicate 
symbolically. An additional point, however, is that the 
objects may be conceptual as well as perceptual and thus the 
world to which the human being consciously responds is much 
different than that of the non-symboling animal: it is 
categorical, discrete, temporalized and spatialized and comes 
to include abstract objects as well as "concrete" objects. 
One of these abstract objects to which the individual 
responds is his own self. Through acquiring the capacity to 
symbolize things in general he may symbolize himself as well. 
Thus, subjective consciousness becomes, as well, objective-
consciousness, i.e., consciousness of itself through its ob­
jectif ication . In essence, the human individual, through 
acquiring symbols, forms a "second self" which overlays the 
first. I quote Bergson (1949:38-39) in this respect: 
Probably animals do not picture to them­
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selves, besides their sensations, as we 
do, an external world quite distinct from 
themselves, which is the common property 
of all [self]-conscious beings. Our ten­
dency to form a clear picture of this ex­
ternality of things and the homogeneity of 
their medium is the same as the impulse 
which leads us to live in common and to 
speak. But, in proportion as the condi­
tions of social life are more completely 
realized, the current which carries our 
conscious states from within outwards is 
strengthened; little by little, these 
states are made into objects or things; 
they break off, not only from one another, 
but from ourselves. Henceforth, we no 
longer perceive them except in the homo­
geneous medium in which we have set their 
image, and through the word which lends 
them its commonplace color. Thus a 
second self is formed. . . a self whose 
existence is made up of distinct moments, 
whose states are separated from"one 
another and easily expressed in words. 
(Italics mine.) 
As Bergson implies, the process by which the second self 
arises.corresponds to the process by which the individual ob­
jectifies his environment generally, namely through linguistic 
communication with other individuals. To speak of the self as 
becoming an object to itself, then, is to imply its social 
derivation through its representation by the individual and 
others in symbolic communication. 
We assume here that the individual cannot indicate him­
self prior to being indicated by another. It is the indica­
tion of the individual by another through symbolic inter­
action that turns his consciousness back upon his own subjec­
tive experience. We quote Mead (1972:202) in this respect: 
The individual experiences himself as such, 
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not directly, but only indirectly, from 
the particular standpoints of other indi­
vidual members of the same social group 
or from the generalized standpoint of the 
social group as a whole to which he be­
longs. For he enters his own experience 
as a self or individual, not directly or 
immediately, not by becoming a subject to 
himself, but only insofar as he first be­
comes an object to himself just as other 
individuals are objects to him or are in 
his experience; and he becomes an object 
to himself only by taking the attitudes 
of other individuals toward himself with­
in a social environment or context of ex­
perience and behavior in which both he 
and they are involved. 
Mead (1972:203) continues: 
The importance of what we term "communication" 
lies in the fact that it provides a form of 
behavior in which the organism or the indi­
vidual may become an object to himself. It 
is that sort of communication which we have 
been discussing—not communication in the 
sense of the cluck of the hen to the chick­
ens, or the bark of a wolf to the pack, or 
the lowing of a cow, but the communication 
in the sense of significant symbols, communi­
cation which is directed not only to others 
but also to the individual himself. So far 
as that type of communication is a part of 
behavior, it at least introduces a self. 
An important point to be made about Mead's latter quota­
tion is that symbolic communication only introduces a self. 
That is, the ability to take oneself as an object of one's 
own consciousness is only initiated by symbolic communica­
tion. Thus, primary alienation refers only to the phase of 
self-development in which the self becomes differentiated as 
an object to itself, in contrast to the secondary alienation 
phase in which the self as object becomes contradistinctive. 
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The differentiation of the self is only the initial process 
of development of the self as object to itself, but is at the 
same time the basis upon which the later contradistinctive-
ness can emerge. 
As indicated earlier, it is through the use of symbols 
that the individual also acquires the capacity of cognitive 
thought. Indeed, mind and self (the objectified self) de­
velop parallel to one another. Mead (1972:159) writes: 
In all conversations of gestures within 
the social process, whether external (be­
tween different individuals) or internal 
(between a given individual and himself), 
the individual's consciousness of the con­
tent and flow of meaning involved depends 
on his thus taking the attitude of the 
other toward his own gestures. In this 
way every gesture within a given social 
group or community comes to stand for a 
particular act or response, namely, the 
act or response which it calls forth ex­
plicitly in the individual to whom it is 
addressed and implicitly in the individ­
ual who makes it; and this particular act . 
or response for which it stands is its 
meaning as a significant symbol. Only in 
terms of gestures as significant symbols 
is the existence of mind or intelligence 
possible; for only in terms of gestures 
which are significant symbols can think­
ing—which is simply an internalized or 
implicit conversation of the individual 
with himself by means of such gestures— 
take place. 
Mead (1972:159) writes further: 
The internalization in our experience of 
the external conversation of gestures 
which we carry on with other individuals 
in the social process is the essence of 
thinking; and the gestures thus internal­
ized are significant symbols because they 
have the same meanings for all individual 
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members of the given society or social 
group, that is, they respectively arouse 
the same attitude in the individuals 
making them that they arouse in the indi­
viduals responding to them. Otherwise 
the individual could not internalize them 
or be conscious of them and their meanings. 
According to Mead, the self develops in two stages: the 
play stage and the game stage. The primary phase of identi­
fication/alienation refers to only the play stage. The game 
stage takes place in childhood and therefore in the secondary 
phase of identification/alienation. Mead's two stages of 
self-development are so well-known in the literature that it 
is not necessary to detail them here except to show their 
concordance to the concepts being presented. 
The addition of the object-self and of mind alters the 
phases of consciousness as previously depicted in Figure 4. 
These alterations are depicted in Figure 5. As shown, the 
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92 
component of cognition is the added factor. By "cognition" 
I simply mean thinking, and by "thinking" I mean the manipu­
lation in consciousness of symbolic representations (objects) 
of the environment by the individual. Cognition involves the 
indication of percepts in the stimulus field symbolically to 
oneself and the trying out in one's imagination of various 
lines of behavior in response to problematical situations 
(Meltzer, 1978:20-22). Cognition, mind, or thinking, then, 
are added to consciousness in the primary stage. Concordant-
ly this state is characterized by the categorical attitude 
and an attitude of the separateness of the self from the 
environment. The subjective self becomes an object to be 
contemplated and, perhaps, placed under surveillance and 
control. But whether such surveillance and control occur 
depends on the concomitant emotional development of the 
individual. 
The emergence of emotional insecurity 
To refer to the process of the emergence of the subject-
object dichotomy as "alienation" would be too strong a term 
if it was not at the same time accompanied by the development 
of an emotional insecurity which predisposes the individual to 
fear or distrust other persons, thus to have a tendency to be 
wary of them, to shy away from them, and, above all, to en­
close the subjective self off from them. The addition of 
these traits to the individual's psyche, along with the split­
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ting of the self into subject and object, justifies the 
alienation term. These developments, moreover, are the basis 
upon which the alienness state comes into full existence. 
The emergence of this emotional insecurity—like that 
of the subject-object dichotomy—is brought about through 
interaction with others in which the infant is attempting 
self-actualization. But, as indicated in the first chapter, 
self-actualization during infancy can only refer to the in­
fant's attempts at satisfaction of the needs of the subjective 
self since the objective self has not yet fully developed. 
Subjective self-needs are posited here as needs in and of 
themselves existing in their own right alongside others. 
This view corresponds with that of Miller (1981:7) who echoes 
those of Winnicott, Mahler, and Kohut: "The child has a pri­
mary need to be regarded and respected as the person he really 
is at any given time, and as the center—the central actor— 
in his own activity. In contradistinction to drive wishes, 
we are speaking here of a need that is narcissistic, but 
nevertheless legitimate, and whose fulfillment is essential 
for the development of a healthy self-esteem." This nar­
cissistic need appears to be essentially the need for a cer­
tain type of self-expression. Miller writes further: "When 
we speak here of 'that which it is at any given time,' we 
mean emotions, sensations, and their expression from the 
first day onward. Mahler (1968) writes: 'The infant's inner 
sensations form the core of the self. They appear to remain 
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the central, the crystallization point of the 'feeling of 
self around which a 'sense of identity' will become es­
tablished.'" These references, of course, can only be, in 
my terms, to the subjective self. 
When the interaction of the infant with others is self-
fulfilling, that is, when his actualization of his subjec­
tive self is met with "... respect, echoing, understanding, 
participation and mirroring. . . " (Miller, 1981:9), then 
emotional security develops. When, on the other hand, the 
significant others with whom the infant interacts sanction 
his subjective self-actualization negatively, he experiences 
basic anxiety and fear and, if the negative sanctioning is 
repeated over time as a modality, these traits are "intro-
jected" as a generalized emotional insecurity. It is the 
feeling of basic anxiety and fear, the resultants of negative 
self sanctions, that are the mark of self-disillusionment 
during infancy. This self-disillusionment, in turn, produces 
the generalized feeling of insecurity, and this feeling is 
the basis on which the individual's alienness is built. 
This is so because the infant begins to inhibit the 
actualization of self out of fear of self-disillusionment. 
He learns to modify his behavior to avoid the negative sanc­
tioning of his significant others. The inhibition of his 
subjective life is the forerunner of the loss of spontaneity 
of behavior and of the growing cognitive control over it in 
the secondary stage. It is the harbinger of the growing 
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dominancy of the "Me" aspect of the self over the "I," i.e., 
the overlayering of the subjective self by the objective self. 
The development of this dominancy of the Me over the I 
is, as I have said, the resultant of negative interactions 
between the infant and others, but particularly between the 
infant and its mother or mother surrogate. Miller (1981:8), 
in speaking of her narcissistic patients, has said that 
" .  .  . 1  f o u n d  t h a t  e v e r y  o n e  o f  t h e m  h a s  a  c h i l d h o o d  h i s t o r y  
. . ." where : 
There was a mother who at the core was 
emotionally insecure, and who depended 
for her narcissistic equilibrium on the 
child behaving, or acting, in a particu­
lar way. This mother was able to hide 
her insecurity from the child and from 
everyone else behind a hard, authoritarian, 
and even totalitarian facade. 
This child had an amazing ability to per­
ceive and respond intuitively, that is, 
unconsciously, to this need of the mother, 
or of both parents, for him to take on the 
role that had unconsciously been assigned 
to him. 
This role secured "love" for the child— 
that is, his parents narcissistic 
cathexis. 
This is, of course, to say not much more than that the 
mother's narcissism brings about that of the child. The 
question arises as to how the mother's narcissism was 
brought about, but this is a question I shall defer until 
Chapter VI when the sociological sources of alienation and 
aleinness are traced. The importance of Miller's statements 
for our analysis is to point out the part of the parent-child 
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relationship to the development of emotional insecurity and 
thence ultimately to the loss of spontaneity of subjective 
self-expression and the emergence of the dominancy of the 
Me over the I. 
Continuing the Psychic Identity of the Infant 
with Others; Primary Identification 
Even though the infant develops the self-other distinc­
tion with the acquisition of language more or less automatic­
ally, if he does not at the same time develop emotional in­
security, then he continues in psychic unity with others. 
This is because, even though the Me has developed, the spon­
taneity of the I is left unhindered. The development of 
objective self-consciousness proceeds as merely alternating 
phases with no dominancy over the subjective self. In other 
words, there is no "split" between the subjective self and 
the objective self, one as subordinate the other as super-
ordinate. The development of one is the development of the 
other. 
Though he does not refer to it as such, Hewitt (1979:71) 
has described the individual's self-consciousness at the pri­
mary stage of the identification/alienation process as 
follows, providing, of course, that the individual has not 
developed an emotional insecurity and anxiety; "The 'I' and 
the 'Me' continually alternate in ongoing conduct. At one 
moment, the individual acts as an 'I,' responding to a par­
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ticular situation and to the object and people in it; at the 
next moment that response becomes a part of the past and so 
is part of the 'Me'—the response now can be an object of 
reflection." 
Thus, while the self as object is known and is distinct, 
it is known only as an intermittent phase of the "conversation 
of gestures" between the subjective and objective self. The 
self as object enters into the stream of consciousness only 
as a momentary reflection, disappears as the subjective self 
waxes, reappears again. In addition, even though the individ­
ual now has an objective self and, in this sense, loses his 
complete identity with others and perceives himself as dif­
ferentiated from them, still this is not felt as an alienness 
from them since he does not fear them, is not anxious in their 
presence, nor wary of their responses to him, and, indeed, 
cannot at this point of the identification process fully con­
ceptualize himself as "alien." The individual's identifica­
tion with others at this point is one of emotion rather than 
cognition. 
This development allows the infant to reach out to others 
and to embrace them for he has no fear of them. He has no 
fear of them because they haven't negatively sanctioned, in 
a modal sort of way, his actualization of the subjective 
self. He has not been required to inhibit his impulses, his 
feelings, and has received positive sanctions to his subjec-
tive-self expressions. The relationship between the mother 
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and infant has been a warm and nurturant one in which fear 
and anxiety, the avoidance of which would have compelled the 
infant to inhibit his spontaneous impulses and enforce upon 
them a rigid control and dominance of the "Me," played no 
or little part. He is "full" of security. 
In such a case, the I and the Me develop concordantly 
and interlace. The orientations and attitudes of others 
(the generalized other) are absorbed into the individual's 
own psychic structure as the "Me" and fuse with the "I" in a 
natural sort of way, not by virtue of the infant's desire to 
know these attitudes in order to avoid disillusionment but 
because he simply appropriates them to his growing sense of 
self. They become "his own," so thoroughly mapped into his 
nervous system that he will not even have to think about 
them prior to his acts. The Me, in such a case occurs only 
in "real" problematical situations in which goals are blocked 
and which require the engagement of mind and self with respect 
to their accomplishment, and which have no reference to 
the avoidance of self-disillusionment but simply to the ac­
tualization of the self. 
Conclusion 
With the differentiation of the self into subject and 
object, and with the development of emotional security or 
insecurity, the primary phase of the identification/aliena­
tion process is ended. Ordinarily, we can say that this 
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phase of the process lasts only about eighteen months to two 
years of the life-cycle. Nevertheless, as I hope to have 
shown, it is an absolutely crucial phase in determining 
whether the individual comes to experience a modal alien-
ness from or identity with others in society. It sets the 
stage for the next phase of the process, i.e., it establishes 
the objective self and undergirds it with emotional security 
or insecurity. If in the course of the differentiation of 
the self the individual is encouraged, through the mechanism 
of the objective self, to inhibit subjective self-expression— 
"encouraged," that is, through negative sanction and avoid­
ance of disillusionment—then he begins to suspect that this 
subjective self of which others disapprove is somehow bad. 
Not only has the self become differentiated from others but 
it has the possibility of becoming conceptualized as contra-
distinctive. Of course, the opposite occurs if others en­
courage subjective self-expression; the individual's concep­
tion of himself is one of identity with these others. 
These further developments, however, mark the secondary 
phase of the identification/alienation process. The de­
scription of this phase is the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV: 
IDENTIFICATION AND ALIENATION 
IN CHILDHOOD: 
THE SECONDARY PHASE 
The secondary phase of the identification/alienation 
process starts as soon as the individual begins to form a con­
cept of himself. As we have seen, this event occurs when the 
self takes itself as an object. Once objectification of the 
self occurs, i.e., when the individual learns his own name and 
begins to use the personal pronouns to distinguish himself 
from others, a set of attitudes toward himself develops. 
These attitudes form his self-concept. If the individual 
forms an attitude toward himself such that he believes he is 
not a bona fide or authentic member of his society, then I 
label him alienated from others. If, on the other hand, he 
forms the opposite attitude, i.e., that he is a genuine, 
authentic member of his society, then I label him identified 
with that society. Either of these states emerge in, and are 
the culmination of, the secondary phase of the identification/ 
alienation process. 
The dynamics of the secondary phase are in some respects 
the same as the primary phase but there are also significant 
differences. These differences revolve around the formation 
of the objective self. For instance, the individual still 
attempts to actualize and fulfill the subjective self but in 
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childhood this attempt becomes self-conscious. Thus, in this 
phase, fulfillment of self is accomplished in terms of the 
satisfaction of cognitive motive as well as physiological or 
biological need. The actualization process itself is now no 
longer merely action and social action alone but is accom­
panied by symbolic communication. That is, actions, both the 
individual's own and other's, now take on symbolic dimensions 
and are interpreted in light of their meanings for the newly 
emerging concept of self. It is on the basis of these inter­
pretations that the attitude toward oneself as alien or i-
dentical to others develops. 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the secondary 
phase of the identification/alienation process, i.e., to show 
how, in some detail, the developments of the object-self and 
of emotional security or insecurity in infancy are further 
elaborated in childhood and lead to identity or alienness 
respectively. 
Identification in Childhood 
As indicated in Chapter III, the objectification of the 
subject-self occurs via symbolic interaction. As also indi­
cated in Chapter III, symbols may stand for two classes of 
objects, e.g., things and concepts, or concrete objects and 
abstract objects, respectively. When an individual is given 
a name, he is thus objectified in his own consciousness, but 
he is at first objectified as a concrete entity. It is only 
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later that he comes to also objectify himself conceptually, 
i.e., abstractly. He forms a conception of himself, over 
time. 
This self-concept is essentially a set of attitudes ex­
pressed toward one's own experiences, that is a set of atti­
tudes toward the subjective self. These attitudes, moreover, 
when analyzed, reflect a structure. For instance, some atti­
tudes reflect the individual's perceptions and cognitions of 
himself as to who he is, that is, to his identity. Such 
verbal statements as "I am John" or "I am a father" or "I am 
an accountant" identify the individual to himself and others. 
They distinguish him from and place him in relation to others. 
Other verbal statements, such as "I am fat" or "I am a glut­
ton" describe the individual's perceived traits. These state­
ments present an image of the individual with respect to his 
body, his feelings, thoughts and actions. Statements like "I 
am a good (or bad) father" or "I am fat and ugly" are state­
ments which not only represent identity and image but repre­
sent a judgment or evaluation as well. They represent the 
individual's regard for himself, i.e., his self-esteem. 
The structure of the self-concept is to a large extent a 
derivative of the social system and culture of the society. 
To say this is simply to reiterate the gist of the discussion 
in Chapter III on the emergence of the subject-object di­
chotomy in consciousness. It was said there that objectifi-
cation was basically a process of the joint designation of a 
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percept or image by a symbol. Symbolization of the individual 
is thus the mechanism through which he comes to view himself 
as an object, but this symbolization is, in turn, simply a 
set of social categories to which the individual is assigned 
by others and by himself. 
The self-concept, then, is essentially made up of the 
various social categories of the society and reflects the 
social structure. Thus, the self-identity element for the 
most part derives from the system of status-roles^ of the 
society; the self-image element derives from the descriptive 
traits arising as stereotypical of each of the status-roles. 
These descriptive traits constitute the ideal image of the 
person occupying them. The self-esteem element is by and 
large a derivative of the social esteem accorded to the 
various status-roles of the society together with any dis­
crepancy between the individual's "real" self (his actualized 
self) and the "ideal" self (what he wishes to be). 
It follows from these assertions that it is through the 
construction of the self-concept that the individual is 
psychologically integrated into (or alienated from) society 
from a social-psychological viewpoint. Through symbolic 
interaction the individual builds his self-concept. This con-
have used this term very broadly to refer to not only 
social-statuses per se but to the whole host of categories 
into which persons in society classify one another. For a 
more detailed treatment see Rosenberg (1979:9-14). 
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cept, in turn, is simply reflective of the social-system and 
culture of the society. These systems, in turn, act as in­
tegrating mechanisms of the society. They bind people to­
gether organically and mechanically. By assuming various 
status-roles of the social-structure the individual thus 
takes his "place," whether "high" or "low," in the society 
and is integrated into it. 
The assumption of certain specific status-roles is, of 
course, more or less automatic. Examples are the status-role 
of "human being," "male" or "female," "child" or "adult," 
"peasant" or "nobleman," "white" or "black," etc. These are 
the ascriptive statuses. Without effort on his part the in­
dividual is automatically assigned to these categories and 
expected to display the ideal images attached to them. Other 
status-roles are achieved. These must be attained through 
the efforts of the individual himself. They are not automatic. 
But the individual may be ascribed to or achieve various 
status-roles, of course, without identifying with them. 
Identifying with a status-role means that the individual 
claims it as his own; he chooses it for himself and conceives 
of himself in its terms. As Johnson (1960:128) has stated: 
"One is said to identify with a social role if one . . . 
adopts it as one ' s own, striving to attain the necessary 
skills and to conform with the role norms—one is said to 
identify with a social group if one . . . considers oneself a 
member of it." (Italics are mine.) 
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The process by which the individual attains an identity 
with these status-roles I have referred to as the identifica­
tion process. The secondary phase of this process is dis­
tinguished by the formation of the self-concept. It pro­
ceeds by way of the individual's assuming the various status 
roles and gradually coming to build up an identity in the 
overall, or "global," sense composed of all the status-roles 
he claims for his own. As he matures, the child is assigned 
certain status-roles and expected to act according to the 
normative ideals of them. He also assumes certain status-
roles which are not automatically assigned. The appropria­
tion of both sets of these status-roles as his own, both the 
ascribed and the achieved, constitutes his overall identity, 
image and esteem, i.e., his overall self-concept. (Those 
status-roles which he appropriates within any particular 
situation is said to afford the individual a "situated" 
identity.) It is only over a period of some duration that 
this overall identity is attained. 
The secondary identification process per se may be said 
to begin when the individual, through interaction with others, 
starts to learn o^ the social structure of the society. In 
American society, for instance, the individual will learn that 
he is a human being as opposed to his companion which is a 
dog. He will learn that he is a male as opposed to his mother 
and sister who are females. He will learn that humans do not 
eat bones, and males do not wear lipstick. He will also learn 
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that humans are generally more esteemed than dogs and that 
males are generally held in higher esteem than females in 
American society. Throughout his associations with others he 
will constantly become aware of these various status-roles 
and of which apply to him and of which do not. 
The mere learning of the status-roles, of the images and 
esteem attached to them, however, is not sufficient for 
identity with them. As indicated, the individual must choose 
these roles as his own. This choice appears to be mostly a 
matter of the social esteem accorded to the status-role. 
Through his interaction with others, the individual is. guided 
into accepting certain status-roles and achieving others by 
the sanctions, both negative and positive, applied by others. 
In other words, significant others offer the individual so-
cial-esteem if he accepts certain status-roles which they 
ascribe to him (they deny it if he doesn't), and the individ­
ual seeks social esteem by the achievement of certain other 
status-roles which he more or less chooses as his own. 
When an individual chooses a status-role as his own, 
appropriates it to his self-concept, he is said to have 
"introjected" the status-role. Webster defines this term as 
"the adoption of externals (persons or objects) into the self, 
so as to have a sense of oneness with them and to feel per­
sonally affected by what happens to them." (Quoted in Rosen­
berg, 1979:36-37.) Rosenberg (1979:37) has stated that "when 
an external object is introjected, the fate of the object and 
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of the self are experienced as inextricably intertwined." 
He states further: . .if anything external to the self 
is capable of arousing feelings of pride or shame—pride in 
my shiny new automobile, shame at my unfashionable clothes, 
pride in an honor bestowed, shame or embarrassment at the 
defeat of my school team—then these elements have been ap­
propriated by the self and are contained within its bounda­
ries" (1979:35). 
Although chosen roles are introjected into the self and 
thus evoke certain emotions, not all of them do so equally. 
It is apparent that some statuses are more cherished as 
one's own than others. Some status-roles may be introjected 
only superficially while others lie at the very core of the 
self. The emotional experiences of gaining and losing 
status-roles during the acquisition of an overall or global 
identity thus vary accordingly. Some roles are gained and 
lost rather imperturbably during the process (and continue to 
be so throughout life) while the gain or loss of others evokes 
strong emotions. 
Merely choosing a status-role and introjecting it 
(whether centrally or peripherally) is insufficient to reach 
a state of identity with that role. In addition the individ­
ual must confirm his claim to it in the eyes of others. He 
"must" do so because of the near impossiblility of success­
fully acting it out without such confirmation. If others 
fail to agree with the individual that he is what he claims 
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to be the reciprocations necessary for most roles to be 
affected may simply be withdrawn. Though some roles may be 
carried out without others and some are less reciprocal than 
others, it is in the nature of the social act that it re­
quires another for its completion. Furthermore, the self-
concept is essentially a social phenomenon in that we cannot 
see ourselves except as others see us, except by taking the 
role of the other. The self as object to itself cannot even 
exist except as the individual takes the attitude of the 
other toward his self. 
Confirmation of identity occurs as the individual, 
through actualization of the self, compares himself to the 
stereotyped self-ideal prescribed by the status-role, and 
as others, who also use the ideal as a basis for their com­
parisons, make affirmative judgments about these comparisons. 
As he makes these affirmative judgments, and as others com­
municate their affirmative judgments to him, the individual 
is confirmed in his own eyes that he is what he purports to 
be in that particular situation. 
These comparisons made by the individual and others are 
the cognitive element added to the self-fulfilling experience 
during the secondary phase. As was shown in Chapter III, 
self-fulfillment is also an emotional experience, but this 
emotional experience is now contingent on the cognitive in­
terpretation of the actualization of the self. 
This contingency upon cognitive interpretation, however. 
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in no way reduces the importance of the emotional element in 
self-fulfillment. Indeed, we may say that it is still the 
ingredient which completes the experience; it gives the 
experience the fullness of meaning. Although in sociology 
this term has been used to refer primarily to action that is 
characterized by cognitive or symbolic terms, and this usage 
is correct, still this usage should not overlook the fact that 
subjective states of emotion are always corollaries of objec­
tive or cognitive processes.^ The object-self, again, is 
merely the cognitive outgrowth and overlayering of the sub­
jective self. It is in the subjective self that the meaning 
of action is substantiated. 
This idea is brought out nicely by Gendlin (1964:112). 
He writes: "Both in social talk and in theory we so largely 
emphasize external events and logical meaning that it almost 
seems as if it were difficult to notice that, in addition to 
external objects and logic, we also have an inward bodily 
feeling or sensing (a direct referent)." He states further: 
It is less apparent, but still easily 
checked by anyone, that this direct 
referent contains meaning. At first 
it may seem that experiencing is simply 
the inward sense of our body, its ten­
sion or well being. Yet upon further 
reflection, we can notice that only in 
this direct sensing do we have the mean­
ing of what we say or think. For, with-
For this reason, I use the term "feeling" as part of 
my definition of alienness and identity to signify its 
alliance with cognition. 
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out our "feel" of the meaning, verbal 
symbols are only noises . . . 
Verbalization, language, are the symbolic and outward ex­
pressions of the "feeling," "experiencing" process. As Gend-
lin (1964:112) says: "Before symbolization the felt meanings 
are incomplete . . . Thus, to explicate is to carry forward a 
bodily felt process." Gendlin's references to an "inward bod­
ily feeling or sensing" or a "direct referent" are, of course, 
the equivalent of the concepts of the "dureé" and the subjec­
tive self discussed in Chapter III. Gendlin thus recognizes 
the subjective and the objective states of self-experience and 
points out that the subjective states of experience, the "di­
rect referent" (dureé, subjective consciousness) are in process 
and that the carrying forward of this process depends to a 
large extent on the symbolization of its varying states in in­
teraction with other persons. The "completion" of this feel­
ing, experiencing process involves the emotional concomitant 
of cognitive interpretation and always accompanies the actuali­
zation of self. It "colors" the interaction, gives it its 
fullness of meaning. To say this is simply to reiterate that 
the objective-self is an outgrowth and overlayering of the sub­
jective self and that cognition is always connected to emotion. 
It is important to point out again that self-esteem in 
the objective sense is merely a need in the subjective sense 
transformed into a motive. As indicated in Chapter III the 
infant has the narcissistic need of subjective self-expression. 
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As we have seen, the subjective self consists primarily of 
the internal, multiphasic flow of consciousness of the bodily 
and environmental states, registered as sensation and feel­
ing (or emotion). These sensations and feelings form the 
core of the subjective self around which an identity, in the 
objective sense, is formed. The self-concept, i.e., the 
objective-self, is always grounded in the experiences of 
the subjective self and it is the subjective self that is 
in contact with and reacts to the environment. The objec­
tive self, in this sense, is simply the cognitive side of the 
subjective self, a reflection upon it. 
The combined elements of a positive cognitive judgment 
that the individual is what he claims to be and the emotional 
concomitant of this judgment thus make up the experience of 
self-fulfillment in the secondary phase of identification. 
This self-fulfilling experience, repeated modally in the in­
dividual's interactions with others, is the final ingredient 
of the formation of identity with any particular status role. 
Having assumed various status-roles, both ascribed and a-
chieved, having chosen a particular status-role as his own, 
and having been self-fulfilled by repeated confirmation from 
others, the individual's identity with the status-role is 
complete. The individual comes to believe that he is the 
kind of person the status-role implies. This belief becomes 
a stable part of the set of attitudes he has toward himself 
and is emotionally affirmed. 
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As the individual identifies with more and more of these 
status roles, he forms an identity in the overall or global 
sense, i.e., an identity compounded of all the status-roles 
he has drawn from the "generalized others" of his society and 
constellated in the "Me" aspect of himself. As said pre­
viously it is through the formation of the "Me," reflective 
of the generalized other, that the individual takes himself 
as an object. If, over the course of his maturation and so­
cialization, he conceives of this object as a bona fide 
member of his society, integrated with it in various degrees 
and ways through his identifying with its various social 
categories, then he has reached a state of identity with the 
society. 
The state of identity itself, then, can be characterized 
in two ways, the first and foremost of which is by the cog­
nition, backed up by emotion (or feeling), that one a mem­
ber of the society (an American, a Japanese, a Wintu, Hopi, 
etc.), or that one a human being (as opposed to an 
"animal"), a male, etc. This knowledge, rooted in emotional 
experience as already described, links the individual to 
others, not only to those who hold such identities in common 
but to those who hold different identities but which relate 
to him reciprocally in social relationships, e.g., male-
female, husband-wife, doctor-client, etc. Even though these 
identities are different from his own they are a reciprocal 
and thus constitute a kind of unity. 
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A second way in which the identity state can be char­
acterized, however, already alluded to in Chapter I and 
Chapter III, is in terms of the degree to which the object 
self is present in consciousness, thereby rendering the 
individual separate from or distinct from his environment. 
As I have indicated in the preliminary sketch of my theory 
in Chapter I, a distinguishing characteristic of the alien-
ness state is a modal self-consciousness, i.e., an almost 
constant awareness of the self as object. By definition, the 
differentiation of the self from others is a necessary factor 
in the alienation of the self from these others. It is not 
sufficient, of course, as the contradistinction of the self 
is also an essential ingredient. But the term "alienation" 
connotes a separation, at least in the minimal sense. Con­
versely, the identity of the self with the world around it 
presumes its unity with that world. More fundamentally, it 
presumes the obliteration of the self-other distinction, the 
erasure of the subject-object boundary. A state of frequent 
objective-self consciousness by definition separates the 
individual from others, whereas a state of subjective con­
sciousness unites him with others. 
The identity state, then, is marked also by the lack of 
modal self-consciousness as well as by the cognition and 
feeling that one is a bona fide, authentic member of his 
society and also of whatever sub-category or sub-group he has 
chosen as his own. Indeed, the belief that one is a member of 
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his society in the authentic sense makes the lack of self-
consciousness and solf-preoccupation possible. I shall have 
more to say about this, however, in the discussion of second­
ary alienation in the next section of this chapter. 
This unreflective state, in which individuals apparently 
reach partial lack of objectification of self and thus exist 
momentarily and to varying degrees in pure subjectivity, is 
probably what Abraham Maslow (1968) calls the state of being 
cognition. This being cognition is what I have come to think 
of as the essence of the state of consciousness resulting from 
self-fulfillment; it constitutes a very important aspect of 
the state of identity of the individual with society. 
Maslow gives us a good picture of the conscious state 
of the "self-fulfilled" person, that type of person who is the 
opposite of the self-disillusioned person. He attempts to 
describe the state of being of such a person, the experiences 
of such a person. Maslow (1968:646-651) calls these experi­
ences "B-cognition" for "being-cognition," the act of cogni­
tion as a state of being, i.e., "temporary, non-striving, 
purposeless, self-validating, end-experiences and states." 
His description of such experiences includes: "In B-cogni­
tion the experience or the object tends to be seen as a whole, 
as a complete unit, detached from relations, from possible 
usefulness, from expediency, and from purpose." Also: 
(1) The percept is fully and exclusively 
attended to with all its relevant aspects. 
(2) It is seen exclusive of its human 
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relevance, attended to in and of itself. 
(3) B-cognizing seems to make the per­
ception richer. The task of normal per­
ception which is so frequently anxiety 
based or motivation-determined, is ful­
filled in the first viewing and there­
after the object or person, now that it 
has been catalogued, is simply no longer 
perceived. (4) B-cognition includes per­
ception that is relatively ego-tran­
scending, self-forgetful, egoless. It 
is possible in the aesthetic experience 
or the love experience to become so ab­
sorbed and "poured into" the object that 
the self, in a very real sense, disappears. 
Some writers on aesthetics, on mysticism, 
on motherhood, and on love have gone so 
far as to say that in the peak experience 
we may even speak of identification of the 
perceiver and the perceived, a fusion of 
what was two into a new and larger whole, 
a superordinate unit. 
The state of identity also seems to correspond with 
Rogers' (1954:109) concept of the "adjusted self": "The 
self becomes increasingly simply the subjective and reflexive 
awareness of experiencing . . . (it) exists in the experience 
of feelings ... at any given moment the self is primarily 
a reflexive awareness of the process of experiencing. It is 
not a perceived object but something felt in process. It is 
not a structure to be defended, but a rich and changing aware­
ness of internal experiencing." 
The state of identity, then, is one in which, paradox­
ically, the self more or less disappears from consciousness 
as an object of it. The boundaries between the self and others 
are eliminated in the sense that these others, after an 
initial cataloging, are then reacted to without modal con­
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sciousness of the self as an object distinct from them and 
different from them. The interaction proceeds simply on the 
basis of sensation, perception and emotion, with cognition 
playing a minimal role, and certainly engaged in very little 
with respect to the object self. This state is very much an 
extension of the process of the conversation of gestures be­
tween the "I" and the "Me" described in Chapter III. The 
difference is that identity is relatively more complete. 
The identity state is, to repeat, possible only on the 
basis of modal self-fulfillment, not only in childhood but 
also on a fulfillment in infancy which has built up a reser­
voir of positive emotions and which therefore encourages 
rather than inhibits the expression of the subjective-self 
impulses. With these positive dispositions the infant enters 
childhood and assumes new roles, claiming some for his own and 
confirming them in the eyes of others. Out of this process 
his identity is assured. If, however, the infant's experi­
ences of self-actualization are characteristically self-dis-
illusioning, then hs faces childhood with altogether differ­
ent dispositions and is very likely to take, not the route of 
identification, but that of alienation. In this process, 
rather than coming to believe himself to be the kind of per­
son called for by the status-role, he comes to believe he is 
not this kind of person even though he has, in fact, chosen it 
as his own. He comes to form a conception of himself as 
contradistinctive to the status-role. The process by which 
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he does so is the topic of the next section. 
Alienation in Childhood 
The secondary alienation process begins at that point 
where an individual has chosen or appropriated a role for 
himself and fails in confirming it in the eyes of others. 
Disconfirmation of the self, as we have shown previously, 
occurs via the social-psychological mechanism of self-dis­
illusionment. Self-disillusionment is the opposite of self-
fulfillment; and its ultimate consequence, alienness, is the 
opposite of identity. Whereas in identity, the individual 
believes himself to be one with his society and is modally 
in a state of B-cognition, the alienated individual sees him­
self in contradistinctive terms and experiences an almost 
constant state of D-cognition. D-cognition is a state of 
consciousness in which the self as object is held modally in 
the attention of the individual. D-cognition is used in the 
sense that the self as the object of consciousness is sepa­
rated from the environment of which it was once a unity and 
which is now being defended. 
Just like self-fulfillment, self-disillusionment is a 
process that is a little more subtle than we might at first 
assume. Basically, however, it involves a discrepancy be­
tween perceptions that have implications for the self. As 
Toch (1965:128), in his study of social movements, has said: 
A disillusioning experience is the per­
ception of a discrepancy between con­
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ventional beliefs and psychological or 
physical realities. More accurately, 
it represents a perception of a dis­
crepancy between two perceptions, one 
of which shows the consequences of be­
lief, and the second of which reveals 
the import of facts or the demand of 
needs. 
Toch's usage has the advantage of connecting disillusion­
ment to conventional beliefs, and thus to culture (a point I 
have emphasized earlier), and this is another important 
characteristic of self-disillusionment as well, i.e., that 
the real self is discrepant with the ideal self as this 
ideal is reflected in cultural norms, values and beliefs. In­
deed, it is the contradiction between the actions and feel­
ings of others toward the real self and how they are supposed 
to feel and act toward the self that is a critical feature 
of self-disillusionment; for cultural definitions form the 
basis of the individual's ideal self and become the standards 
against which he compares himself to others and against which 
he measures the rightness and wrongness of acts toward him and 
which thus determine the discrepancy between the real-self 
and the ideal-self. When discrepancies between one ' s ideal-
self and the reactions of others occur then the individual 
experiences disillusionment, and such disillusionment has 
certain implications for his self. In our culture, for 
example, it is normative for parents (identity) to love their 
children (identity), but when children perceive that they do 
not do so, then they may come to have an image of themselves 
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as unlovable. To be unlovable, furthermore, is a very bad 
thing, and one's self-esteem is thus lowered. Or in our 
culture it is normative for an older brother (identity) to be 
stronger (image) and dominant (image) over a younger brother 
(identity). To not be so lowers self-esteem. To lower self-
esteem in any of these ways, in turn, is to produce the vari­
ous negative emotions of sorrow, anxiety, sadness, grief, un-
happiness, etc., to varying degrees, or to produce frustra­
tion. These emotions then produce various behaviors, all of 
which may be seen as attempts to restore self-esteem. 
Thus, all facets of the self are involved in disillusion­
ing experiences, i.e., self-identity, self-image, and self-
esteem. We act out of a motive to fulfill ideal self-con­
ceptions involving our identity, image and esteem, but we 
are checked by the responses of another that disconfirm such 
ideal conceptions, that indicate a discrepancy between the 
reality and the ideal. Such responses thus go directly to 
our self-conceptions; they question our identity or seek to 
redefine it; they thus impute a different image and also alter 
our self-esteem; and in so doing they cause us discomfort, 
anxiety, frustration, anger, etc. 
It is perhaps appropriate at this time to describe such 
disillusioning experiences in order to obtain a more con­
crete idea of what the term encompasses. We must realize, of 
course, that descriptions of such experiences by way of the 
printed word are inadequate compared to their presentation in 
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actual life or by audio and video recordings. Nevertheless, 
a fuller understanding may be obtained by presenting ethno­
graphic data which I believe represent such experiences and 
which we may understand intuitively and use as a basis for 
further elaboration. 
Jules Henry's (1973) study of five families describes an 
incident that happened in the Rosenberg family which illus­
trates disillusionment in both its affective and cognitive 
dimensions. Ben and Irving are two brothers. Abraham, a 
third brother, is autistic, and is away from the family in a 
center for treatment. Henry (1973:138-140) describes the 
particular incident as follows: 
When I went outside I found Irving beating 
up Ben again. They wrestled. Ben, as usual, 
seemed to enjoy it. Mr. Rosenberg soon came 
out, got angry and tried to separate them, 
blaming Irving. Soon the father went indoors 
and Irving attacked Ben. Ben began to give 
Irving a hard time by falling on top of him. 
When Irving left, as if to stop fighting, 
Ben called him "chicken," so Irving came 
back and continued to fight. Once Ben got 
a headlock on Irving and pinned him to the 
ground. It was obvious that Ben was prac­
tically inexhaustible and was causing Ir­
ving more and more difficulty. I believe 
that when Irving wanted to quit, it was be­
cause he was tired. It was striking to see 
Ben constantly provoke Irving to continue to 
fight, even though Irving pommeled him so 
and dug his knuckles into him. At one point 
Ben came over and asked me to hold his 
glasses. 
At last, when Irving seemed really exhausted, 
he went inside. I followed him into the 
kitchen, where ^  was sulking, apparently 
very angry. He did not respond to some-
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thing I said. Then he began to scold his 
father for blaming him for attacking Ben. 
He was inhis usual state of mounting 
rage. His mother and father continued to 
blame him and he kept getting angrier and 
angrier. 
I went outside to play with Ben, but I 
could see what was going on in the kitchen 
and I heard Irving screaming. Then he seemed 
to attack one of his parents physically— 
it seemed to me it was his father. Later 
his father said it was the mother, but she 
said it was the father. Then I heard Ir­
ving go into the bathroom, slamming the 
door behind him, and I went inside. Ir­
ving was in the bathroom, sobbing and 
coughing, and his parents were very tense. 
Mr. and Mrs. Rosenberg mixed efforts at 
appeasement with (hostile comments) on 
Irving's behavior. We had originally de-
cided to go to the park this evening, and 
Mrs. Rosenberg said, "We're going now, and 
you'll be left behind." Irving shouted tear­
fully, "Go ahead!" His mother kept telling 
him to come out. I cannot remember much of 
what was said, as the parents stood outside 
the lavoratory door, but it was mostly in­
adequate to the situation and only enraged 
Irving, even after his sobbing had quieted 
down. His tearful voice could be heard 
through the door. One of the things he kept 
saying was, "You cause me so much heartache 
in this house. You blame everything on me. 
You are doing to me what you did toAbe." 
Part of the time I sat in the kitchen with 
Mrs. Rosenberg, who pretended to be reading 
a magazine. I asked her, "Do you know what 
you're reading?" and she answered no. She 
told me that Irving used to have bad respira­
tory trouble but that the condition had been 
quiet for about three years. "He's having 
the beginning of an attack now," I told her, 
and she looked at me incredulously. 
Mr. Rosenberg approached the lavatory door 
angrily and threatened to unscrew the lock. 
Then, in spite of the fact that I had told 
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the parents I would not go to the park if 
Irving didn't come along, Mr. Rosenberg 
said, "Dr. Henry says he wants to go." 
He then added, in a voice that was, for him, 
gentle, "Don't come out for my sake, come 
out for Dr. Henry's sake." 
Somewhere in here one of the parents asked 
Irving, "Why do you stay in the bathroom?" 
And he replied, "Because this is the only 
place where there is solitude." 
After sitting for some time in the living 
room, Mr. Rosenberg joined his wife and me 
in the kitchen. He said, "We must get them 
a bicycle," and the parents talked about 
that for a while. Their idea was that there 
should be one bike for the two boys, and Mrs. 
Rosenberg remarked that the boys had a bicy­
cle once but had never used it. 
Both parents were very anxious as they 
talked about the boys' being bored and not 
associating with other children. They said 
the trouble is that Ben seems too young for 
Irving, that Irving hangs around the house 
with nothing to do. Mrs. Rosenberg feels 
that everything that happened tonight was 
due to boredom. 
Mrs. Rosenberg promised Irving he could stay 
up as long as he wanted and watch his 
favorite TV show. She said, "Come on out, 
Irving, you'll miss your favorite TV show," 
but Irving clamored back, "You never do any­
thing for me." She protested how much she 
had done, resentfully denying his accusations. 
The father's statements were mostly hostile 
rebuttals of what Irving had said. Every 
time hismother reminded him of what she had 
done for him, Irving became sarcastic and told 
her how great she was. Mr. and Mrs. Rosenberg 
spoke of their love for him, and Irving ridi­
culed tEem. Mr. Rosenberg accused Irving of 
wanting to cause the family pain and Irving 
told them they caused him a great deal of pain. 
An effort to appease Irving was to offer him 
chocolate cake, but he said that the cake in 
the refrigerator was only fit for pigs, and 
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that at that time of night no bakery was 
open. 
In talking to me in the kitchen Mrs. 
Rosenberg said that what made Irving mad 
was being confronted with the fact that 
he must have been the aggressor, since 
he was on top of Ben. (Note the misper-
ception.) Ben said that the whole thing 
started because he got very tired and 
didn't want to play ball any more and be­
cause he had made two wild pitches, which 
annoyed Irving very much. 
Irving, looking very tired, his eyes red 
from crying, has come out of the lavatory 
and joined the family in the living room. 
With his back to everybody, Irving began 
to play with the Venetian-blind cord. This 
so angered his father that he got up, went 
over to Irving and told him to stop it, but 
when Irving did not obey, the father seemed 
to think better of it and went back and sat 
down on the sofa. He said nothing to Irving 
for the rest of the evening. Mrs. Rosenberg 
told Irvinghe might break the blind, and if 
he did, there would be no money for a bicy­
cle. Irving scoffed at the idea of his get­
ting a bicycle, saying she would never give 
it to him, and she replied, "Well, you'll 
see. Did I ever go back on anything I said 
to you?" Irving said nothing. 
After Irving stopped playing with the cord 
he slumped down on the floor between a 
chair and the window, with his back to the 
TV set, and remained there until his parents 
went to bed. Through all this Ben sat 
watching TV next to his father. 
When Mr. Rosenberg was getting sleepy, he 
put his arm around Ben and nuzzled him. He 
rubbed his head against Ben's and put a 
hand under Ben's buttocks. Ben did not 
counter-snuggle, and after a while, with 
both his hands, withdrew his father's hand 
from under his buttocks. (At dinner this 
evening, when Irving was out of the room, 
Mr. Rosenberg patted Ben on the thigh and 
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said, with a warm expression, "Bennie.") 
Talking roughly to his parents in the 
living room, Irving said that his mother 
can't stop talking, even in her sleep, to 
which she replied, "How can you tell, 
you're asleep!" Irving said that neither 
his mother nor his father loves him. Her 
listing all the things she has done for 
him, like taking him to the doctor when 
he was sick, drew his scorn and contempt. 
She said, "Doesn't my taking you to the 
doctor when you are sick prove I love you?" 
At one point Irving went into the kitchen 
and his mother set a dish of ice cream be­
fore him twice, but he pushed it away both 
times, with a disgusted expression. 
Protesting mildly, Ben was shoved off to bed 
by his father and urged up the steps by his 
mother. She later told me that Ben had said 
he'd get Irving a new Mad magazine tomorrow. 
She related this with satisfaction, indicat­
ing to me what a nice boy Ben is. (I have 
no record of Ben's having actually done this.) 
At last Mr. and Mrs. Rosenberg went up to bed 
and Irving went into the kitchen, picked up 
the little radio and turned to the ball game. 
He got himself half an apple too. He and I 
were alone now, Irving in the dining room and 
I in the living room. He said nothing. I 
don't remember whether I spoke to him, but 
if I did there was no reply. After a while 
I got up to go upstairs. I said good night, 
but there was no response. 
The next day Mrs. Rosenberg told me that she 
had gone down to him—he doesn't like to be 
alone—and asked him if he wanted to go to 
bed. He said, "Just a minute, until I'm 
finished," listened to the radio a little 
while longer and stopped. She went up to 
bed with him and kissed him good night and 
he kissed her good night. 
That night, for the first time, I saw Irving 
asleep in Ben's bed. They were lying in 
dorsoventral position, Ben's back against 
Irving, and Irving's arm around Ben. 
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The italics in the above quotation are mine and are in­
tended to demark certain appropriate evidences of disillusion­
ment. First, we note that the interactions center upon Ir­
ving as their object, and this, of course, is what makes such 
interactions s'elf-disillusional. Thus, Mr. Rosenberg blamed 
Irving for the fighting, as did Irving*s mother. Secondly, 
we note also the basic discrepancy that pervades the whole 
episode, i.e., the discrepancy between the parents' feelings 
and actions toward Irving which, in turn, is a discrepancy 
between how they are supposed to feel and how they really 
feel. Having perceived the discrepancies between how his 
parents feel and act toward him in many instances of inter­
action before, Irving perceives the blame as a confirmation 
of their real feelings toward him, and since they shouldn't 
feel this way such feelings are a discrepancy in this way 
also, i.e., a discrepancy between his parents' conception of 
him and the ideal self-conception. 
Another discrepancy occurs in interactions between Irving 
and his brother Ben. During the fighting, Ben seems to get 
the best of Irving and calls him "chicken." As older 
brother, Irving is supposed to hold his own (his ideal self). 
Since he apparently has some difficulty at this, this too is 
self-disillusioning. He grows tired, he sulks and gets angry 
and attacks his parents, whereupon they continue to blame him. 
In this and several other ways too, Irving perceives his 
younger brother as his parents' favorite, receiving love and 
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affection and attention over him, again a discrepancy be­
tween his ideal self-conceptions and his real self. Note 
that Mr. Rosenberg did not speak to Irving for the rest of 
the evening but instead attended to Ben in an affectionate 
fashion. This, too, is a disillusionment of the utmost con­
sequences to the self, involving a discrepancy between an 
ideal self and a real self. 
A third, and perhaps most important, characteristic of 
this episode that we note is its more direct implications for 
Irving's self-conceptions and their emotional consequences. 
The discrepancies between how his parents should feel and 
act toward him and how they actually feel and act have come 
to define Irving to himself as unwanted, unlovable, rejected, 
inferior to Ben, preferred (if at all) second to Ben. Irving 
says that neither his mother nor his father loves him. These 
are implications, furthermore, that have dire emotional con­
sequences . The great pain and sorrow emanating from this 
definition and image of himself pervades the narrative. Ir­
ving, indeed, articulates his pain. He states: "You cause 
me so much heartache in this house. I have nothing but heart­
ache in this house." 
We have said earlier, of course, that certain status-
roles could be gained and lost without much emotional effect 
upon the individual. Conversely, we said that there are 
others which have greater emotional implications, that lie 
closer to the center of the self. Those roles which have the 
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greatest emotional implications for our selves, generally 
speaking, are those which admit us to the widest, most inclu­
sive social categories. This is due to the fact that member­
ship in these is often a prerequisite for entry into others 
which are less inclusive and subcategorical. For example, a 
most inclusive category, sociologically speaking, is that of 
"human being." To not be included in this category is to 
place the individual outside the boundary of the most com­
prehensive category and to thereby deny him the most fundamen­
tal expression of self. It is interesting to note that many 
societies have a name which means, in the native dialect, 
"the people" and which implies that other human beings fall 
outside this category, i.e., as "aliens." The treatment of 
such aliens, when captured, often speaks to the profound 
distinction between such persons and themselves in the minds 
of their captors. 
It appears at first somewhat incredible that any indi­
vidual born into a society could come to a state in his self-
conceptions as to believe himself not even to belong to the 
category of human being. Yet at the same time, I have become 
convinced that something like this belief lies at the heart of 
the state of alienness. The alienated individual, though he 
may not be able to articulate it, feels himself to be differ­
ent from others to the point where I have called it a feeling 
of contradistinctiveness. As shown in the ethnographic narra­
tive of the Rosenberg family above, this contradistinctiveness 
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is expressed and revealed in behavior a number of ways and 
constitutes as profound a differentiation as that made be­
tween many primitive peoples and those of other societies. 
It is this contradistinction, the product of modal self-
disillusionment, that seems clearly to lie at the heart of 
the state of alienness. Katz (quoted in Hewitt, 1979:226) in 
his studies of deviance has called this contradistinction the 
"negative essence." He writes; 
. . . the sociological existence of 
deviant phenomena is constituted by 
the imputation of deviant ontological 
status to human beings. The ontolog­
ical status imputed to deviants is a 
negative essence, which is analytically 
the mirror-image of imputing to human 
beings a positive essence, or charisma. 
The one is an imputation of sub-human 
nature, the other of superhuman nature. 
And Hewitt (1979:226), in a further comment upon the 
"negative essence" writes: 
Such a conception carries us to the 
heart of the phenomenon of deviance: 
not merely a category of behavior de­
fined as a breach of social order 
(though that is an essential part of 
it), deviance also is a category of 
persons, viewed as somehow less than 
fully human, less than normal, not up 
to normal human capabilities or dispo­
sitions. (Italics mine.) 
Like the deviant, only perhaps more so, the alienated in­
dividual views himself as less than fully human. In this way, 
he is perhaps the greatest "deviant" of all. Schachtel (1975: 
75) states that alienated people often express ". . .a feel­
ing that compared with others one is not fully a person." 
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This is alienness of the most fundamental nature and the 
emotional consequences of this alienness range from deep and 
agonizing sorrows and depressions to intense hostility and 
rage. 
This particular consequence of the cognition of being an 
alien points out what makes this experience truly disillusion­
ing as contrasted to a "mere" failure to fulfill self in 
actualization—an occurrence that happens rather routinely in 
complex, modernized societies.^ While such routine experi­
ences may attack the self, the individual does not suffer 
from them as he does in the true self-disillusionment, for 
they ^  not have the same meaning. The individual can usually 
shrug them off as insignificant or dismiss them entirely. 
They simply do not carry the emotional freight of the true 
self-disillusionment because they do not carry the same im­
plications for self. As shown in the narrative, the meaning 
of a self-disillusioning experiencing is that one is somehow 
a non-person, possessing a negative essence. It comes to de­
fine the individual to himself in this way, i.e., as a nega­
tive person, unlovable, unwantable, a non-person. Once this 
definition is established, every time an experience of self-
disillusionment occurs it thus reenforces this conception of 
^Feuer (1969) has criticized the theory of alienation for 
equating it with mere self-frustration. I mean to show that 
self-disillusionment is an altogether different phenomenon 
than that to which Peuer seems to refer. 
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self, and bears with it the emotional consequences of grief, 
anxiety, and sorrow. 
In its most basic form, then, secondary alienation 
refers to the process through which the individual fails to 
identify himself as a "full-blown" person, to use Schachtel's 
phrase. He fails to achieve the most basic identity of all, 
the identity of "person," or of "human being." The alienated 
individual comes to possess a "negative essence" that contra­
distinguishes him or her from normality, and serves, thereby, 
to disidentify him or her with his own kind. While cogni-
tively he can realize that he is, of course, a human being, 
there is the failure of emotional confirmation of such knowl­
edge, echoing Gendlin's view that the meaning of our's and 
other's actions has an emotional base or "direct referent" 
that "fills out" or "colors" our interactive life. (As we 
have seen, this emotional base is established in infancy.) 
In the state of secondary alienness, the person's cognitive 
component can at once comprehend the absurdity of the thought 
or statement that one is not a person yet at the same time 
he fails to substantiate it emotionally and experientially. 
To reiterate, these two components of action are thus clearly 
linked; congition does not rule our behavior apart from 
emotion. It is the latter, indeed, that is truly motivational 
and makes our use of the term self-disillusionment, as well 
as fulfillment, appropriate, for it signifies the emotional 
basis of alienness as well as the cognitive basis. 
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We may summarize up to this point as follows: Self-
disillusionment is defined as a social act in which there is 
a perceived discrepancy between the ideal and the real self, 
and which comes to cognitively define the individual to him­
self in a negative way. The disillusioning experience thus 
simultaneously negates the ideal self-concept and constructs 
in its stead a negative kind of self-concept, a contradistinc­
tion between oneself and others, from which emanates the 
negative emotions. These negative emotions, in turn, motivate 
the individual to attempts at restoring his ideal self-
concept. The individual, during such attempts, now becomes 
acutely aware of himself and is, in this even more essential 
sense, alienated, since the self is no longer a unity with 
its environment. It is, instead, an object of his conscious­
ness, becoming so as a result of its disillusionment in inter­
action with others. 
Thus, from modal self-disillusionment alienness occurs. 
Its major characteristics are the modal objectification of the 
self in consciousness, and the contradistinction, in addition 
to the differentiation of the self from others and the cen­
tralization of it in the attention of the individual. The 
centralization of the self in consciousness results from 
being almost constantly in defense of the self-concept, a 
defense against its disillusionment. The avoidance of self-
disillusionment, and the anxiety that it brings, requires 
constant monitoring and control of one's impulses and emotions. 
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Stated in our terminology, the "Me" aspect of the self be­
comes focused upon two other aspects of the self, i.e., it 
becomes focused upon the self-concept, and, also, becomes a 
rather constant monitor of the "I." The "I," in fact, now 
comes under strong censorship and is placed in service to the 
self-conception. Weinstein and Weinstein (1977:107) have put 
it this way: 
There are two possible relations of self to 
self-concept. First, the self-concept may 
be objectified and fixed so that it repre­
sents the self and can be used as an instru­
ment by it to achieve certain rewards and to 
avoid certain punishments. Second, the self-
concept may be made subjective and relative 
to the processes of choosing and creating, 
and therefore provisional, revocable, mutable, 
and representative of only phases of con­
scious processes. 
The second relationship obviously represents the being-
cognition state. Referring to the first relation of the self 
to self-concept, however, these writers call it an "in­
strumental" relationship. In this meaning, the "Me" apparent­
ly makes an instrument of the I and uses it, instrumentally, 
"to effect the idealized self-concept." These authors state: 
"At the limit of instrumentalism the self-concept becomes a 
means to its own presentation and validation. In this case 
the individual is fully absorbed in the self-concept, making 
all actions subordinate to its establishment and maintenance 
in awareness" (p. 108). This relationship represents the 
D-cognition state. 
Self-absorption, modal self-consciousness, self-preoccu­
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pation; these are the mark of alienness, the result of self-
disillusionment. They refer to the constant monitoring and 
control, even suppression, of the impulsive self. Such 
characteristics echo Lasch's "narcissist," Riesman's "other-
directed" type. White's "organization man," and Mill's 
"happy robot." 
In our terminology, then, we are secondarily alienated 
when we fail to fulfill an ideal self-concept. The alienation 
of the self occurs here in the sense that one's behavior, 
feelings, beliefs, etc. are now brought into the awareness 
of the actor. The self is objectified, carved out of the 
flux of consciousness, made the focus of our attention. Such 
objectification is the separation, in our perceptions, of 
ourselves from our environment. We and our environment are 
no longer one. The self is foreground, the environment back­
ground. The failure to fulfill self-conceptions, to translate 
the ideal self-concept into action as confirmed by others, 
brings the self into central consciousness. Behavior now is 
controlled, non-spontaneous. Before action occurs it is sub­
jected to our attention in relation to the self-concept. 
Alienness occurs here in the sense that, otherwise, the self 
would be, relatively speaking, a non-entity, a stream of 
consciousness in which the object self arises, if at all, only 
fleetingly. The individual would no longer be modally self-
conscious. He would exist in a state of "being cognition," 
and unity with society, though not like that in the state of 
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duration. When, on the other hand, he becomes conscious of 
himself, the self is separated from the social environment. 
The individual is no longer in psychic unity with his society. 
He not only views himself as an object, but invests this ob­
ject with a negative essence. Disillusionment comes to 
identify the individual negatively to himself. He comes 
to define himself as an alien among his own people. 
Conclusion 
With all that has been presented in Chapter III and in 
this chapter it is probably worthwhile to present a brief 
recapitulation at this point before going on to a more de­
tailed description of the alienated state. 
As seen in Chapter III, the individual is born with no 
objective self-awareness. In this state, i.e., the state of 
subjective awareness only, he experiences no distinction be­
tween himself and others other than a perceptual differentia­
tion. Born into a symbolically communicating society, how­
ever, he acquires language and, concomitantly acquires objec­
tive self-consciousness. Underlying this acquisition is a 
certain emotional mode of experience. Depending on whether 
the mode is positive or negative, the individual will even­
tually become identified with certain status-roles of the 
society or alienated from them. Since it is through identi­
fication with these status roles that he is integrated into 
society, if he becomes alienated from them he also becomes 
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alienated from society, i.e., the other persons with whom he 
is associated. 
It is the negative mode of emotion which leads to alien-
ness. Subjected to a modal self-disillusionment in infancy 
the individual experiences emotional insecurity. Lacking in 
basic emotional security, the infant's development of the 
positive self-concept later is jeopardized, for, if those 
significant others around him, having failed to love him in 
infancy, continue their lack of love in childhood, the child 
begins to conceive of himself in this way, i.e., as unlovable. 
This is the beginning of the negative essence or contradis-
tinctive characteristic, the perception of being unloved, the 
conception of being unlovable. Angyal (1951:52) writes: 
In the neurotic development there are 
always a number of unfortunate circum­
stances that instill in the child a self-
derogatory feeling. This involves on 
the one hand a feeling of weakness which 
discourages him from the free expression 
of his wish for mastery, and on the other 
a feeling that there is something wrong 
with him and that, therefore, he cannot 
be loved. The whole complicated struc­
ture of neurosis appears to be founded 
on this secret feeling of worthlessness, 
that is, on the belief that one is inade­
quate to master the situations that con­
front him and that he is undeserving of 
love. 
And Schachtel (1975:78) states that the dynamics of this 
fe e l i n g  o f  b a s i c  a n x i e t y  a n d  s e l f - d e r o g a t i o n  o f t e n  " . . .  
crystallize around repeated parental remarks which, rather 
than referring to a particular act of the child, say or imply 
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that the child or lacks, by its, very nature, such and 
such; that Tom is a lazy-good-for-nothing or that he is 
'just like Uncle Harry,' who happens to be the black sheep 
in the family." (Italics mine.) 
While these significant others then continue their 
psychic assault upon the child and therefore merely continue 
what they have always done, we must remember that the intra­
psychic developments are interrelated so that the basic 
anxiety the child has developed during infancy also has its 
effects, quite independently of the effects of the continued 
self-disillusionment by significant others. That is, the 
lack of an inner emotional strength predisposes the individ­
ual to certain behavior tendencies and comparisons which play 
back upon the self-concept. Such tendencies toward timidity, 
shyness, withdrawal, etc., definitely tell the individual 
something about himself. Of course, when these effects are 
coupled with the continuing seIf-disillusioning responses in 
childhood, then the full development of negative essence and 
thence of alienness is even more probable. 
The development of negative-essence through self-dis­
illusionment is thus the basis of alienness for it consists 
essentially of the formation of a conception of oneself as ab­
normal, subhuman, unlovable, unwanted, etc. Alienation thus 
is a long-term process in which significant other persons' 
interactions are of a self-disillusioning consequence and in 
defense from which the individual becomes seIf-preoccupied. 
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In coming to be constantly self-preoccupied the individual 
loses his unity with his environment since the acting, spon­
taneous, impulsive, subjective self has now become separated 
and contradistinctive within his consciousness as an object, 
and is measured and controlled constantly by the "Me." He 
exists now in a defensive state as opposed to a state of 
being. He has, indeed, become fully alienated. 
We turn now to a fuller characterization of the alienated 
person. 
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CHAPTER V: 
A PORTRAIT OF THE ALIENATED INDIVIDUAL 
Alienness as a psychological state is expressed well in 
the following poem gleaned from a student newspaper in a 
community college: 
I've carefully travelled the 
corridors of my mind 
Opened every door and seen 
only blackness. 
I've looked into my soul 
And seen only ugliness. 
I've considered the space I fill 
And decided it would be better 
empty 
Why do others trouble with me 
When I am so devoid of worth? 
Why must I continue to waver 
On the outside edge of life? 
Where is my peace? 
Is it hiding 
In the ugly, empty darkness 
within me? 
I don't know. 
I don't know. 
K.J. 
In this poem, we see the negative essence of the self, we 
see the preoccupation with the self, we see the feeling of not 
being a part of humanity, and we see the emotional concomi­
tants of these attitudes. While these are the essential 
characteristics of the alienated state per se, there are ad­
ditional traits that are said to constitute it. Seeman (1959), 
of course, has been primarily responsible for drawing atten­
tion to this "alienation syndrome," i.e., the feelings of 
meaninglessness, powerlessness, self-estrangement, anomia, and 
isolation. It is obvious that our discussions thus far have 
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overlapped, at least implicitly, most of these, but some, 
e.g., powerlessness and meaninglessness especially, require 
further elaboration. 
As indicated in Chapter I, the full description of the 
alienated state is a major problem remaining. This includes 
not only a listing of the major traits which comprise it but 
also their dynamic interrelationships. Although we have 
offered some preliminary conceptualizations in this regard, 
we need now to accomplish closure by adding to the descrip­
tion the traits which we have omitted and prescribing their 
interrelations and dynamics in greater detail. 
Self -Images 
of the Alienated Person 
In Chapter IV I said that modal self-disillusionment 
produced a negative essence or contradistinctive conception 
of the self. This negative self-concept, in turn, produces an 
almost constant preoccupation with the self-concept, a pre­
occupation with denying it or suppressing it in consciousness 
and with fabricating, enhancing and protecting an ideal self 
concept. 
The dynamics of this process have been felicitously de­
scribed by Weiss (1975:466) as follows: "The alienated pa­
tient is not born alienated nor does he choose alienation. 
Lacking genuine acceptance, love and concern for his individ­
uality in . . . [infancy], he experiences basic anxiety." 
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Weiss continues ; 
Early he begins to move away from his 
self, which seems not good enough to 
be loved. He moves away from what he 
is, what he feels, what he wants. If 
one is not loved for what one is, one 
can at least be safe—safe perhaps by 
being very good and perfect and being 
loved for it, or by being very strong 
and being admired or feared for it, or 
by learning not to feel, not to want, 
not to care. Therefore, one has to 
free oneself from any need for others, 
which means first their love and affec­
tion, and, later on, in many instances, 
sex. Why feel if there is no response? 
So the person puts all his efforts into 
becoming what he should be. (Italics 
mine. p. 466.) 
The construction of an ideal self-concept and the at­
tempts to ^  that concept is basically an attempt to alleviate 
the self-hate that disillusionment has engendered. In per­
ceiving himself as unloved, unwanted, a non-person, the 
individual comes to think of himself in derogatory terms. He 
is unlovable, worthless, unwanted, sub-human. This is his 
real self-image, what he "knows" himself to actually be. How­
ever, the knowledge of this real self is so painful that the 
individual must constantly attempt to change it and to bring 
it into concordance with the idealized image. This ideal 
image comes to guide his behavior and to dominate his con­
sciousness. The individual thus literally tries to become, 
to actualize and fulfill, these idealized self-images. 
As implied in Weiss's quotation above, there are three 
kinds of such ideal self-conceptions in a global sense that 
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the individual may construct, and each in its own way repre­
sents a primary solution to the basic anxiety and negative 
feelings that the individual has with regard to his real 
self concept. 
The first of these is what we may call the "Conqueror." 
Horney (1950:214-215) has described the "Conqueror" (though 
she does not use this particular term) as follows: 
He glorifies and cultivates in himself 
everything that means mastery. Mastery 
with regard to others entails the need 
to excel and to be superior in some way. 
He tends to manipulate or dominate others 
and to make them dependent upon him. This 
trend is also reflected in what he expects 
their attitude toward him to be. Whether 
he is out for adoration, respect, or rec­
ognition, he is concerned with their sub­
ordinating themselves to him and looking 
up to him. He abhors the idea of his be­
ing compliant, appeasing or dependent. 
Furthermore, he is proud of his ability 
to cope with any contingency and is con­
vinced that he can do so. There is, or 
should be, nothing that he cannot ac­
complish. Somehow he must be—and feels 
that he is—the master of his fate. 
Helplessness may make him feel panicky 
and he hates any trace of it in himself. 
The Conqueror overcomes the derogatory feelings in him­
self by suppressing them and by becoming a superior person, 
to be looked up to and admired. He thus experiences pleasant 
emotions from this image of himself. Also, he succeeds in 
vindicating the hostility and rage that he feels (uncon­
sciously perhaps), for others, resulting from his shabby 
treatment in infancy. 
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When the Conqueror fails to fulfill this ideal self-con­
ception he resorts to various means to deny these failures to 
himself. As Horney (1950:192-193) writes: 
By dint of imagination, high-lighting 
"good" qualities, blotting out others, 
behavioristic perfection, externali-
zations, he must try to maintain in his 
mind a picture of himself of which he 
can be proud. He must, as it were, put 
up an unconscious bluff and live with 
the pretense of being all knowing, all 
generous, all fair, etc. He must never, 
under any conditions, be aware that by 
comparison with his glorified self he has 
feet of clay. In relation to others one 
of two feelings may prevail. He may be 
extremely proud, consciously or uncon­
sciously, of his faculty of fooling every­
body—and in his arrogance and contempt 
for others believes that he actually 
succeeds in this. Conversely, he is most 
afraid of being fooled himself and may 
feel it as a profound humiliation if he 
is. Or he may have a constant lurking 
fear of being just a bluff, more intensely 
so than other neurotic types. 
A second major idealized self-concept is what may be 
called the "Saint." Again, Horney (1950:222-223) describes 
this kind of self-concept, primarily in imagery, as follows; 
His idealized image of himself primarily 
is a composite of "lovable" qualities, 
such as unselfishness, goodness, gener­
osity, humility, saintliness, nobility, 
sympathy. Helplessness, suffering, and 
martyrdom are also secondarily glorified 
... a premium is also placed on feel­
ings—feelings of joy or suffering, feel­
ings not only for individual people but 
for humanity, art, nature, values of all 
sorts. To have deep feelings is part of 
his image. 
In becoming a Saint the individual once again overcomes 
143 
derogatory feelings about himself, but in an opposite way 
than the Conqueror. Hence, opposite kinds of behavior ensue 
but the effect is the same, an experience of greater self-
esteem and therefore of pleasure and the relief of basic 
anxiety. Of course, just like the Conqueror, the Saint's 
real self-image intrudes and he must resort to various de­
fense mechanisms to avoid the negative effect of such intru­
sions. He, too, engages in imaginary fantasies, suppressions, 
externalization, etc., to maintain the idealized self-image 
and avoid self-disillusionment. 
A curious attribute of the Saint in this respect, which 
makes him quite different from the Conqueror, is his inability 
to feel pride consciously in his idealized attribute, that is 
to consciously experience his own self-esteem. He cannot do 
so because his very self-image of saintliness, which includes 
humility, requires him not to do so. Thus, in his behavior he 
may never express his self-esteem openly, and even in his 
feelings and thoughts he suppresses this esteem, whereas the 
Conqueror * s primary characteristic seems to be his obvious 
(but only apparent) love of and pride in himself. The Con­
queror's superior image allows him to do so whereas the Saint's 
does not. 
A third idealized self-concept that emerges is what we 
may call the "Stoic." Horney (1950:277) describes this 
type's image as ". . .a composite of self-contained serenity, 
freedom from desires and passions, stoicism, and fairness." 
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The Stoic has simply resigned from the battle of trying to 
get love and affection from others. He has withdrawn into 
stoicism, beyond or above it all, detached from emotional in­
volvement. Self-disillusionment can now no longer touch him. 
And like the Conqueror and the Saint, the Stoic must resort to 
the use of the various defense mechanisms to maintain the 
idealized image in the face of disillusionment, but he par­
ticularly relies on imagination and fantasy. Having with­
drawn from active involvement, yet still not relinquishing all 
of life's goals, he resorts to imagining himself as accomplish­
ing these goals. 
Unless one of these self-conceptions wins out and becomes 
the central tendency in the individual's personality, the 
alienated person actually shows combinations of these images, 
and his or her activities, feelings and thoughts will be 
products of all of them at various times and places. A ten­
dency toward any one of these conceptions probably consti­
tutes a neurotic state whereas most alienated persons probably 
experience the whole configuration only to varying degrees 
that may never reach full neurosis. 
The constant attempt at living up to these ideals, how­
ever, produces a set of characteristics that are more or less 
typical of all alienated individuals. 
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Major Characteristics of the 
Alienated Person 
The first and most basic characteristic of the alienated 
individual, of course, is his sense of isolation from others. 
In failing to obtain an identity as a human being the individ­
ual automatically becomes isolated from other people in his 
own perceptions and conceptions of himself. This perception 
and conception i^, indeed, alienness per se. He feels and 
sees himself apart, not just from specific other people or 
groups but from humanity in general, and he feels unlike them, 
different. First of all, he probably feels inferior to them. 
He knows this, secretly, though when he adopts the idealized 
image he tries to hide this even from himself. This inferior­
ity is a negative essence that makes him somehow sub-human, 
abnormal. 
Furthermore, he has the impression that he simply does 
not experience the world as others do. These two distinc­
tions are not independent, for being inferior, unloved, un­
wanted, makes him experience life differently, e.g., promotes 
a greater sensitivity to actions of others, and forms a dif­
ferent perspective that "cuts through" the morality of the 
culture and the ethnomethodology of most people. Thus, he 
often becomes unconventional in his thoughts and may glorify 
such unconventionality, relegating himself to the outskirts 
of society even more. In addition, the alienated person may 
perceive himself to be different physically, from others. 
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usually a difference that, once again, reenforces his feelings 
of inferiority and unlovableness. He may see himself as un­
handsome, ugly, as having too many freckles, too large ears 
or nose, of being too short or tall, too awkward, etc. He 
may fasten upon such differences and blow them all out of 
proportion. In sum, these images of himself serve to make 
the individual feel different, and therefore alien, to others, 
and he develops a deep sense of isolation from these others. 
A second major characteristic of the alienated person is 
his feeling of being a constant spectator of himself. This 
feeling is engendered by his feeling of difference from 
others in a negative way and a desire to be like them. This 
feeling infuses the individual's consciousness, constituting 
an underlying factor in the whole dynamic of his personality 
system and motivates him to almost constantly seek a redefini­
tion and confirmation of himself. This modal objectification 
and preoccupation with the self in the individual's conscious­
ness is thus a major factor in the alienness syndrome. It 
constitutes a very essential element of the alienated state. 
This self-preoccupation is more true, perhaps, of the 
Stoic than of the Saint or the Conqueror, but each type has 
this feeling. And, of course, such a feeling emerges because 
it is true; he a constant spectator in the sense that he 
must constantly monitor his own behavior and feelings and 
compare them with his ideal self-image. He must never admit 
the real self-image to others or even to himself. He must 
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never admit his inferiority, his ugliness, his unworthiness 
of love and affection, his sense of difference and isolation. 
Thus he must be always ready to censor the "I" if it does not 
fit the ideal self-image. He must always be looking at him­
self from an "outside" perspective. 
It is this characteristic more than any other which is 
implied in Riesman's other-directed type, and in Goffman's 
characters, who are so concerned with presentation of the 
self, and in Lasch's "narcissist." Since the self is a social 
product, alienated people must confirm their self-conceptions 
in the eyes of others like everyone else, the difference be­
ing that the self-concept has become rigid and fixed and 
dominating. It is this absolute necessity to maintain this 
concept that may account for other-directedness, and perhaps 
not, as Riesman's theory indicates, the concern for getting 
ahead and the recognition that to do so depends on other peo­
ple in the bureaucracy. The other-directedness may come from 
the need to maintain an idealized self-concept as confirmed 
in the eyes of significant and reference others. The alienat­
ed modern man is probably not a "hollow shell" with no self-
concept. Modern man, like historical man, has a self-concept, 
too, but one which, if he is alienated, he must defend with 
his every action. Otherwise he is his real self, unworthy, 
unlovable, sub-human, inferior. 
A third basic characteristic of the alienated person is 
a sense of indefiniteness, or a vague, diffuse dissatisfaction 
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with life, or, according to Lasch (1979:81) "pervasive feel­
ings of emptiness and depression." Such feelings are often 
expressed as like being in a "void" or as a feeling of great 
"emptiness." 
This sense of vagueness, of diffuse anxiety, of a void, 
or emptiness, is what I believe the term "meaninglessness," 
as used in alienation studies, should connote. Thus, con­
trary to much usage, it is not that the individual perceives 
the external world itself as meaningless but that the indi­
vidual cannot make meaning out of his own life. For the in­
dividual, it is a failure to be able to find meaning in his 
own existence. His life lacks meaning, is empty, is like a 
void, is vaguely apprehended, indefinite (undefined). 
"Meaning," in this sense, is used as it is in Schutz's 
social-phenomenology to refer to the implication of an action 
within the overall "Act." Thus, as Schutz (1967:61) says, 
"The meaning of any action is its corresponding projected 
Act," where by "Act" he means a completed (or consummated, in 
Mead's sense) action. The individual's life may thus be con­
ceived as an action. What, then, we may ask, is its meaning? 
To do so is to ask what goal it strives for, what ultimate 
value it seeks to attain. If one has his goal in mind, then 
the actions one engages in as one's life unfolds have meaning 
in terms of their "fit" or "place" within the life-act as it 
is previsioned. 
But we must reiterate here the importance of the emotion-
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al basis of meaning, or what Gendlin (1964) has referred to 
as the "direct referent." As we have said previously, with­
out the "feel" of the events and structures within which we 
are implicated these events and structures are only external 
objects, not a part of us, and we may react to them at the 
cognitive but not the emotional level. I am suggesting that 
through lack of identity with a social group the individual 
fails to introject the emotional concomitants of its norms, 
values and beliefs and thus fails to obtain their full mean­
ing. Extreme examples of this, of course, are the sociopathic 
states. Thus, the alienated person, in failing to obtain 
identification with his society or social group, has failed 
to imbue his own actions with the emotional grounding that 
completes their meaning. Without this emotional grounding, 
the meaning of the action is not felt but only known. The 
individual's sense of vagueness, of emptiness, of diffuse 
anxiety, is thus, essentially, a sense of meaninglessness 
wherein he cannot connect his emotions to his actions. To 
him, his actions thus may be without meaning, hence his sense 
of indefiniteness and vagueness and the anxiety that accom­
panies these. 
This sense of meaninglessness is also connected to the 
usage in alienation literature of the term anomia or personal 
"normlessness." Norms are guides to conduct. They are 
based on values, which are ends, or goals. These values and 
norms must be internalized which means they must not only be 
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known but felt. In suffering from anomia the individual is 
deprived of the emotional basis for the conduct of his life. 
In being so deprived he suffers meaninglessness. He ex­
periences his own life as a void, bereft of purpose and mean­
ing. These terms thus imply a lack of sense of direction, no 
reference points, an amorphous landscape from the individual's 
point of view. As Kenneth Keniston's (1965) character Inburn 
(who is a composite of Keniston's alienated subjects) puts it, 
the world may appear to such individuals as an "endless and 
featureless countryside." But anomia is accounted for, of 
course, not by the fact that society endless, featureless, 
meaningless, etc., but by the failure to achieve an identity 
from which flows the sense of belonging, meaning, purpose, and 
normativeness, since to identify as human, and hence as female 
or male, or as a certain race or ethnic group, or as a member 
of a certain religion, class, or occupation, etc., is to 
locate oneself within a social structure and a social process 
and hence to provide direction (to varying degrees, of course). 
Without this source of identity, one feels "lost on an un­
charted sea." 
To say this is simply once again to promote the idea of 
the psycho-social essence of the self, especially in the sense 
of the identity concept. As we have said, the term "identity" 
is a psycho-social term indicating a sense of sameness and 
belonging with others of one's group, class, or ethnic cate­
gory, etc., and it gives a sense of place and location of the 
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individual within his society. Moreover, it is emotionally 
based as well as cognitively. Without this identification 
within his group, the individual feels lost, alone, without 
direction, without meaning. 
A fourth major characteristic of the alienated person is 
his sense of not being "himself" but of presenting an artifi­
cial facade. Henry (1973:49) refers to this as "sham," that 
is ". . . a concealment of how we really feel and pretense 
of feeling something different." Schachtel (1975:75) writes 
that alienated people "... tend to feel that they travel 
with a forged passport, under an assumed identity." And 
Horney (1950) makes this characteristic the equivalent of 
alienness itself, for she refers to it as "self-alienation." 
By this, she means the individual's lack of spontaneity, the 
lack of the expression of the impulsive "I" and its sub­
ordination by the "Me" to the ideal self-conception. All 
of these usages I believe are equal to the more sociological 
familiar term of "self-estrangement." In the process of 
"self-alienation," or self-estrangement, the individual puts 
a greater and greater distance between his spontaneous im­
pulses and his actual behavior. Horney believes that in this 
process the individual's "own" emotions and wishes are so 
overridden that he may become unconscious of them after a time. 
While it seems inconceivable that an individual can actually 
lose consciousness of one's emotion, values, beliefs, etc., 
one can, apparently, constantly monitor and assess these for 
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their fit with ideal self-conceptions or role requirements 
and suppress them if they do not do so. The suppression can, 
then, in extreme cases, "deaden" the individual's awareness 
of his own beliefs, values and emotions, or diffuse them to 
the point where he or she appears to have none of his own or 
to be immune or inured to the normal emotional consequences 
of events. This is closer to what Horney means when she 
speaks of the "loss" or "alienation" of the self, for by 
"self," here, she is referring to the .impulsive, spontaneous 
"I." 
It is interesting to note the difference between the con­
cept of sham, of concealment of one's true "feelings," and to 
what existentialist philosophers refer to as "inauthenticity." 
According to Sartre, to live authentically is to live up to 
the social ideals of oneself, for instance, the Christian 
ideal or the middle class ideal, or the Jewish ideal, if one 
is  C h r i s t i a n ,  m i d d l e  c l a s s ,  o r  J e w i s h .  H e  s t a t e s ;  " . . .  
authenticity for . . . [the Jew] is to live to the full his 
condition as Jew; inauthenticity is to deny it or attempt to 
escape from it" (1967:216). Note that Sartre is not speak­
ing here of the subjective, spontaneous "I," and the failure 
to live up to it but to the denial of one's social self-ideal, 
and to act as though one were not even aware of what situated 
others impute one to be in the effort to be another type of 
ideal-self, one that will please the other interactants. For 
Sartre, the Jew should accept the fact that one is a Jew and 
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is so defined by others, and one must deal with that defini­
tion of oneself as a fact of his situation. 
He writes (1967:216): 
What characterizes the inauthentic Jews 
is that they deal with their situation by 
running away from it; they have chosen to 
deny it, or to deny their responsibilities, 
or to deny their isolation, which appears 
intolerable to them. That does not neces­
sarily mean that they wish to destroy the 
concept of the Jew or that they explicitly 
deny the existence of a Jewish reality. 
But their gestures, sentiments and acts aim 
secretly at destroying this reality. 
In a word, the inauthentic Jews are men whom 
other men take for Jews and who have de­
cided to run away from this insupportable 
situation. The result is that they display 
various types of behavior not all of which 
are present at the same time in the same 
person but each of which may be character­
ized as an avenue of flight. 
Sartre, furthermore, recognizes the self-conscious as­
pects of these attempts by certain Jewish people to escape 
their situated identity. He states; "For my part, I recog­
ni z e  t h a t  t h e  e f f o r t  t o  e s c a p e  p r o d u c e s  i n  s o m e  J e w s  . . .  an 
almost continuously reflective attitude" (p. 217). And, 
"with . . . (the Jew), anxiety often takes a special form; it 
becomes a fear of acting or feeling like a Jew" (p. 217). 
It is in the loss of the spontaneity of one's actions and 
in the engagement of sham, as well as inauthenticity, that the 
fifth major characteristic of the alienated person emerges. 
This is a feeling of not being the source of his own actions, 
a loss of autonomy, a feeling of powerlessness. Horney (1950; 
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166) writes that the compulsive character of self-idealization 
" . . .  i n e v i t a b l y  d e p r i v e s  t h e  p e r s o n  o f  h i s  f u l l  a u t o n o m y  a n d  
spontaneity. As soon as, for instance, his need to be liked 
by everybody [the Saint] becomes compulsive, the genuineness 
of his feelings diminishes; so does his power to discriminate. 
As soon as he is driven to do a piece of work for the sake of 
glory [the Conqueror], his spontaneous interest in the work 
itself decreases." Horney writes further; 
. . . the neurotic does not own his energies 
(feel his energies as his own). He has the 
feeling of not being a moving force in his 
own life . . . when a person for instance, 
feels that he must do everything that is 
expected of him, he is actually set in 
motion by the pushes and pulls of others, 
or what he interprets as such—and he may 
stand still like a car with a run-down 
battery when left to his own resources 
(p. 166). 
Again, powerlessness, like meaninglessness, is not used 
in the sense that the individual assesses the objective condi­
tions of his society and his ability to influence its politi­
cal processes and arrives at the conclusion he cannot do so. 
Instead, powerlessness is a subjective state in which spon­
taneity is overridden in the service of living up to an ideal 
self-image. Energy derived from impulse is used in the ser­
vice of being the idealized-self which the individual knows to 
be a sham or inauthentic. 
These characteristics, i.e., constant spectatorship of 
the self, of sham, inauthenticity, and lack of spontaneous 
action, also bring on a desperate fatigue at constantly being 
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something one is not, of being "on stage." This is a sixth 
major characteristic of alienness. The alienated person, 
being obsessed with the fear of being "unmasked," and his 
contrivance exposed, must work continuously at his defenses. 
As Lasch (1979:169-170) has written: "Imprisoned in his self-
awareness, modern man longs for the lost innocence of spon­
taneous feeling." Schachtel (1975:75) says that the fear of 
exposure is present in those individuals who feel they are 
playing at a role, who present an artificial facade to the 
world. He writes: "They tend to feel that they travel with 
a forged passport, under an assumed identity." Constant pre­
occupation with the ideal self and the fear of the exposure of 
the real self require so much energy that the alienated person 
thus often feels a sense of weariness and fatigue that bor­
ders, at times, on exhaustion. Often it may turn into down­
right hopelessness. The urge to "give up," to say "to hell 
with it" and to go on spending binges or leave work undone for 
long periods may also be results. The whole effort may come 
to be "just not worth it." In this sense, the feelings of 
meaninglessness and powerlessness may be enhanced. This 
feeling of great fatigue, of weary dejection, is, indeed, an 
important correlate of these two characteristics. 
These, then, are the major characteristics of the alien­
ated person: (1) he has an extreme sense of difference and 
therefore of isolation from others. Also he (2) constantly 
monitors his own behavior and emotions and overrides his spon­
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taneous impulses. In addition, he (3) has a sense of mean-
inglessness or emptiness to his life and often engages in 
(4) sham and inauthentic behavior, basically for the purpose 
of living up to an ideal self-image that will bring him so­
cial approval or admiration, or raise him above such base 
needs. He then (5) loses a sense of being the source of his 
own activities and feels powerless. The whole charade, fur­
thermore, involves such constant effort that it brings on 
(6) tautness of muscles and body-posture, nervous tension and 
perhaps frequent headaches. He suffers from fatigue and 
weariness. 
We turn now to the socio-historical and socio-cultural 
contexts producing these characteristics. 
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CHAPTER VI: 
THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL AND SOCIO-CULTURAL 
CONTEXTS OF IDENTIFICATION AND ALIENATION 
As indicated in Chapter I, the interactional process 
occurs in a specific situation comprising a certain time and 
place. Individuals interact with "objects" in this immediate 
situation, including themselves, as well as other concrete 
objects like furniture, tools, etc., and abstract objects 
like norms, social categories or groups (etc.). In this 
immediate situation, individuals actualize and present them­
selves to others and are either fulfilled or disillusioned, 
the repeated experiences of which lead to identity or alien-
ness, respectively. 
But interactional situations occur in a larger socio-
cultural context also. That is, social situations are always 
imbedded in a wider network of social organization and social 
structure and in the cultural system of norms, values and 
beliefs which Underlie them. Furthermore, beyond the socio-
cultural context lies a "socio-historical context," that is, 
a phase or stage in the structural development of a society. 
Thus, the "situation" at any given moment may be conceived as 
the result of the larger socio-cultural context, and the 
socio-cultural context in turn may be seen as the result of 
what has gone before it in a sequence of historical events. 
A full accounting of the alienation process and of the alien-
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ness state requires that we extend our analysis into the wider 
contexts beyond the situation to seek the sociological and 
historical conditions under which they arise. 
It is not, of course, as though we had to begin anew, 
for as indicated in our review of the literature, a host of 
writers have sought to account for alienation in a socio­
logical and historical way. As also indicated, however, 
there are some problems with these theories that, in my view, 
render them inadequate. These problems have to do primarily 
with the way in which sociological factors become mediated 
through the social process to the individual, there to be 
reflected in his or her character. As we have seen, the 
basic proposition of alienation theory is that changes in 
the structure and culture of traditional society have brought 
on the alienation of the members of this society from one 
another. From the point of view of this study, this means 
that such changes produce the alienation process which pro­
duces the feeling of alienness. The basic question is: How 
do they do this? And the answers given in classical theory 
appear to be unsatisfactory for several reasons. 
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to try to 
trace out the sociological causes of alienation, conceived 
as a product of a specific type of socio-cultural context in 
a specific phase of socio-historical development. Its 
necessity stems from what I believe to be certain limitations 
in the classical, neo-classical and contemporary empirical 
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theories. I shall first clarify the concepts of "socio-
historical" and "socio-cultural" context and then will ad­
dress the problems of theory and seek their remedies in ac­
cord with my own theory as set forth previously. 
The Socio-Historical Contexts 
of Identification and Alienation 
While many social scientists have attempted to do so 
(Sahlins and Service, 1960; Parsons, 1966), it is extremely 
difficult to ascertain on an empirical basis any overall pat­
tern of historical development of societies. Although clearly 
some patterns exist, each society has its own unique history 
and therefore develops in its own unique way. Whether this 
development occurs via the dynamics of a materialist class-
conflict, a struggle between a "center" and a "periphery," suc­
cessful adaptation to a challenge, or via diffusion or inno­
vation, etc., the pattern of change is probably not universal. 
In this study, therefore, I am not advancing any universal 
theory of change to account for alienation and alienness. What 
I am attempting is to isolate a certain process of social 
change at the socio-historical level that can adequately ac­
count for the occurrence of alienation at the social-psycho-
logical level. This process, again, is not posited as a uni­
versal, evolutionary scheme. 
As I have intimated earlier, the central proposition in 
alienation theory is that a change in a society from a tradi­
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tional type to a modern type is the primary source of aliena­
tion. As I have also intimated, however, the specific 
causal sequences of this process remain rather vague and ob­
scure. The proposition itself is so abstract that it does 
not tell us how this transition brings alienation about. The 
dichotomy of tradition vs. modern encompasses such a host of 
changes that the isolation and identification of such a 
process becomes extremely difficult. 
It is possible, however, to discern one trend implied 
in this dichotomy which represents a particularly good candi­
date as an explanation of the emergence of an alienation 
process in the modern societies. At the same time, this trend 
is fairly well accepted throughout the literature (Smith, 
1976:53) and is therefore somewhat relieved of the problems 
of cultural evolutionary theory. I speak of the trend, mani­
fested in a great number of societies, and certainly one im­
plied in the tradition to modern dichotomy, of structural dif­
ferentiation, specifically from simple to complex. 
By structural complexity, I am referring primarily to 
the number of "parts," i.e., social-statuses, social-relation­
ships, social-groups, social-categories, etc. which emerge 
primarily on the basis of a division of labor. By division 
of labor, I am referring, as in Durkheim's (1964) usage, to 
the differentiation of functions, and thus of status-roles, 
in the society. Greater structural complexity will refer to 
an increase in the number of such units within any particular 
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society. 
On the basis of this concept, i.e., of structural-
complexity, it is possible to arrange societies on a continu­
um from least complex to most complex. From the viewpoint 
of contemporary knowledge of social change, specifically 
from the viewpoint that no universal patterns of change can 
be empirically substantiated, it seems to me that this trend 
is the most that can be "rescued" or salvaged from classical 
alienation literature with regard to its central proposition, 
i.e., that the change from a traditional type to a modern 
type of society brings about alienation. To do otherwise 
risks bringing up all the value-problems contained in terms 
like "modernization," "cultural-evolution," etc., which I 
wish to avoid. 
The division of labor, and its consequent, structural 
complexity, therefore, assumes a central role in the attempt 
to construct a theoretical account of the socio-historical 
context of alienation and alienness. In what follows I shall 
attempt to trace out what I believe to be types of societies 
based on different levels of structural complexity. I shall 
also attempt to delineate what I believe are the factors 
and their dynamics involved in the transformation of a society 
from a low level of structural complexity to a higher one. 
To paraphrase primarily from Durkheim (1964), the divi­
sion of labor seems to occur most directly as a result of 
increased population in a society, which produces greater 
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intra-societal competition between persons and groups. Per­
sons and groups specialize as a result and a greater division 
of labor ensues. Population increases, in turn, depend upon 
a variety of factors but first and foremost upon food supply. 
This, in turn, seems to depend mostly upon technological in­
novation with, respect to securing food and commodity products 
from the natural resources of the societal territory. When 
food supply increases, population increases, and it is popu-
lation increase which I shall single out as the primary fac­
tor leading to the formation of new levels of structural 
complexity as a result of the competition for scarce re­
sources it engenders. 
The least complex societies, which I shall call level 1, 
2 
consist of a quite small population. The social organization 
of such societies consists primarily of family groups linked 
together by intermarriage and kinship. The family performs 
most social functions. A family's mode of food production 
in such societies consists of hunting or fishing (or both) 
and gathering. Its technology is based around these modes. 
The communities tend to be encampments, or winter and summer 
villages of temporary residence. 
If the society's environment can provide enough food, 
^I use the term primary here as I have used it pre­
viously to refer to a first or initial phenomenon. 
2 
This level is similar to what in anthropology is re­
ferred to as "bands," consisting of hunters and gatherers. 
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then its population may increase, depending on its tech­
nology. From such increases in population, the structure of 
the society changes into a new type of greater complexity 
which I shall designate as level 2. These more complex 
structured societies are composed of a number of sub-
societies that are socially integrated through the formation 
of new structures which I shall call "associations." Pre­
sumably with the increase in population of the original so­
ciety, the surplus people break off to form their own social 
units, but maintain social ties with the original group, not 
only by kinship but by the formation of new social units 
other than the family. The formation of such units is what 
distinguishes these societies as of greater structural com­
plexity. While each sub-society thus forms a separate com­
munity, each is tied with others socially, culturally and 
geographically by the formation of "associations." In Durk-
heim's terms, the society has become "segmented," but the as­
sociations help to keep it integrated structurally. The 
family, however, is still the most important unit. 
As food gathering or production technology continues to 
develop, population continues to increase. The territory of 
the society begins to fill up. Families claim most of the 
livable land. Unless the surplus people wish to invade 
another society's territory, the people are faced with food 
shortages. Under this condition, there is a pressure for the 
social units of the society to begin greater interchanges of 
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food, goods, and services to offset shortages in one area 
with surpluses in another. The structure that does this is 
the status-role of chieftain, and it is this social develop­
ment that demarks a new level of structural complexity. This 
level I shall designate as level 3. 
The chief's major function appears to be to redistribute 
surplus goods and services. These surplus goods and serv­
ices result from the greater division of labor that in turn 
has resulted from the greater intensity of competition among 
the social units to secure subsistence, which in turn has 
resulted from their increased numbers. Thus, these societies, 
unlike the others, are not merely "segmented," in Durkheim's 
terminology, but are truly differentiated by a division of 
labor. This division of labor, furthermore, is not merely 
a symbiotic development but an act of conscious specializa­
tion. 
The more numerous specialized units and the emergence of 
the chieftain's role for their coordination is the primary 
characteristic that sets this society off from less struc­
turally differentiated societies. But there may also be a 
measure of prestige and power which devolves to the chief 
and carries over to his relatives. Certain norms of defer­
ence and sumptuary rites may emerge around this role, and it 
tends to become hereditary, with the chief's relatives taking 
the position upon his death or ascension. Thus, while true 
stratification in the political and economic sense does not 
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occur in these societies, certain social divisions may occur, 
demarked by norms of deference and consumption. This charac­
teristic also distinguishes this society structurally from 
others and places it higher on the continuum. 
In such societies, too, there are the first beginnings 
of the fully developed status-roles of priest, though these 
are still relatively diffuse. Food surpluses help support 
such a truly specialized class, which also develops its own 
norms, rituals and ceremonies. 
This more complex structure, i.e., level 3, shows a new 
form of social integration, which Durkheim called "organic." 
Units become economically interdependent. Socio-political 
integration, though still weak, is stronger at this level. 
Cultural, or "mechanical," integration is weakened in this 
society because of the division of labor, but because it is 
still territorially and numerically small enough for inter­
action among the units to occur frequently, common values, 
beliefs and norms remain fairly intact. 
In a historical context, it may be argued that, as 
population continues to grow, poeple are forced to settle 
in areas less capable of providing enough food and sub­
stance. These new settlements find it necessary to pro­
vide for themselves by providing special services to others. 
Such services coul-d include specialization in handicrafts 
and trade goods, or in defense, or in religion. These goods 
and services are then traded, or bartered, for food, or for 
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other goods and services. It is probably on the basis of 
trade, along with the continuing increase in population, 
that a new community form, the city, was to emerge and which 
was to become the characteristic community form of a more 
structurally complex society than those discussed. This 
level will be designated as level 4. 
This structural level of society is demarcated from the 
other types by institutionalized force. A group arises which 
claims for itself the right of ultimate sanction of other 
groups by coercive power. Its authority is legally estab­
lished. Norms are increasingly transformed from folkways and 
mores to laws. This development is a direct outgrowth of in­
creasing population pressure and urbanization. We may pre­
sume that such pressures on societies emanated not only from 
within but without. Other societies, too, were coping with 
population growth. These other societies represented con­
stant threat. Furthermore, there is little doubt that 
scarce resources and increased competition for them, especial-; 
ly as enhanced by urban concentration, lead persons to 
utilize differentials in power to further their own inter­
ests, or even to seek out such differentials for their use. 
If a certain group came to specialize legitimately in the 
defense of an urban community or society, such legitimacy 
only further supported the development of institutionalized 
force by providing the "golden opportunity." 
The ultimate structural result, therefore, may have been 
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the formation of the "state," that is, a system of status-
roles whose manifest function is to defend against other 
societies and to control, regulate and coordinate—from a 
more or less central point—the activities of intra-societal 
members. The development of a political state thus demarks 
this a 4 level of structural complexity. It was probably 
based primarily in some urban community from which it ex­
tended its power throughout the territory and over all of 
the rest of the society. It built walls and fortifications 
around its city into which the farmers and villagers in the 
surrounding hinterlands could withdraw from attack. 
Some of these societies extended their territories 
through conquest, becoming truly large and complex social 
systems, such as the Chinese, Indian and Mesopotamian. From 
these original, pristine civilizations emerged the civili­
zations of Egypt, Greece, Rome, Crete, etc. The development 
of such societies constitutes a fifth level of structural 
complexity. Their formation probably presented rather formi -
dable problems of integration and presuppose concomitant 
developments in written law, in communication, trade and com­
merce, etc. It is these patterns of structure which place 
them at higher levels on the structural continuum. 
At this level of complexity, and perhaps at the pre­
vious level as well, technological innovation in food and 
commodity production and population growth are still impor­
tant factors in the dynamics of these societies, but more 
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and more relevance has to be attributed to externally in­
trusive factors as well as to the factors of intra-societal 
conflict between members and groups at the "center" and on 
the "periphery" of the society. 
The historical fates of these ancient civilizations are 
now a part of our history books and are fairly well-known. 
They were eventually broken up or reduced territorially and 
replaced by the contemporary nation-states, some with 
attendant increases in structural complexity based on an 
almost explosive division of labor. These latter nation-
states are marked off from the others by the existence of 
an industrialized economy and by corporate and bureaucratic 
forms of organizations, all of which are based on rational­
istic and scientific principles applied to production and 
human relations. They represent the highest and sixth level 
of structural complexity, not only in terms of a profusion 
of occupational status-roles, groups, organizations, and 
differentiated institutions, but in terms of the heterogenity 
of religious, ethnic and other social divisions of the popu­
lation. 
The Socio-Cultural Contexts of Identification 
and Alienation: Gemeinschaft 
and Gesellschaft 
Societies may be classified within a socio-historical 
category according to the structural scheme just presented. 
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The idea is that each of these levels of structural complexi­
ty represents a specific configuration of organizational and 
structural characteristics resulting from the confluence of 
various factors over time. Each of these levels, therefore, 
represents a historically developed socio-structural context 
within which alienating processes may be located. 
These contexts, in turn, may be seen as associated with 
particular socio-cultural contexts, that is a particular set 
of values, beliefs and norms characterized by a particular 
Weltanschauung or geist. Traditionally, sociologists have 
recognized two major types of such contexts: the gemein-
schaft and the gesellschaft. These terms, of course, stem 
from the work of Tonnies (1963) though they were recognized 
before him. Since Tonnies's work, other similar classifica­
tions have emerged.^ 
While gemeinschaft has been translated in sociology as 
"community," and its opposite, gesellschaft, as "society," 
such usage fails to capture the essential meaning of the term, 
and especially that which is relevant to the concept of 
identity/alienness. But in his review of the concept of 
gemeinschaft, Cohen (1978:2) brings out this meaning. He 
writes: 
English speaking peoples have translated 
^See the review of types used by Sorokin, Redfield, 
Parsons and Becker in the introduction to Community and So­
ciety by Charles Loomis and John McKinney. 
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gemeinschaft to mean "community." Oc­
casionally we come closer to the essence 
of Tonnies's meaning when we say communal 
spirit or communal relationship. Gesell-
schaft is translated to mean "society," 
"association," or "large society." In 
fact, the title of Tonnies's book is 
stated as Community and Society in the 
English translation. Such a conception 
is more sterile and simple than Tonnies 
himself obviously intended. This intent 
is visible, for example, when he refers to 
the gemeinschaft of mother and child, 
gemeinschaft o1~mind, gemeinschaft of 
friendship and the like . I . . This is a 
far cry from the translation and idea of 
gemeinschaft which sees it as community, 
unless whenone uses the word "community" 
what is meant is the inner essence of 
this, in the form of communing, wherever it 
is found, whether between mother and child 
or in place of residence and elsewhere. 
Cohen states further that gemeinschaft is ". . . a form 
of relating to group and world, and a view of the world, ac­
tually a Weltanschauung ... a mode of perception and a mode 
of relating." In a clear reference to gemeinschaft in this 
way, Cohen (1978:3) states; 
A gemeinschaft may refer to a special kind 
of social group, a type of relationship, 
and a way of thinking. It is a group or 
relationship that comes into being because 
sympathy among the members arises and makes 
them feel that the relationship is a value 
in and of itself (Timasheff, 1957, p. 98; 
Loomis and McKinney in Tonnies, 1963, p. 5). 
Gemeinschaft may be seen not only as a group 
of a certain kind, but as a thread of 
thought, a perception, of feeling, of rela­
tionship as well, where all of this in effect 
is the purpose of the relationship. It is 
not a matter of what one can get out of the 
relationship. The relationship is not per­
ceived as a means, but as an end, having 
value of its own accord. The gemeinschaft 
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exists because the relatedness to what­
ever is perceived in essence and under­
stood is a pleasure in and of itself. 
In the gesellschaft context, on the other hand, social 
relations are not perceived as ends in and of themselves but 
as means to an end. This end is usually considered to be 
purely economic, as in the attainment of greater efficiency 
for the pursuit of profit. Reason dominates over tradition or 
over morality in the gesellschaft context. In his discussion 
of the concept, Loomis (1964:286-287) states that: 
In gesellschaft, beliefs must submit to 
such critical,objective, and universal-
istic standards as employed in logic, 
mathematics and science in general. The 
norms for the expressing of sentiments 
follow the model of the "calculating 
scheming person" (F. Tonnies, Community 
and Society, p. 130), e.g., "honesty is 
the best policy" under the gesellschaft 
only if it pays dividends in terms of 
the goal (or ends) to be honest, not be­
cause of any intrinsic morality in hon­
esty. Behavior in the marketplace is 
taken as the model .... Obligations 
in relationships are functionally specif­
ic (ibid., pp. 177, 194, 278 and 279, 
fn. 22) and affectively neutral (ibid., 
pp. 75, 90, 129, 141, 156, and 157). 
In our usage, then, the terms gemeinschaft and gesell­
schaft shall refer to a cultural context that accompanies cer­
tain structural configurations of a society as it develops his­
torically. In this sense, these terms will refer more to the 
value-orientations that characterize the societal partici­
pants and to the system of norms that reflect these orienta­
tions. After Parsons and Shils (1951), we shall reserve the 
169 
gemeinschaft term to refer to that value pattern of affectivi-
ty, particularism, ascription, diffuseness, and collective-
orientation. Conversely, we shall reserve the gesellschaft 
term tp refer to that value pattern of affective-neutrality, 
universalism, achievement, specificity, and self-orientation. 
In our theorizing in this study, the gemeinschaft con­
text is seen to be associated with the first three levels of 
social structure. The gesellschaft context emerges most 
clearly at the fourth level of social structure. The socio-
historical development of a society from communal to associa-
tional through these levels, and their associated cultural 
development, is shown in Figure 6. It is convenient, and 
quite in accord with sociological custom to classify the 
first three types of societies as sub-types within a larger 
type of "communal," "folk" or "traditional" society, and to . 
Level 1 
T _ communal gemeinschaft 
2 societies = culture 
Level 3 
Level 4 
Level 5 associational _ gesellschaft 
societies culture 
Level 6 
Figure 6. Levels of Structural and Cultural Development 
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classify the latter four as sub-types of "associational," 
"urban," or "modern" societies. It should be understood that 
the gesellschaft culture develops gradually in each successive 
socio-historical category of society until it comes to its 
fullest expression in the industrialized nation-states. 
It should be pointed out here again that I am not ex­
pressing an evolutionary or even neo-evolutionary theory of 
social change that is universal to all societies. As I have 
said previously, I wish merely to extrapolate a structural 
trend which can be observed to have occurred in a great 
number of societies and which I believe represents a 
plausible causal sequence producing alienation. My view is 
that, as the factors enumerated interact in the way I have 
described over time, greater structural complexity of the 
society is produced. It is this structural complexity, in 
turn, which produces alienating processes. Societies do not, 
of course, have to follow this route to modernity. Indeed, 
today, through the export of industrialism, commercialism 
and Western rational, scientific and technological procedures, 
these causal processes often do not apply. Still, in whatever 
way the movement from traditional to associational types 
occurs, it is in this transition that I locate the causal 
process producing alienation and alienness. 
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Identification and Alienation of Self and Others 
in the Two Contexts 
It is in the context of associational societies and 
gesellschaft culture that sociologists, from the classical to 
the neoclassical to the contemporary, locate the alienated 
individual. Conversely, in the communal societies with their 
gemeinschaft culture there is said to be an almost complete 
fusion of the individual with society. 
In his analysis of Durkheim's work, Tiryakian (1962:53) 
makes this point: 
Durkheim posits in The Division of Labor, 
that the earliest form of society is 
characterized by mechanical solidarity, 
analogous to the solidarity of elements 
and molecules in physical bodies; fur­
ther, the bond relating people to society 
is analogous to that which relates things 
to the person. Mechanical solidarity is 
more or less spontaneous, and personal 
volition counts for little, since it has 
not yet developed. In such a society, 
still approximated in existent primitive 
groupings, individuals resemble one an­
other so much in their perception of the 
world that the collective consciousness 
is practically coincident with the in­
dividual consciousness; there is really 
no individual consciousness as such. 
The individual consciousness is a 
"simple dependency of the collective 
type and follows all its movements, 
just as the object which is owned 
follows those of its owner." 
Tiryakian states further that Durkheim certainly was a-
ware that individual differences in personalities existed 
among these early societies and that it was recognized and 
taken into account. But as the quotation above indicates. 
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the degree of similarity in belief and practice was so great 
that "... the collective consciousness is practically coin­
cident ,with the individual consciousness . . . ." Such a 
state represents, indeed, an ultimate identity of the individ­
ual with society. 
In the associational society, however, a disunity be­
tween the individual and society exists. Marx (1963) de­
scribes the individual in this state as: 
. . . separated from community, with­
drawn into himself, wholly preoccupied 
with his private interest and acting in 
accordance with his private caprice. The 
only bond between egoistic men is natural 
necessity, need and private interest, the 
preservation of their property and their 
egoistic persons (p. 26). 
And Tonnies (1963:65) remarks that: 
The theory of the gesellschaft deals with 
the artificial construction of an aggre­
gate of human beings which superficially 
resembles the gemeinschaft insofar as the 
individuals live and dwell together peace­
fully. However, in the gemeinschaft they 
remain essentially united in spite of all 
separating factors, whereas in the gesell­
schaft they are essentially separated in 
spite of all uniting factors. 
And in one of the more modern versions (Lasch, 1979) the 
individual is described as avoiding "close involvements," 
cultivating "a protective shallowness," entertaining "fan­
tasies of omnipotence and a strong belief in [the] right to 
exploit others and be gratified." Lasch calls this individ­
ual "... the narcissist, who sees the world as a mirror of 
himself and has no interest in external events except as they 
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throw back a reflection of his own image"; and added to these 
traits is the individual's feeling "of vague, diffuse satis­
faction with life," and the feeling that "his amorphous 
existence" is "futile and purposeless," "empty" and "inauthen-
tic. " 
These two extremes of socio-cultural contexts, then, 
produce two extremes of individual consciousness, one of 
identity with, the other of alienness from, society. The 
question we take up next is just how the associational type of 
context does this. 
Associational Society 
and the Alienation Process 
Just how does associational society constitute the con­
ditions which produce alienation? As we have seen in the re­
view of literature in Chapter I, many writers have addressed 
this problem, but as also indicated in that chapter, several 
problems emerge with these theories which render them unsatis­
factory in accounting for alienation and alienness as we have 
conceived them. In our view, the alienation process consists 
of a long term series of disillusioning experiences in which 
the individual comes to define him or herself in a negative 
way and hence fails to identify him or herself as a normal 
human being. The alienness of which we are writing in this 
study is basically the feeling of not belonging to, or lack of 
identity with, humanity. A complex set of traits and attitudes 
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stems from this feeling. This feeling, and its accompanying 
set of traits, can probably only be gotten in the very early 
stages of personality development, for later, in adulthood, 
the individual may refract, refute or simply ignore the im­
plications of another person's action for his self. From 
this perspective, it is obvious that the alienation process 
must be located in those situations which themselves are 
parts of primary group contexts. To not do so requires an 
"oversocialized" conception of man's nature in that to be 
influenced by secondary group contexts the individual's 
personality must be conceived as quite plastic, even in adult­
hood, for it is only during this phase of the life cycle that 
such groups can have their effects. In addition, to locate 
the alienation process solely in secondary groups gives these 
groups properties of self-fulfillment or disillusionment they 
probably don't fully possess. 
The alienation process as lying within secondary groups, 
therefore, must be ruled out, and the theories of alienation 
which hypothesize the source of alienation to be in economic 
or political sectors of society can at best be justified only 
as dealing with another definition of alienness, one which I 
believe to be inadequate in accounting for the truly complex 
phenomenon that has come to occupy hundreds of writers in a 
variety of different fields. Even such secondary groups as 
the schools and the churches must also be ruled out as being 
places of alienation because they do not have access to the 
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individual early enough. Thus, as the conceptual work in the 
preceding chapters has strongly implied, the alienation/ 
identification process per se is most likely to occur in the 
family. 
But, of course, simply because we learn that the aliena­
tion process must be confined to the primary family group does 
not mean that its causes are also located solely here. It is 
an overwhelmingly supported conclusion that the family is 
shaped largely by factors outside it in the larger society. 
As Yinger (1969:271) has stated; 
The central proposition of contemporary 
family theory is scarcely new or start­
ling. It is that the family cannot be 
understood as an isolated phenomenon. 
It must be seen in the context of the 
economic and political institutions, the 
religious influences, the population facts 
of the society of which it is a part. It 
is not by chance that a static agricultural 
society will emphasize the extended family, 
will often permit or encourage plural 
marriage, and will give to parents the 
power to make choices of partners for 
their children. Such elements as these 
fit into a stable social structure, just 
as emphasis on the conjugal family, ro­
mantic love, and separate households is 
likely to characterize urban, mobile so­
cieties. Powerful forces create the 
kind of family system to be found in a 
particular setting. 
The theory of alienation presented in this study, there­
fore, does not depart radically from those traditional aliena­
tion theories which seek its causes in the structure of the 
society except to emphasize the family group as the institu­
tional area in which the alienation process occurs. This 
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emphasis stems naturally from our definition of alienation, 
just as Marx's emphasis upon economic institutions stemmed 
naturally from his definition of alienation. In defining 
alienation differently than I have in this study, however, the 
traditional theories of sociology give us very little insight 
as to just how other structural factors impinge on the family 
to produce the alienating process within it. With only a few 
exceptions (Keniston, 1965; Riesman, 1977), neither have 
modern writers dealt with this problem. The question, then, 
arises; just how is the family implicated in the structure 
and organization of the society so as to establish the aliena­
tion process within it? 
Associational society and the family 
The precise nature of the relationship between the family 
and the modernization of society is still largely unknown. 
Industrialization and urbanization, for instance, have been 
posited as influencing the family in various ways. But in a 
review of some studies examining the impact of these variables 
upon the family, John Edwards (1969:17) comments: "The(se) 
articles . . . strongly indicate a need for revision in our 
theories pertaining to the relationship between industrializa­
tion, urbanization, and the family." And in a further comment 
he says : "What appears certain is that industrialization and 
urbanization are sometimes sufficient conditions for altering 
family structure, but they are not necessary ones, and the 
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precise nature of their relationship remains obscure and of 
greater complexity than most studies of familial change in­
dicate" (p. 17). 
Two outcomes of industrialization and urbanization which 
so far remain relatively unquestioned, however, are those of 
emphasis on romantic love and changes from patriarchal-author-
itarianism to democratic-equalitarianism. The two seem to go 
together and are at least partially accounted for by the in­
dustrialization and urbanization of society. 
From patriarchal-authoritarianism to democratic-equalitarianism 
Burgess, Locke and Thomes (1971:8) argue that the American 
family is changing from a "traditional" type to a "companion­
ship" type. They distinguish the two as follows: 
The family as"a traditional system and 
as a companionship represent two polar 
conceptions. The most extreme conceptual 
formulation of the traditional family 
system would be one in which its unity 
would be determined entirely by the tra­
ditional rules and regulations, specified 
duties and obligations, and other social 
pressures impinging on family members. 
The family as a companionship system fo­
cuses on the unity which develops out of 
mutual affection, intimate communication, 
and mutual acceptance of a given division 
of labor and given procedures of decision 
making by a husband, wife, and children. 
Probably the foremost factor bearing on family unity in 
the companionship type, as these writers suggest, is mutual 
affection between husband and wife. Whereas in the tradition­
al family love and affection between spouses played a less 
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extensive role, in the companionship family they came to have 
paramount importance. Lantz and Snyder (1969:98-99) make 
reference to this change: 
As indicated earlier, the American family 
has not always considered love to be the 
basis for its existence. Especially 
marked changes in the role of love in 
marriage have occurred within the last 
fifty years, as manifest not only in the 
changing basis for family life, but in 
writings that reflect the spirit of the 
period. 
Miller and Swanson (1969:228) also make this point while 
beginning to trace the connection of the phenomenon to larger 
changes in society, such as urbanization and industrializa­
tion: 
It was into this urban-industrialized 
family that there came romantic love in 
the modern sense. If husband and wife, 
parent and child were not bound together 
as tightly as before with the old ties of 
kin supports and the heavy dependence of 
woman on man, a new basis for their rela­
tion had to develop. It was, as Burgess 
and Locke suggest, shared affection. In 
this remaining bond, the relation had to 
be more intense and sure than before. 
Romantic love became the test. It was a 
passion for another person so great that 
one was singled out from all others as 
the only fully satisfying object in the 
world; so intense that at the slightest 
chance of its failure, appetite fled, 
words were inadequate, and the world 
barren until it was resumed. And with 
romance went the criteria of common in­
terests and compatibility. In the rela­
tions of equals, interests had to be 
common and compatible or the marriage 
failed. 
Other writers, too, trace the emergence of love and af-
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faction as the unifying force in the contemporary American 
family and begin to link up structural factors to it in an 
empirical fashion. Thus, a study by Levinger (1964) showed 
great similarities in the reported goals and criteria for 
satisfaction among men and women. Both husbands and wives 
were equally apt to rank companionship and affection as the 
most important goals for a good marriage. Although a study 
by Farber (1957) showed dissimilarities among husbands and 
wives of a lower socio-economic class concerning marital 
goals, wives in this group still ranked affection and com­
panionship significantly high. Gurin and others (1960) report­
ed that husbands and wives were equally likely to mention some 
aspect of their interpersonal relationship, as opposed to 
their external environment, in evaluating their marriages. 
This in turn was related to socio-economic status with those 
higher in status linking affection and companionship more 
often to marital adjustment. Komarovsky (1964) also indicated 
the same linkages in her study of blue collar marriage. 
There is cross cultural confirmation of this phenomenon 
also. In Oscar Lewis's book (1959:ix) it is stated: "Demon­
strative affection or, except during a relatively brief court­
ing and initial mating period, what we usually mean by 'love,' 
are rare among the poorer, simpler peoples of the world. Above 
all, where hunger and discomfort rule, there is little spare 
energy for the gentler, warmer, less utilitarian emotions and 
little chance for active happiness." 
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These studies suggest two things important to our study: 
(1) husbands and wives, at least among the higher socio­
economic categories in contemporary associational societies, 
put great emphasis on affection and companionship as goals of 
marriage; (2) such an emphasis may be a result of moderniza­
tion and the transfer of functions from the family accompanied 
by a rising economic well-being which releases people's ener­
gies and time to the affectional function. This latter point 
is made by Lantz and Snyder (1969:46-57): 
In industiral society, the family no 
longer had to depend on its own resources 
for survival. The fulfillment of such 
basic needs as those for food, clothing, 
shelter, medicine, recreation, education 
and protection was largely taken over by 
specialized agencies outside the home. 
And many of the duties that were still 
performed in the home such as cooking 
and cleaning were greatly simplified 
through technology and mechanization. 
Having been freed from performing many 
chores that previously were necessary 
for its survival, the family could now 
apply the extra time and energy to other 
areas of family living. 
Family instability and changing family functions 
It appears, then, that the bonds of love and affection 
have become the major integrating factors of families in 
contemporary associational societies. However, the cohesive-
ness of the family appears to decline concomitantly, as 
measured by divorce. Reiss (1971:284) indicates that "divorce 
is associated with economic conditions in part; and during 
good times the overall divorce rate increases, as can be 
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s e e n  . . .  b y  c o m p a r i n g  t h e  1 9 3 0 s  ( t h e  d e p r e s s i o n  y e a r s )  w i t h  
the 1940s." Thus, when things are economically good the 
affectional factors play a greater role. But these, in turn, 
are most likely to lead to divorce. Reiss (1971:286) indi­
cates why; 
Love is a quality that can be lost in a 
relationship more easily than can a sense 
of duty to be married and raise a family. 
This being the case, the basis of marriage 
can be more easily lost when that basis 
is love. In such a case the individuals 
involved will seek a divorce because mar­
riage has been defined by them as involv­
ing a love relationship. 
The importance of the affectional component of the modern 
marriage and its relationship to the instability of the family 
is also indicated by Lantz and Snyder (1969:4); 
. . . much marital incompatibility is 
based on the interpersonal relationship 
between husband and wife. The variety 
of ways in which husbands and wives 
treat each other, both interpersonally 
and sexually, are expressions of all 
that is felt between the marital part­
ners. Thus the basic attitudes of 
husband and wife toward each other find 
expression in all phases of marital life. 
It follows, then, that a breakdown in the 
interpersonal relationship between hus­
band and wife sets the stage for sub­
sequent marital difficulties. 
But while the ultimate measure of instability in the 
family, of course, is divorce rate, this is an after-the-fact 
statistic. Marriages are obviously unstable before their ul­
timate break-up, and it is this aspect of instability that 
seems to bear the most weight in contributing to alienness. 
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It does so through its effect on the socialization process. 
Family instability and socialization 
The weight of the husband-wife relationship upon the 
psychic development of the child is testified to by Burgess, 
et al.(1971:515): 
The relationship between the parents in 
a home, whether it be a straining one or 
supporting one, looms much larger in its 
bearing upon the children's behavior than 
do such things as education or the econom­
ic advantages or handicaps which the par­
ents have had. In fact, the marital rela­
tionship appears to be more important than 
any other factor in the homes thus far 
studied ... In our study we found that 
if too many areas of adjustive difficul­
ties exist between parents, it brings them 
insecurity which communicates itself to 
the child, who then uses devices we call 
aggression, withdrawal, or problem be­
havior in his efforts to recapture equi­
librium. 
Various studies seem to corroborate this finding. A 
study by Renne (1970) reports that parents who reported prob­
lems with their children were more likely to be dissatisfied 
with their marriages. Westman and Cline (1971) report that 
". . . there is a period of disillusionment that precedes 
thought and discussion of divorce. During this period, the 
marriage relationship is strained and the children receive the 
backwash, even when open conflict has not occurred. At the 
very least, the rift between the parents creates an atmosphere 
in which the children lack an image of emotional honesty." 
Despert (1953) refers to the situation of estrangement be­
183 
tween husband and wife that often precedes divorce as "emo­
tional divorce." She claims this to be a worse condition than 
actual divorce; "While the physical separation of parents 
brings many urgent problems in its wake, it is not the sever­
est blow to children. The emotional separation of parents 
from each other, and of parents from children, works its 
destruction on children in homes where the word divorce may 
never have been breathed." 
Lantz and Snyder (1969:380) report the following case: 
There is the case of a 28-year-old woman 
who was married to a successful professional 
man. The marriage was poor from the out­
set. The woman's solution to the marital 
difficulties was to become pregnant in the 
hope that her husband would not then wish to 
abandon her. Although there was every indi­
cation that the relationship with her hus­
band was deteriorating, the woman continued 
in her belief that children would preserve 
her marriage. By the age of thirty-three, 
this woman had three children, all conceived 
with the same motive. The parents were in 
continual conflict, and the children experi­
enced considerable neglect. Shortly after 
the third child was born, the husband became 
involved with another woman and left his wife. 
As this case illustrates, one consequence of marital in­
stability, whether in the form of an outright rift ending in 
divorce or of an emotional estrangement, is the neglect of 
the child. In the study cited earlier by Westman and Cline 
(1971) they include the following effects on children: 
From the point of view of the affected 
children, divorce requires a number of ad­
justments; (1) to the anxiety, confusion 
and strife of the conflict-ridden marriage; 
(2) to the absence of an image of adults 
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with mutual affection and respect; (3) to 
the compromise of routine childrearing 
responsibilities accompanying the disin-
tegrating marriage; (4) to the prospect 
of change in parent relationships; and 
(5) to the parents preoccupation with 
rearranging~theirown emotions and lives, 
leading to a reduction in attention to 
the children, or, in some cases, to an 
overreliance on the children for support. 
(Italics mine.) 
Thus, there appears to be some evidence and substantial 
agreement among researchers and analysts that family in­
stability has various deleterious effects upon the children. 
These effects are usually analyzed as emotional in nature even 
though their specific form or nature is rarely indicated and 
the social-psychological processes are not clear. Burgess, 
et al,. (1971) alludes to the child seeking to "recapture equi­
librium"; Westman and Cline (1971) refer to the lack of an 
"image of emotional honesty," etc. 
The effects of marital instability appear to depend to a 
large degree upon the phase of the personality formation 
process that the child is in, for socialization has different 
consequences at different times in the life cycle. The 
earlier phases of the socialization of the child appear to be 
crucial. 
If divorces occur in the seventh and eighth years of 
marriage, it follows that children are relatively young, i.e., 
in the infant stage or childhood stage of the development of 
personality. It is obvious that family instability can thus 
have important consequences for the development of emotional 
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security and self-conceptions, two of the most important out­
comes of personality formation. At the same time, each phase 
of personality development is locked into and predicated upon 
the other. The interruption or malfunction of a previous 
phase will thus have its important effects upon the follow­
ing phase, probably rendering it inoperative or causing it to 
develop in undesirable, negative kinds of ways. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Our theory of the structural causes of alienation con­
sists basically of the proposition that (1) the growth of 
population (based on improved technology) increases the 
structural complexity of society; (2) in becoming more struc­
turally complex, the form of integration of the family is 
altered, becoming based almost entirely on love and affection 
between the spouses; (3) being a weaker form of integration, 
the stability of the family is decreased, as indicated by 
high divorce rates. These rates indicate the number of 
marriages in which role-reciprocity and complementarity have 
broken down and from which emerges a great deal of anxiety, 
anger, frustration, jealousy, lack of trust, quarreling, 
fighting, cutting remarks, etc.; (4) the primary result of 
this instability between husband and wife is to direct and 
concentrate most of their energies on themselves and their 
problems. Children, while they may not be neglected deliber­
ately are inevitably neglected: the routines of childrearing 
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are interrupted; there is a reduction of attention; and even 
when these tasks are performed they may be done in a highly 
anxious state or perhaps even resentfully; (5) the further 
effect of these factors is to create an insecurity in the 
infant and a negative essence in the child. With these de­
velopments comes self-preoccupation and the control of the 
"Me over the I" in service to some ideal self-conception. 
Over time the factors solidify into true feelings of alienness 
with all of the attendant characteristics described in 
Chapter V. 
With these formulations behind us the theory of aliena­
tion as I have propounded it is essentially complete. We 
turn now to an attempt at empirically substantiating certain 
key propositions selected from the theory in its overall 
sense. 
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PART THREE; 
A CROSS-CULTURAL TEST OF 
THE THEORY 
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CHAPTER VII: 
ALIENATION IN EIGHT SOCIETIES 
The theory, having been put forward in Part One, now re­
quires an empirical substantiation. As far as I know, no 
attempt has ever been made to empirically verify the general 
proposition of alienation theory: that it is the moderniza­
tion of society that brings about alienation and alienness to 
a wide degree. It is obvious, of course, that such a verifi­
cation poses almost insurmountable methodological difficulties 
and this may be the reason why no effort has been made. 
Despite the knowledge that many difficulties would in fact 
exist and that the findings and conclusions of the attempt to 
substantiate this proposition would be hindered by methodo­
logical fault, such an attempt was undertaken. This part of 
the study is a report on the effort to verify the central as­
sumption in alienation theory, and certain corrolaries as 
they have been developed in the theory just presented. 
Methodological Procedure 
Only certain key propositions have been selected for the 
empirical substantiation of the theory. These propositions 
are key in Zetterberg's (1965:161-166) sense, i.e., they 
occupy strategic points in the overall system of propositions 
such that the disconfirmation of any single one could serious­
ly discredit the whole theory. 
The propositions are as follows: 
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Socio-structural complexity will be associated nega­
tively with family stability; the greater the structural com­
plexity of a society the less stable the family. 
Hg: Family stability will be positively associated with 
socialization; the greater the family stability the more 
nurturant the form of socialization. 
Hg: A nurturant form of socialization will be positively 
associated with alienness-identity; the more nurturant is the 
socialization process, the greater will be the individual's 
identity with the society. 
The causal model for these propositions is given in 
Figure 7. I have included the variable numbers and their sym-
Structural complexity 
of society (variable #2, X^) 
(-) 
V 
Family stability (variable #3, Xg) 
( + ) 
V 
Socialization process (variable #4, X^) 
( + ) 
V 
Alienness/identity 
of the individual (variable #1, Y) 
Figure 7. Causal Model of the Variables 
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bols (x and y) so that the reader may refer to them if need be. 
The design of the study called for by the propositions 
is obviously cross-cultural and the method used was what 
Smelser (1976) has called "systematic comparative illustra­
tion, " or what has been traditionally called the comparative 
method. Since all scientific methods, including the statis­
tical and experimental, utilize comparison, Smelser opted 
for the former term. 
Systematic comparative illustration is a method which 
consists of a selection of a limited number of cases or 
units—in this instance total societies—upon which measure­
ment of a set of independent and dependent variables is 
undertaken and whose relations are then analyzed. It is a 
method used when the cases are not drawn on a random basis 
and their number is too small for probability inferences be­
yond the sample. 
The sample of societies in this study was not drawn 
randomly and is very small thus requiring the use of system­
atic comparative illustration. The reason for drawing a 
limited number of cases non-randomly is simply the almost non­
existence of indicators of the alienness variable with an ac­
ceptable degree of face validity. Alienness per se is not 
ordinarily measured or reported upon in the ethnographic 
and historical literature which was used as the data source for 
this study. Only eight cases, indeed, could be found which 
yielded valid indicators of the dependent variable. To find 
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these indicators, a rather thorough immersion in the cultures 
of these societies was required in order to derive some esti­
mate, sometimes rather rough, of the levels or incidence of 
this variable. Inferences had to be made from ethnographic 
observations of a variety of areas of the social life of the 
societies studied. 
The paucity of data, while suspected, was not known at the 
beginning of the study. Thus, at first, a statistical method 
was attempted consisting of the assignment of numbers to all 
societies listed in the HRAF (Human Relations Area Files) and 
of drawing a random sample of fifty units. Prior to this, each 
of the major independent variables of structural-complexity, 
family-stability and socialization, and the dependent variable 
of alienness, had been operationalized (see Appendix I). Using 
the operationalization of structural-complexity, each society 
was then classified into its appropriate level. With the 
realization that alienness would perhaps be the most difficult 
variable to measure, an attempt to obtain a measure of this 
variable was made first. It soon became evident that there 
would be very little indication of this variable per se in the 
ethnographic literature. Some categories of the structural 
classification were ultimately emptied for lack of data. 
The procedure thus reverted simply to the attempt to lo­
cate ethnographic reports which contained observations that 
offered valid indication of the level of alienness. This 
entailed a case by case search through the HRAF files. As it 
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turned out, very few societies in the HRAF had ethnographic 
reports containing valid data on the alienness variable. A 
search was then begun on ethnographic and historical reports 
outside the HRAF which might do so. With such cases located, 
efforts were then attempted to secure valid indicators of 
family stability and socialization also. Such an attempt 
proved far less difficult though, again, some cases were 
eliminated for lack of valid indicators. The end result of 
this attempt was the sample of eight societies shown in 
Appendix II. No valid data whatsoever could be found for 
the level 4 and 5 societies and so these categories have been 
eliminated. 
The ethnographic and historical sources from which the 
data were drawn are given in the context of the study where 
they are cited along with the page numbers where the data were 
found. The observations cited do not represent the complete 
data sources, however, but are selected as the most represen­
tative. A complete data file has been compiled separately 
from this study. All sources are cited in Appendix II. 
Once these data were located and extracted they were 
coded for the purpose of quantitave analysis. Coding proce­
dures are given in Table 2 of Chapter VIII (see p. 242). Such 
quantification was primarily for the purpose of clarifying more 
precisely the relationships and indicating, however roughly, 
their strength. The heart of the analysis, however, remains 
in the systematic comparative analyses given at various 
192 
points throughout Chapter VIII. 
I turn now to the presentation of the most pertinent 
data, though certainly not all, on each of the variables in 
each society within each of the structural categories. Fur­
ther comments on methodological problems and procedures will 
be made in Chapter VIII. 
Family Stability, Socialization 
and Alienness in Level 1 Societies 
The Wintu 
The Wintu Indians lived in the Sacramento valley of the 
state of California. Their population in 1910, the period in 
which the primary ethnographer, Cora Dubois (1935), was 
studying them, was 395 individuals. Their traditional life­
style had remained relatively intact though they had of course 
come into contact with whites fairly extensively at that 
time. According to Dubois (1935:28) and Newcomb (1974:198) 
they resided in relatively permanent villages consisting of a 
loosely scattered collection of bark houses numbering from 
four to five up to several dozen. The primary social unit 
was the restricted family of parents and children and perhaps 
a close kinsman or two. They had no hereditary leader, vil­
lage council or other governmental structure. "They recog­
nized that there were other communities like themselves in 
language and life-style, but even though their children found 
spouses in other villages, neither economic nor other neces­
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sity drew them together" (Newcomb, 1974:198). The Wintu then, 
because of their lack of structural bonds between the village 
communities, may be considered a level 1 type society (see 
Appendix I). 
With respect to Wintu family stability, the marriage form 
of the Wintu has been described by Dubois (1935:55) as 
"brittle monogamy," although polygamy was apparently accepted. 
"Divorce was easy and frequent since the grounds were simply 
incompatibility or adultery" (Dubois, 1935:56). Divorce was 
effected by either the woman or the man withdrawing from the 
joint residence and establishing a new residence with another. 
The ideal form of marriage was apparently a union of a "pair 
of siblings to a pair of siblings" (Dubois, 1935:59). "Yet 
the more or less brittle monogamy and the free play of indi­
vidual taste in contracting marriage . . . must have obstruct­
ed the smooth functioning of the ideal system" (Dubois, 
1935:59). The relationship between the spouses was one of 
"respect," indicating some formality. Such a relationship is 
in contrast to a "joking relationship" that existed between 
cousins, and between brothers and sisters. 
Dubois (1935:56) reports that: "despite the fragility 
of the marriage bond there was a distinct sense of the legiti­
macy or illegitimacy of offspring. A child which was deserted 
by its father before or shortly after birth was called 
patdoksila (lost flint child), which was a term of approbrium. 
An offspring born to a woman who had been promiscuous was 
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called sella (everyone's child) or boxaila (brush child)." 
Adoption of children by near relatives was frequent among 
the Wintu and a generally accepted pattern: 
If a child were adopted he was given 
the same status as a man's own off­
spring. There was none of the semi-
slavery of northwestern California; 
nor was there any of the feeling as­
sociated with foster parents which is 
found in our own society. Thus, Sadie 
Marsh was brought up by a paternal 
aunt. The love she has had for this 
woman did not impair the affection she 
felt for her true mother, who lived 
scarcely a mile away. At the same time 
Sadie felt free to make her elder broth­
er's dwelling her home. In this in­
stance, which was in no manner atypical, 
the child had three easily accessible 
homes and sets of family ties (Dubois, 
1935:47-48). 
Socialization of the children among the Wintu is accom­
plished primarily by the mother or adoptive relatives during 
the infancy and early childhood stages for both sexes. The 
father assumes more and more responsibility for the male child 
as he grows older. 
Dubois (1935:46) reports that newly born children were 
"... bathed three or four times a day until the cord dropped 
off. Some informants were of the opinion that only then 
might the child be placed in its cradle." She also reports 
that "children were nursed from two to four years" and that a 
mother "rubbed, kneaded and stretched a child's body" during 
infancy to make it shapely, struck the toes gently with a fire 
poker to make the feet short, and rubbed the cheekbones upward 
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to make them high (Dubois, 1935:47). Newcomb (1974:199) 
reports that "throughout California the rearing of children 
was casual and informal, with little emphasis placed on naming 
ceremonies or on the formal instruction of children." So­
cialization of the children among the Wintu, all in all, 
appears to be relatively nurturant. 
The Wintu individual's identity with his society appears 
to be nearly complete submersion, approaching the degree 
which Durkheim described as the classical case. Dorothy 
Lee's (1959) analysis of Wintu language is the most affirma­
tive of this observation. Lee (1959:131-132) states that: 
The Wintu Indians of Northern California 
have a conception of the self which is 
markedly different from our own . . . The 
definition of the self in our own culture 
rests on our law of contradiction. The 
self cannot be both self and not self, both 
self and other; the self excludes the 
other. Wintu philosophy in general has no 
law of contradiction. Where we have mu­
tually exclusive dualistic categories, the 
Wintu have categories which are inclusive, 
but not mutually so; that is, object A will 
be included in object B, but not vice versa. 
Out of this context, B can be distinguished 
or emphasized through various linguistic 
devices. For example, in Wintu thought, 
man is included in nature; natural law, 
timeless order, is basic and true, ir­
respective of man. However, independent 
judgment, private experience and free will 
are not thereby excluded, but function 
transiently within the framework of natural 
law; man actualizes and gives temporality 
and concreteness to the natural order upon 
which he impinges through act of will and 
personal intent. 
Speaking to the relation of the self and society more 
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directly, Lee continues; 
The concept of the self forms one of 
these non-exclusive categories. When 
speaking about Wintu culture, we can­
not speak of the self and society, but 
rather of the self society. As a 
member of my society, writing for readers 
of this cultural background, I am present­
ing my study from the point of view of the 
self and its gradually decreasing partici­
pation in society; however, I believe that 
this is only due to my cultural bias, and 
that a Wintu would have started from what 
for us is the opposite direction, the 
gradual distinguishing of the self from 
society. 
Lee states further: 
In our own culture, we are clear as to 
the boundaries of the self. In our 
commonly held unreflective view, the 
self is a distinct unit, something we 
can name and define. We know what is 
the self and what is not the self; and 
the distinction between the two is al­
ways the same. With the Wintu the self 
has no strict bounds, is not named and 
is not, I believe, recognized as a spe­
cific entity. 
Wintu orientation does not, then, include the object self 
in a modally scrutinizing, evaluating way. Introspection is 
not a characteristic of the Wintu, is in fact uncharacteristic. 
Their orientations are outward to the world around them and 
it is the environment which captures their attention and to 
which they are primarily related in a way which constitutes 
an obliteration of the self. 
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The 0j ibwa 
The Ojibwa, or Chippewa, Indians reported upon in this 
study lived in Canada along the Berens River on the east side 
of Lake Winnipeg. The specific societal unit studied was 
known as the Saulteaux. The larger Ojibwa cultural entity 
was not politically integrated in any way so that the Saul­
teaux can only be considered a level 1 type society. 
As Landes (1969:1) reports: 
The Ojibwa lived in clusters, or vil­
lages ... of from three to fifteen 
families. The village was the largest 
social unit. It existed in spring and 
summer when the various small families 
came in from the scattered hunting 
grounds. It was held together by little 
more than the consciousness of neighbor­
hood, for no official activities charac­
terized its existence. 
Around any one large body of water, such 
as Rainy Lake in Ontario, the Rainy 
River, and the numerous lakes in Minne­
sota, were a number of these villages. 
Each village was independent, but shared 
with its neighbors designations and sen­
timents which distinguished it (or them) 
from other water groups or villages. 
Ojibwa culture at the time of the ethnographers' visits 
to them was relatively pristine. Hallowell (1974:119) reports 
that due to migration into the remoter regions in the pursuit 
of furs the original culture was better preserved than other 
Indians whose contact with whites was more extensive. Also, 
the fur trade itself "supported and encouraged the perpetua­
tion of their aboriginal ecological adaptation—hunting. In 
consequence, not only was their subsistence economy retained. 
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but the seasonal movements, institutions, attitudes and be­
liefs that were closely integrated with it." 
Ojibwa family life can only be described as turbulent. 
The form of marriage most practiced was monogamy although 
polygamy was acceptable. Landes (1971:85) reports that 
"divorce is nearly as common as marriage" and that "some 
people are divorced not once only, or, even twice, but seven 
or eight times." Remarriage inevitably follows and "women re­
marry ... as often as eight times" (Landes, 1971:82-83). 
Divorce is not institutionalized in Ojibwa society, however, 
and amounts to desertion. It occurs on "any conceivable 
pretext or on none at all" (Landes, 1971:91). Like modern 
European marriages "divorce implies that common interests are 
at an end" and the basis for the marriage has disappeared. 
Family life in Ojibwa society according to Landes (1971: 
18) ". . . was often broken or violently upset because of the 
easy separations of husband and wife in consequence of 
jealousies arising from love affairs . . . ." This turbulence 
follows from the fact that, again like European marriages, 
each spouse "... pins his or her self-esteem upon the 
other's reaction" (Landes, 1971:66-67). 
Needless to say, perhaps, this state of the family has 
direct consequences for children. Landes reports that "when 
the parents change mates, their offspring may go with either 
parent." Consequently, "the woman of many marriages may keep 
under one roof her children by previous marriages or some of 
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the children of her present husband, who may also have with 
him offspring from several marriages. Although children are 
sometimes raised by members of their bilateral kindred in the 
case of broken families, they usually reside with and are 
raised by one of the biological parents. 
Socialization of children among the Ojibwa was carried 
out primarily by the mother, during infancy, for both sexes. 
Male socialization became more the responsibility of the 
father during childhood. Densmore (1970:48) reports that an 
Ojibwa mother "... had her infant constantly with her, 
and the daily relation between mother and child was closer 
than in the white race." Densmore states further: 
It was the desire of the Chippewa that 
their children should be straight and 
vigorous, and to that end the mother 
began a child's training in early in­
fancy. Two means were employed for this 
training as well as for convenience in 
taking care of the child. These were 
(1) the cradle board and (2) a custom 
which arose after the Chippewa obtained 
cotton cloth and which may be designated 
as "pinning up the baby." With these 
forms of restraint they alternated periods 
of freedom when the child was "let out for 
exercise." 
Densmore reports frequent bathing with a warm water and 
herbs mixture. The cradle board was filled with a moss that 
had been dried over the fire and rubbed and pulled apart until 
it was soft and light. The baby was usually naked, or wore 
only very little clothing, and was surrounded by this moss in­
side the cradle board. "In cold weather a baby's feet were 
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wrapped in rabbit skin with the hair inside, or the soft down 
of cattails was placed around them" (Densmore, 1970:48-49). 
Lcuides (1969:13) observes that: 
The married couple loves the thought 
of producing offspring and of caring 
for them. Great indulgence is shown 
young children, from giving them the 
breast at each cry to not interfering 
with their bloody battles. 
She reports too, however, that "during infancy, parents 
regard their offspring much as wild pets are regarded; some­
times they are neglected, but often they are joked about and 
gloried in." 
In later childhood, the parents make a practice of teasing 
the child by bragging about his cousins. This is apparently 
an initiation into adult life. The cousins' parents, in turn, 
brag on their nephews or nieces in the presence of their own 
children. The cousins themselves apparently join in this 
teasing and jesting custom and tease and jest with one an­
other. This is perhaps the basis of the "joking relationship" 
that characterizes cousin relationships among the Ojibwa. 
Punishment of children is the responsibility and right of 
the father only, but in actuality the mother takes whatever 
liberties in this regard she wishes. Punishment on her part 
consists of scolding and withholding food. 
In comparison to the Wintu, Ojibwa socialization—because 
reports of it contain some reference to neglect, to teasing 
and jesting as normative aspects—would appear to be somewhat 
201 
less nurturant though not excessively so. 
Measurement of Ojibwa alienness-identity reveals a sur­
prise. Identity appears to be quite low among the Ojibwa, 
or conversely, alienness appears to be quite high. This 
conclusion is supported by the following ethnographic obser­
vations which indicate a high degree of self-consciousness on 
the part of Ojibwa individuals and psychological distance 
between them. Hallowell (1974:172) reports that: 
Although there is no single term in 
Ojibwa speech that can be satisfactorily 
rendered into English as "self," never­
theless, by means of personal and pos­
sessive pronouns, the use of kinship and 
so on, the Ojibwa Indian constantly 
identifies himself as a person. Every 
individual knows who he is, where he is, 
and what kind of being he is : he enter­
tains definite beliefs and concepts 
that relate to his own nature. Besides 
this, his language enables him to ex-
.press such concepts as self-defense, 
self-glorification, self-deceit, self-
command. 
The Ojibwa, then, appear to be quite self-aware, and this 
is one of the essential dimensions of alienness or psychologi­
cal distance from others in society. Other dimensions are 
noted, however, by ethnographers. Landes (1971:178-179) 
reports that an Ojibwa man ". . .is constantly alive to the 
need of guarding himself, to the need of keeping his pride 
intact, and as a consequence vague, persecutory trends are 
manifest in everyone's reactions." He reports further that 
". . . there are always latent suspicions between Indians of 
different communities" and that a "cautious and restrained 
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manner of approach is adopted." This behavior occurs with 
respect to the individual's own community members and even 
to his own kin, though not as much so. Hallowell (1974:145) 
writes: "so far as interpersonal relations go, there is a 
great deal of restraint among the Saulteaux upon the expres­
sion of all categories of emotion—joy, irritation, anger, 
etc. The most outstanding exception is laughter." He also 
reports an "emphasis on strong restraint and control" and 
behind this "severe control is wariness and caution" (1974: 
149). Both Landes and Hallowell report a high degree of 
"individualism." The latter researcher uses characteriza­
tions such as "amiable front," the "suppression of one's own 
feelings and opinions," "anxiety" and "latent mistrust." 
The Ojibwa thus appear to be a "deviant case" insofar 
as the relationship between structural complexity and identity 
is concerned. As such, they will require further comment in 
our analysis and conclusions in a later part of this study. 
Family Stability, Socialization 
and Alienness in Level 2 Societies 
The Cheyenne 
The Cheyenne lived primarily on the plains of what is now 
the state of Wyoming in the United States. Their social or­
ganization fits the classification of level 2 societies al­
most perfectly. Service (1971) indicates that the tribe 
was "... divided into ten loosely organized bands, each one 
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with its own special taboos, ceremonies, and medicines." 
The whole tribe assembled once a year to perform the great 
communal hunt of the buffalo. During this time, the people 
gathered within certain areas specially designated for each 
of the bands. Within each of these bands, each individual 
further belonged to a "kindred" and then further to a family. 
Service reports that the tribe was crosscut by a series of 
"societies" which had military, social, and ceremonial func­
tions at the time the bands were united during the great hunt. 
When the communal hunt was over, the people split up into 
their separate families and dispersed to various parts of the 
territory where adequate forage for their horses was available 
and where hunters could cover a wider range. At this time, 
they usually resided for a period in "band camps" (Hoebel, 
1960:31) consisting of one or more families. These camp lo­
cations are apparently well-known and are given names. Fami­
lies move in and out of them as their needs warrant. 
The Cheyenne family is a matrilocally extended form con­
sisting of a man and wife and their married daughters and 
their husbands (from different families), their daughters' 
children and any unmarried sons. According to Service (1971; 
125) "a single tipi shelters only a husband and wife and small 
children, and the extended family's camp consists therefore of 
a cluster of several tipis." 
Cheyenne family stability, in terms of both divorce and 
the internal relations between the spouses, seems to be high. 
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Divorces are rare, and with respect to the husband-wife rela­
tionship, Hoebel (1960:24) reports that: 
Husbands and wives, although they are 
diffident in their attitudes toward 
each other in the early stages of their 
marriage, usually become most fond of 
each other. They form a close working 
team with a strong sense of family re­
sponsibility. Michelson's old woman in­
formant related, "We had our first child 
after we had been married a year. It 
was at that time that I began really to 
love my husband. He always treated me 
with respect and kindness" (Michelson, 
1932:8). And when her husband died, 
"His death made me very lonely, and it 
was the most terrible event in my life." 
Such was the ideal life between husbands 
and wives, although, of course, it did 
not always work out thus. Some wives 
were shrewish. Some men were jealous 
or mean tempered. 
Cheyenne socialization of children appears to be particu­
larly nurturant and self-fulfilling. Hoebel (1960) reports 
that children are highly valued by parents and by Cheyenne 
society in general. "Newborn babies are gently greased, 
powdered, and wrapped in soft robes. If the weather is cold 
they are carried in their mother's arms for warmth and com­
fort" (Hoebel, 1960:92). The baby is carried much on the 
cradle board. "When not on the cradle board it is rocked in 
the arms of the mother or grandmother and soothed with lulla­
bies. It is nursed whenever it shows a desire." The baby is 
cuddled and constantly loved in an atmosphere of interest. 
Hoebel (1960:92) reports that the Cheyenne will not 
tolerate a crying child and will remove it from the camp 
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"into the brush where [it is] . . . hung on a bush" until it 
stops crying. 
As the infant gets a little older, it is more often 
carried about on its mother's back in a blanket sling rather 
than on the cradle board. Its head projects about her 
shoulders; it hears and sees all she does; it shares the 
warmth of her body and feels the movements of her muscles; it 
receives food passed over the mother's shoulder; it even 
sleeps on her back as she goes about her household tasks. It 
is enveloped in warmth, movement, and affectionate attention. 
Its body is gently soothed with medicated ointments and soft 
vegetable ointments. Its early years are full of adult-given 
gratification. Its frustrations must, however, be quickly 
internalized, for the alternative is isolation in the brush. 
This is the first lesson learned, and it must be remembered 
at all times; it pervades Cheyenne life. "Children are to 
be quiet and respectful in the presence of elders" (Hoebel, 
1960:92). 
The typical Cheyenne person does not appear to suffer 
feelings of alienness. Indeed, the evidence supports the 
opposite contention. Hoebel (19 60:90) describes Cheyenne 
personality characteristics as follows: 
Reserved and dignified, the adult Chey­
enne male moves with a quiet sense of 
self-assurance. He speaks fluently, but 
never carelessly. He is careful of the 
sensibilities of others and is kindly 
and generous. He is slow to anger and 
strives to suppress his feelings, if 
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aggravated. Vigorous on the hunt and 
in war, he prizes the active life. 
Towards enemies he feels no merciful 
compunctions, and the more aggressive 
he is, the better. He is well versed 
in ritual knowledge. He is neither 
flighty nor dour. Usually quiet, he 
has a lightly displayed sense of humor. 
He is sexually repressed and maso­
chistic, but that masochism is expressed 
in culturally approved rites. He does 
not show much creative imagination in 
artistic expression, but he has a firm 
grip on reality. He deals with the 
problems of life in set ways while at 
the same time showing a notable capacity 
to readjust to new circumstances. His 
thinking is rationalistic to a high de­
gree and yet colored with mysticism. His 
ego is strong and not easily threatened. 
His super ego, as manifest in his strong 
social conscience and mastery of his 
basic impulses, is powerful and dominat­
ing. He is "mature"—serene and composed, 
secure in his social position, capable of 
warm social relations. He has powerful 
anxieties, but these are channeled into 
institutionalized modes of collective 
expression with satisfactory results. 
He exhibits few neurotic tendencies. 
The typical grown-up Cheyenne woman ex­
hibits much the same constellation of 
traits. Not having the direct outlet 
for aggressive impulses that men find 
in war, she is touchier in domestic re­
lations and apt to be a bit willful with­
in her family. Grinnell calls her "mas­
terful." She is more artistically crea­
tive than the male, but still within pre­
scribed limits. She is equally repressed 
sexually but manifests less compensatory 
behavior in masochism and aggression 
against enemies—although both these 
traits are discernable in her. 
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The Hopi 
The Hopi tribe lives in the southwestern part of the 
United States. Their settlements were built on the tops of 
the mesas that are characteristic of the topography of the 
area. Three of these mesas were the primary sites of the 
Hopi villages. Their villages consisted of the now well-
known pueblo dwellings, consisting of terraced adobe apart­
ments. The dwellings are arranged in streets and plazas. 
Two Hopi villages, Sichomovi and Walpi, were located on 
"first mesa." "On second mesa are Mishongnovi, Shipaulovi, 
and Shangopovi. Bakavi, Hatevilla, and Oraibi . . . are lo­
cated on third mesa. In addition. New Oraibi and Moenkopi 
which are new villages, formed by dissidents from Old Oraibi, 
are also associated with third mesa" (Eggan, 1950:8). 
According to Eggan (1950:8) "in spite of the region's 
aridity the Hopi were primarily maize agriculturalists. 
They also raised beans, squashes, pumpkins, sunflowers, and 
cotton .... Sheepherding was also a major subsistence ac­
tivity. Hunting was primarily a ceremonial activity . . . ." 
Although each village was politically independent, and 
there was no overall chief or council, the Hopi tribe as a 
whole is associated by various matrilineal clans which were 
joined together by twelve unnamed exogamous phratries. This 
feature places Hopi society within the second level of struc­
tural complexity. 
The form of the Hopi family is extended with residence 
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of the newly married couple being matrilocal. The members of 
the family occupied the same apartment in the pueblo. Mar­
riage is strictly monogamous. 
Family stability, because of matrilineality and matri-
locality and its extended form, is quite high in Hopi society. 
This is so despite a relatively high divorce rate for married 
couples, especially early in the marriage. Titiev (1971:30) 
reports a rate of 34%. However, also according to Titiev 
(1971:17) the effects of divorce are "... minimized through 
the mechanism of the household which is so ordered that it 
takes up the shocks that occur from breakdown of individual 
families. So secure and firmly embedded is the position of a 
woman in her household group, that a change of husband has 
little or no effect on the larger unit." 
This is true, also, for children. Titiev (1971:17) in­
dicates that "thanks to the joint principles of matrilineal 
descent and matrilocal residence, all children are automatic­
ally as firmly ensconced in their natal household groups as 
are their mothers." 
When divorce occurs (for a variety of reasons), material 
goods are simply divided along the original lines of ownership 
established and the husband returns to his own mother's house­
hold. Children "invariably remain with the mother" although 
older children may follow either parent (Titiev, 1971:17). 
Titiev (1971:43) reports that: 
As long as there is constant operation 
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of the household system it makes com­
paratively little difference in Hopi 
society whether marriages endure or 
not. The strength and durability of 
the household unit is scarcely affect­
ed by the collapse of limited families, 
and it is for this reason that the so­
cial structure of the Hopi has been un­
shaken by the widespread prevalence of 
such disturbing factors as adultery and 
divorce. 
These observations seem to warrant the conclusion that 
hopi family stability is high though, of course, such stabili­
ty is muted by the fact that divorce occurs frequently. How­
ever, it should be remembered that even at 34% this leaves 
66% of the marriages remaining intact. As Titiev (1971:43) 
has remarked; 
It would be misleading if nothing were 
said of marriages which are characterized 
by affection and permanency. Where a 
man's marital experience is happy, he 
tends more and more to identify himself 
with his wife's group; and not infre­
quently a married man remains devoted 
to his wife's household even at the 
expense of allegiance to his own clan. 
Hopi socialization of infants and children appears to be 
something less than a nurturant form. According to Aberle 
(1951:121) it is characterized by parents' "fobbing off of 
responsibility for severe punishment on to other relatives and 
on to Soyoho" and "the use of Katcina figures for rewards and 
withholding of rewards." Also, children are often exposed to 
relatives who claim to be affectionate but whose joking im­
plies some cruelty. They are also exposed to parents' con­
cealment of aggressive impulses toward others in their près-
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ence, and are subjected to the initiation ceremonies into the 
Katcina which involve a whipping. 
Aberle notes that these early experiences combine to 
"create in the child's mind a grave difficulty in interpret­
ing the true intentions of others." He notes that this diffi­
culty leads to mistrust in the child and that later experien­
ces as an adult tend to reenforce this mistrust. This re-
enforcement is due to the fact that Hopi culture contains 
beliefs of the existence of evil intentioned witches, or 
persons of "two-hearts," even among one's own kin, and thus 
one must conceal one's aggressive impulses from another in 
case he or she might be a witch. Thus, witchcraft, the wit­
ness of and practice of concealment of one's true feelings, 
the experiences of joking relatives, punishment by the Katcina 
and the initiation ceremony—all these may combine to produce 
rather pervasive feelings of distrust in individuals. And 
other observers seem to confirm this. Titiev (1971:57) 
writes that "fear and suspicion still seem to be dominant 
factors in Hopi life." 
This basic mistrust of others, in turn, leads to what 
Aberle calls "a real psycho-social isolation among the Hopi." 
Confirming this are reports of the extreme Hopi individuality, 
of their "freedom of thought and action," extending even to 
their children and pets. An informant of Titiev's (1972:28) 
reported that "every Hopi . . . must look out for himself and 
can expect little help from non-relatives." Titiev reports 
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that "the spirit of individuality is so strong that no over­
all unity can be achieved." 
Other reported characteristics of the Hopi personality 
are in harmony with these observations. Their "poise," 
their sense of courtesy to others, their peculiar trait of 
not inquiring after the health of distant relatives, their 
unwillingness to intervene in the affairs of others, all 
point to a relatively low degree of identification with others. 
Family Stability, Socialization 
and Alienness in Level 3 Societies 
The Nootka 
The Nootka's territory was located on the northwest 
coast of North America in what is now British Columbia, 
Canada. Their communities were of two major types, the 
more permanent winter villages, located in the sheltered 
coves of the upper reaches of the various inlets along the 
coastal region, and their summer villages, located on the 
lower reaches of the inlets where fishing and sea mammal hunt­
ing could take place. The summer villages contained the mi­
grated populations of a number of winter villages and were 
thus larger. 
Although Nootkan population, according to Service (1971: 
209), consisted of some 6,000 individuals, the population as 
a whole was never united socially. The social organization 
of the Nootka at its highest level is thus comprised of the 
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"confederacies" that came about as a result of the summer 
gatherings upon the beaches of commonly inhabited inlets. 
Within these confederacies, there is a smaller "association" 
of individuals because of their inhabitation of a common 
winter village. Within this "association," individuals are 
united by lineages who constitute a "household" occupying a 
common dwelling. The different confederacies, even though 
their members speak the same language, are effectively social­
ly isolated from one another by the relatively high peaks and 
rugged terrain between the inlets. 
In addition to these units, Nootkan society also is 
divided into various clans and associations. But Nootkan 
social organization more importantly is also marked by a 
system of chieftainships, each with a higher or lesser rank 
relative to one another. Each rank is inherited and has 
commensurate with it certain privileges, rights and duties. 
As Service (1971:216) indicates, "the most usual symbolic 
expression of differences in inherited rank are sumptuary 
customs in dress, the use of special names, economic privi­
leges, potlatch rights, and various ceremonial privileges." 
This chieftainship system places every individual in a posi­
tion of rank relative to one another and is thus not a true 
stratification system since each person if it were so con­
strued, would have to be in a stratum by himself. 
It is this system of chieftainships that marks a funda­
mental departure from the structure of the societies, both 
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bands and tribes, that have been discussed previously. For 
it is this structure that functions to integrate the confed­
eracy in ways beyond the associations in tribes. The nature 
of this integrative mechanism is brought out by Service (1971; 
217) as follows: 
The various grades of chiefs have various 
amounts of territory over which they act 
as executives for their lesser kinsmen. 
Those who use the resources formally ac­
knowledge the positions by paying sorts 
of tributes, such as first fruits of the 
salmon catch or berry-picking, certain 
choice parts of sea mammals killed, blan­
kets, furs, and so on. Many economic pro­
ducts are acquired by the chief according 
to strict and complicated custom, but quan­
tities of goods are also given to the 
chief more freely, when there is a surplus 
beyond the donors subsistence needs. The 
chief has no means to enforce these divisions 
of the products, of course, and thus, in a 
strict sense, the process should not be con­
sidered a tax or tribute. Furthermore, and 
importantly, these gifts do not function 
particularly to increase personal wealth 
which the chief might consume, for it is 
understood that he will later give away a 
comparable amount of goods in a great feast 
or potlatch. The chief's function is to 
redistribute goods, a not unusual feature 
in the primitive world. 
The economic function is clear: different 
individuals, families, and groups have vary­
ing degrees of luck at hunting or fishing 
at any given time, and may also be engaged 
in quite different pursuits. One way to get 
rid of a surplus of salmon and acquire some 
needed oil, for example, would be to trade 
for it, as in a market. This method of dis­
tribution would be familiar to members of 
European society, but many primitives dis­
tribute goods in quite a different way. The 
surpluses are given to the chief, who may 
distribute them to the members of his group 
at an occasion (typically made festive) or 
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may exchange with another group by 
giving the products to them at a feast 
in their honor, later to receive some 
of their surpluses at a reciprocating 
feast. 
The Nootkan family, as indicated, is extended and patri-
local, the bride, from a different village, coming to reside 
with the groom's family in his village. Because it is 
extended the family unit as a whole remains relatively intact 
but there is considerable degree of instability in the nuclear 
units within the extended family. Gunther (1962:544) reports 
that "there are relatively few adults in the present popula­
tion that have had only one marriage." Service (1971:221) 
reports that "divorce is quite common." 
This high rate of divorce is apparently the result of a 
good deal of marital discord between the spouses. Swan (1870; 
53) reported an incident of backstabbing between an ex-husband 
and the husband of a woman. He writes also that "the husband 
claims the privilege of correcting the wife, and some of them 
receive very severe beatings" (1869:11). Drucker (1951:276) 
writes of "a young chief who 'didn't get along well' with his 
wife. She was always nagging and complaining. His parents 
tolerated her because she had borne him a child." 
Childlessness was the most common reason for marital dis­
cord (Service, 1971:221). Adultery was another frequent cause 
(Drucker, 1951:287; Swan, 1869:13). Simple incompatibility 
appears to be another. Drucker (1951:303) writes that "the 
system of parental arrangement of marriage was at the root of 
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a great deal of marital discord. Young people who were per­
fect strangers were united without being given a chance to 
make any adjustments and then expected to get along together." 
Unlike the Hopi extended families which experienced a 
high divorce rate also, but which were capable of absorbing 
the shocks, the Nootkan family appears to have suffered from 
these internal discords between nuclear units. Drucker (1951: 
302) indicates that "if a couple had children, their friends 
and relatives did everything in their power to prevent a 
separation, for it was considered a disgrace for a child to 
have parents living and be brought up by a stepfather or step­
mother." He reports also that in case of divorce "the alloca­
tion of children presented quite a problem. Both families 
wanted them, recognizing that in later life they would align 
themselves more definitely with the people who brought them 
up" (1951:303). 
Another effect of divorce upon the Nootkan family was in 
terms of the dowry and the bride's endowment, consisting of 
the rights and privileges exchanged at marriage. In the case 
of one divorce, Drucker reports that "all the elaborate and 
costly performances went for naught. She took a dislike to 
her husband, rejected his advances, and returned to her par­
ents' home a few weeks later. The privileges, both those of 
the dowry, and those of the 'bride endowment,' since they had 
been given for the children of the couple, automatically re­
verted to the original owners" (1951:299). 
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Nootkan socialization appears to be highly nurturant, 
despite the almost certainly deleterious effects of a fairly 
unstable situation upon the parents. Some of the shocks of 
the unstable husband-wife relationship are cushioned by the 
presence of the other members of the household. Service 
(1971:219) reports that "instruction of the young ... is not 
the duty of the mother and father alone; aunts and uncles, 
older siblings, and especially grandparents are all active in 
the training of the child." 
Service (1971:219) reports also that "by modern American 
standards, the Nootka are affectionate and indulgent toward 
children. Toilet training does not begin until late, and 
physical punishment is not used—nor are children ever slapped 
or spanked for any other reason. The only means of correc­
tion, even for older children, is talking to them, attempting 
to shame them. This does not mean that the parents are care­
less, however, for they give great attention to the proper 
care and education of children. Instruction in etiquette and 
morality begins early in life, and the children are patiently 
corrected over and over again." 
The Nootkan's identity with, or self-absorption in, his 
society is not complete although there are manifestations 
that it is relatively high. He seems not to be as completely 
absorbed as the Wintu or the Cheyenne, but neither is he as 
"individuated" as the Ojibwa or the Hopi. The relation be­
tween the typical Nootkan and his society is probably charac­
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terized by that between Sapir's and Swadash's (1955:356) in­
formant, Tom, and his society; 
. . . Tom has always been rather sober, not 
a skeptic by any means, but not an emotional 
enthusiast. His knowledge of religious 
ceremonials is vast, but the spirit that 
animates this knowledge is rather one of 
order, of legal particularity, not of 
spiritual ecstasy. The practical econom­
ical world, the pursuit of gain, has always 
been more congenial to Tom's temperament. 
This does not mean that Tom is a rational­
ist in matters relating to the unseen world. 
Only the educated or half-educated half-
breeds are rationalists, and more than one 
of them has angered Tom by his ill-advised 
attempts to disturb him with skeptical argu­
ments. However, there has been no change 
in Tom. He knows, as firmly as he knows his 
own name, that when the rumble of thunder 
is heard from the mountain, it is because 
the thunderbird is leaving his house on the 
peak, flapping his wings heavily, as he makes 
off for the sea to prey upon the whales. 
This relative balance between the Nootkan and his society 
is further evidenced by the fact that Tom, while being capable 
of distinguishing himself from a number of societal categories, 
still feels himself to be a part of his society and "at home" 
in it. 
. . . Tom early learned his exact relation­
ship to all his kinsmen. He soon learned 
also the degree of his relationship to the 
neighboring house groups. He applied the 
terms "brother" and "sister" not only to 
his immediate brothers and sisters, but 
to his cousins, near and remote, of the 
same generation .... As torn grew older, 
he became cognizant of an astonishing 
number of uncles, aunts, grandfathers and 
grandmothers, of endless brothers-in-law— 
far and near. He was very much at home in 
the world. Wherever he turned he could say, 
"Younger brother, come here!" or "Grand­
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father, let me have this .... "Along 
with his feeling of personal relation­
ship to individuals there grew up in 
Tom a consciousness of the existence 
of tribal subdivisions in the village 
.... Each of the tribal subdivisions 
or "septs" had its own stock of legends, 
its distinctive privileges, its own 
ho u s e s  i n  t h e  v i l l a g e  . . . .  (Sap i r  
and Swadash, 1955:242). 
The fact that the Nootkan is often conscious of himself 
in contrast to others of his society, however, is indicated by 
the following observation of Sapir and Swadash (1955:350) who 
write: "Aside from the elementary problem of making a living, 
a Nootka Indian's main concern is to earn the esteem of his 
fellow tribesmen . . . ." Conscious concern with the self is 
also indicated by this passage: "The Indians believe that 
they do not like big foreheads and slim legs, nor do they 
approve of wide eyebrows, which are narrowed, if necessary, 
by plucking out some of the hairs. Later on in life Tom was 
less particular about his natural appearance, having been well 
'fixed' by his mother in infancy" (Sapir and Swadash, 1955: 
236). (Italics mine.) 
But this form of self-consciousness, of course, is what 
I have earlier termed mere self-differentiation and is to be 
contrasted to the contradistinction of the self, i.e., a 
negative essence experience. For the general observations of 
ethnographers do not point to a narcissistic self-preoccupa­
tion which marks true alienness. Service (1971:226) writes 
that "... the Nootka are a strikingly lighthearted people 
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with a highly developed sense of humor. Horseplay, buffoonery, 
and ribald anecdotes are very common, and satirical clowning is 
often a motif in otherwise serious ceremonies .... All in 
all the typical personality of the Nootka Indians stands in 
striking contrast to the gloomy sullenness which has been 
attributed to other peoples of the northwest coast." And 
Drucker (1951:279) indicates that "with whatever group a man 
happened to be living, he identified himself completely. For 
the time being, he centered all his interests and loyalties in 
that group, and participated in all its festivities." 
The Trobriand Islanders 
The Trobriand Islands are a part of a larger system of 
islands called Melanesia. These coral islands lie just off 
the southeastern extremity of New Guinea. "The bulk of the 
Trobriand population lives on one large island, Kiriwina 
(or Boyowa), which is 30 miles long and quite narrow" (Ser­
vice, 1971:231). The total population is approximately 8,500 
(Austen, 1936:17). 
The people live in a number of village communities scat­
tered about the island. Some are located on the coast, others 
are located inland. "The larger inland villages are typically 
built on level ground in a geometrical plan. In the center, 
or plaza, is the level, well trodden ceremonial court and dance 
ground, the whole area surrounded by a concentric ring of yam 
storehouses" (Service, 1971:231). Behind these yam houses is 
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a ring of small domestic dwellings. Located next to these 
dwellings is the family's garden plot in which the staple 
crop of yams is grown. 
The Trobriand population as a whole is divided into four 
great clans. Each of these is subdivided into sub-clans or 
lineages. The primary social unit is the patrilocal but 
restricted nuclear family of husband and wife, and children, 
if any. In addition to these social divisions, Trobriand 
society is characterized by a stratificational system which 
ranks the clans with respect to one another. Each individual 
is ranked also, then, according to his clan membership. Ac­
cording to Service (1971:238); "The rank of individuals is 
manifested by titles, the right to wear certain ornaments, 
and, most important of all, by forms of etiquette." 
Villages, too, are ranked with respect to one another 
since they contain differentially prestigious persons in 
various proportions. Every village has a headman, or chief, 
who is the eldest male of the most prestigious clan in the 
village. The village in which the eldest male of the most 
prestigious clan resides is therefore the highest ranking 
village. The village chief receives from each household a 
certain quantity of the yams produced but he then later 
distributes it through ceremonial functions. In addition, 
each lesser ranked village pays "tribute" to the leading 
village. "This payment of tribute, however, appears to be 
less a payment under duress through force or conquest and more 
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a payment of kinship obligations" (Service, 1971:239). 
From each village subject to him, the 
headman of the ranking village takes a 
wife. This wife is always the sister or 
daughter of the chief of the subject 
village. Inasmuch as a wife's family 
has to supply the son-in-law with a 
large proportion of their produce at 
harvest time, the ranking chief there­
by receives a considerable amount of 
food. And because the wife is from the 
ranking family of the subject village, 
nearly the whole community is involved 
in this production. 
In this way, a chief's prestige may be 
appraised in terms of wealth—the amount 
of produce deposited in his storehouse. 
But this is not his personal wealth, for 
he redistributes this store to pay for 
the many services he receives; he has to 
furnish food for the big feasts and cere­
monies to which his far-flung in-laws must 
be invited. 
In this system of redistribution through a chieftain role 
within the Trobriand society, we once again observe the dis­
tinctive trait of these types of societies which serves to 
characterize them as level 3 types. 
Within this overall societal structure, the family 
exists as a restricted family unit with the wife, a member of 
another clan, coming to live in the husband's house. This 
nuclear family unit appears to enjoy a high degree of stabili­
ty. For the most part, such stability is supported by the 
fact that the wife's family contributes almost the whole of 
economic goods and services to her household, including a 
large amount of yams. Under these circumstances, it is the 
husband's greatest loss when a separation occurs and he exerts 
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a good deal of effort usually to reunite with his wife. 
But in addition to this structural basis of family 
stability, there appears to be a rather genuine affection 
prevailing among husbands and wives. As Malinowski (1935:32) 
has stated: "The woman, who has no economic inducement to 
marry, and who gains less in comfort and social status than 
the man, is mainly influenced by personal affection and the 
de s i r e  t o  h a v e  c h i l d r e n . "  A n d  h e  s t a t e s  f u r t h e r  t h a t  " . . .  
the husband lives with his wife because he is attached to her 
and is fond of her, because he was at one time in love with 
her and married her very largely for that reason" (1935:201). 
He states, too, that "... young people want to marry, even 
when they already possess each other sexually, and . . . the 
state of marriage has real charm for them" (1935:80). 
Bolstered by social structure, by the positive attitude 
toward marriage, and by mutual affection between the spouses, 
"the majority of . . . marriages appear to be successful" 
(Malinowski, 1926:151). Malinowski says: "I seldom witnessed 
qu a r r e l s  o r  h e a r d  b a d  l a n g u a g e  a m o n g  m a r r i e d  p e o p l e  . . . "  
(1929:133) and "Husband and wife in the Trobriands lead their 
common life in close companionship, working side by side, 
sharing certain of the household duties, and spending a good 
deal of their leisure with each other, for the most part in 
excellent harmony and mutual appreciation" (1929:109). 
But Malinowski reports also that "... naturally there 
are also less happy unions" (1926:142) and that "Divorce is 
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not infrequent ..." (1929:142). Despite these reports, 
however, on the whole Trobriand marriages appear to be 
quite stable relative to the other societies we have reported 
upon. 
Trobriand socialization of children can only be described 
as very nurturant, for both the mother and the father share 
in the children's care and they do so with love, affection 
and tenderness. Malinowski (1929:523) reports that "The moth­
er stands in a close bodily relation to her child in its 
earliest years, and from this position she recedes, though 
only gradually, as he grows up . . . weaning takes place late, 
and children . . . are allowed to cuddle in their mother's 
arms and to embrace her whenever they want to." With respect 
to the father, the relationship with his children appears to 
be uniquely affectionate. Malinowski (1922:71) states that 
"The father's relation to his children is remarkable . . . the 
father is by far the nearest and most affectionate friend of 
his children." He further reports that "... the father is 
a close companion to his children; he takes an active part in 
the cares which are lavished upon them, invariably feels and 
shows a deep affection for them, and later has a share in their 
education" (1929:6). 
Although the data are insufficient to be highly confident 
as to the inferences drawn from them, it seems to be of high 
probability that the typical Trobriand Islander is highly 
identified with his or her society and does not see himself 
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as an alien to it and is rarely self-consciously preoccupied 
with self-conceptions and self-presentation. This is af­
firmed by the following observations by Malinowski (1929: 
391): "The garden magician, the head fisherman, the leader 
of an expedition, identifies himself to a great extent in 
ambition, in hope, and in effort, with the communal interest. 
He is extremely keen that all should go well, that his village 
should surpass all others, that his ambition and pride should 
be justified and win the day." Furthermore; 
They have no knowledge of the total outline 
of any of their social structure. They 
know their own motives, know the purpose of 
individual actions and the rules which apply 
to them, but how, out of these, the whole 
collective institution shapes, this is beyond 
their mental range. Not even the most in­
telligent native has any clear idea of the Kula 
as a big, organized social construction, 
still less of its sociological function and 
implications. If you were to ask him what 
the Kula is, he would answer by giving a few 
details, most likely by giving his personal 
experiences and subjective views on the Kula, 
but nothing approaching the definition just 
given here. Not even a partial coherent ac­
count could be obtained. For the integral 
picture does not exist in his mind; ^  jji 
it, and cannot see the whole from the outside 
TMalinowski, Ï922; 83). (Italics mine.l 
Family Stability, Socialization 
and Alienness in the Level 6 Societies 
The Japanese 
There can be little doubt that Japanese society is a 
thoroughly modern, industrialized nation-state and has been 
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for a considerable amount of time. Major changes in its 
social structure, however, did not occur until after World 
War Two, when extensive changes in its legal norms were in­
troduced. We are, of course, primarily concerned with the 
effects of these changes upon the family. 
In this regard. Langer (1966:172) reports that "After 
the War, constitutional reforms and Japanese civil law broke 
up the old family system, and replaced it with a more demo­
cratic and less authoritarian framework of human'and legal 
relationships." This occurrence follows the trend depicted 
in previous sections of this study. 
But the Japanese family authority pattern is not entirely 
of a democratic-equalitarian type. Even though its household 
form has become primarily restricted, it retains some of the 
features of the extended household. Reischauer (1977:130) 
reports that: "the nuclear family in contemporary Japan is 
somewhat less eroded than its American counterpart. Parental 
authority is stronger, and family ties on the whole are clos­
er." He also reports that "... some three quarters of 
retired persons still live with their children." 
On the other hand, as we would expect from our theory in 
the previous section, love and affection have come to play a 
major part in the husband-wife relationship. Langer (1966: 
177) reports the following: 
Most marriages in postwar Japan are 
neither pure love matches nor the tra­
ditional arranged marriages of prewar 
226 
Japan, but rather a blend of the two. 
Sometimes an arranged meeting is the 
starting point and love follows. In 
other cases, two young people meet by 
chance, fall in love, and then arrange 
to marry each other through the tradi­
tional go between. The go between is 
brought in to assure both families that 
the prospective partners are compatible 
with regard to character, personality, 
education, and family background. 
The changing basis of marriage, from a structurally 
sanctioned union to one of love, affection and companionship, 
would lead us to expect low family stability in Japan. How­
ever, this appears not to be the case. The divorce rate is 
reported to be only about "a third of that in the U.S." 
(Langer, 1966:177), which translates to about 17%. This 
figure is reportedly lower than that at the turn of the cen­
tury. Even when we consider the fact that the Japanese family 
structure appears not to have reached a fully companionship-
type, this figure is still much lower than our theory might 
lead us to predict, and we would have to rate Japanese family 
stability as high. In this respect, then, Japan is definitely 
a "deviant" case. 
Socialization within the Japanese family appears to be 
highly nurturant at least with respect to infancy. Ishida 
(1971:51-52) reports the following: 
When a couple has children, their interest, 
particularly that of the mother, tends to 
be concentrated on the children. The moth­
er generally devotes herself to their up­
bringing. Even in the case of a family of 
the new middle class, which represents in 
many ways the most radical departure from 
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tradition, it is reported that the 
mother provides her children with con­
tinuous attention. For instance, she 
usually sleeps with the child, and she 
carries it on her back when she goes 
out shopping. This intimate relation­
ship and close physical contact between 
mother and child is one of the special 
characteristics of the Japanese family. 
The intimate relationship continues to 
exist until the children reach late 
adolescence, although occasionally they 
revolt because they feel the close tie 
with their parents to be a burden. 
Although once we learn family stability is high in Japan 
we would then predict highly nurturant socialization, the fact 
that we find it in a society as structurally complex as Japan 
is also a departure from what would have been predicted by 
our theory. This nurturant form of socialization appears to 
be continuous with what it was in World War Two or perhaps 
even traditional Japan (Benedict, 1946:258), and has not 
changed appreciably. The conditions of modernization, coupled 
with the fact that the Japanese housewife does not typically 
work outside the home, have, indeed, seemed to enhance this 
nurturance characteristic. Quoting from Ishida's observa­
tions once again, we learn that "The decrease in the amount of 
time spent on housekeeping, the result of the introduction of 
such durable consumer goods as washing machines, has made the 
housewife's loneliness even more intense. Left alone for long 
periods, she often tries to alleviate her discontent by 
lavishing attention on her children. 'Education Fever' and 
the overprotection of children are the results" (1971:52-53). 
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In later childhood, the Japanese socialization tech­
niques contain elements that indicate some possibilities of 
self-disillusionment. Although the period upon which her 
observations were made are not with respect to modern day 
Japan, Benedict's (1946:260-264) statements are probably still 
accurate : 
Children are usually weaned after they can 
understand what is said to them. They have 
sat in their mother's lap at the family 
table during meals and been fed bits of 
the food; now they eat more of it. Some 
children are feeding problems at this time, 
and this is easy to understand when they 
are weaned because of the birth of a new 
baby. Mothers often offer them sweets to 
buy them off from begging to nurse. Some­
times a mother will put pepper on her 
nipples. But all mothers tease them by 
telling them they are proving that they 
are mere babies if they want to nurse. 
"Look at your little cousin. He's a man. 
He's little like you and he doesn't ask 
to nurse." "That little boy is laughing 
at you because you're a boy and you still 
want to nurse." Two-, three-, and four-
year-old children who are still demanding 
their mother's breast will often drop it 
and feign indifference when an older child 
is heard approaching. 
This teasing, this urging a child toward 
adulthood, is not confined to weaning. From 
the time the child can understand what is 
said to it, these techniques are common in 
any situation. A mother will say to her 
boy baby when he cries, "you're not a girl," 
or "You're a man." Or she will say, "Look 
at that baby. He doesn't cry." When an­
other baby is brought to visit, she will 
fondle the visitor in her own child's 
presence and say, "I'm going to adopt this 
baby. I want such a nice, good child. You 
don't act your age." Her own child throws 
itself upon her, often pommeling her with 
its fists, and cries, "No, no, we don't 
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want any other baby. I'll do what you 
say." When the child of one or two has 
been noisy or has failed to be prompt 
about something, the mother will say to 
a man visitor, "Will you take this child 
away? We don't want it." The visitor 
acts out his role. He starts to take the 
child out of the house. The baby screams 
and calls upon its mother to rescue it. 
He has a full-sized tantrum. When she 
thinks the teasing has worked, she relents 
and takes back the child, exacting its 
frenzied promise to be good. The little 
play is acted out sometimes with children 
who are as old as five and six. 
Teasing takes another form too. The 
mother will turn to her husband and say to 
the child, "I like your father better than 
you. He is a nice man." The child gives 
full expression to his jealousy and tries 
to break in between his father and mother. 
His mother says, "Your father doesn't shout 
around the house and run around the rooms." 
"No, no," the child protests, "I won't 
either. I am good. Now do you love me?" 
When the play has gone on long enough, the 
father and mother look at one another and 
smile. They may tease a young daughter in 
this way as well as a young son. 
Such experiences are rich soil for the fear 
of ridicule and of ostracism which is so 
marked in the Japanese grown-up. It is im­
possible to say how soon little children un­
derstand that they are being made game of by 
this teasing, but understand it they do soon­
er or later, and when they do, the sense of 
being laughed at fuses with the panic of the 
child threatened with loss of all that is safe 
and familiar. When he is a grown man, being 
laughed at retains this childhood aura. 
These observations, then, indicate something less than a 
fully or very-highly nurturant socialization process. Still, 
comparatively, this process is marked for the most part by a 
highly nurturant attitude and practice, though it is confined 
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to the infant years. 
The idea that the Japanese person's identification with 
his or her group is extreme has been widely reported and ac­
cepted in the west. When the word is used more or less as 
the equivalent of "group loyalty" or "altruism," this is 
probably true, at least much more so than in the U.S. How­
ever, our usage of the identification or identity term refers 
more to the absence of the self-conscious differentiation 
from and contradistinction of the individual and the group or 
social category. When we attempt to measure the typical 
Japanese person's identity with his or her group or social 
category in this way, we can only come to a somewhat tentative 
conclusion. The self-consciousness of the individual Japanese, 
for instance, is very high. It is so high and so frequent 
that the Japanese consider it a tremendous burden lifted from 
them when they are able to escape it. These conclusions are 
supported by the following observations by Benedict (1946: 
248-251). 
Suzuki, the great authority on Zen Buddhism, 
describes muga as "ecstasy with no sense of 
I am doing it," "effortlessness." The "ob­
serving self" is eliminated; a man "loses 
himself," that is, he ceases to be a specta­
tor of his acts. Suzuki says: "With the 
awakening of consciousness, the will is 
split into two: . . . actor and observer. 
Conflict is inevitable, for the actor-self 
wants to be free from the limitations of 
the observer self. Therefore in enlighten­
ment the disciple discovers that there is 
no observer-self, "no soul entity as an un­
known or unknowable quantity." Nothing re­
mains but the goal and the act that accom­
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plishes it. The student of human behavior 
could rephrase this statement to refer more 
particularly to Japanese culture. As a 
child a person is drastically trained to 
observe his own acts and to judge them in 
the light of what people will say; his ob­
server-self is terribly vulnerable. To 
deliver himself up to the ecstasy of his 
soul, he eliminates this vulnerable self. 
He ceases to feel that "he is doing it." 
He then feels himself trained in his soul 
in the same way that the novice in fencing 
feels himself trained to stand without fear 
of falling on the four-foot pillar. 
Benedict continues: 
Such concepts are eloquent testimony to 
the heavy burden the Japanese make out of 
self-watchfulness and self-surveillance. 
They are free and efficient, they say, 
when these restraints are gone. Whereas 
Americans identify their observer-selves 
with the rational principle within them 
and pride themselves in crises on "keep­
ing their wits about them" the Japanese 
feel that a millstone has fallen from a-
round their necks when they deliver them­
selves up to the ecstasy of their souls 
and forget the restraints self-watchful-
ness imposes. As we have seen, their 
culture dins the need for circumspection 
into their souls, and the Japanese have 
countered by declaring that there is a 
more efficient plane of human conscious­
ness where this burden falls away (194 6: 
248-249) . 
Benedict contrasts the Japanese viewpoint of this self-
consciousness with that in American culture. She writes: 
In Western phraseology, the Japanese in 
the practice of muga and of "living as 
one already dead" eliminate the con­
science. What they call "the observing 
self," "the interfering self," is a 
censor judging one's acts. "It points 
up vividly the difference between West­
ern and Eastern psychology that when we 
speak of a conscienceless American we 
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mean a man who no longer feels the sense 
of sin which should accompany wrongdoing, 
but that when a Japanese uses the equiv­
alent phrase he means a man who is no 
longer tense and hindered. The American 
means a bad man; the Japanese means a 
good man, a trained man, a man able to 
use his abilities to the utmost. He 
means a man who can perform the most 
difficult and devoted deeds of unself­
ishness. The great American sanction 
for good behavior is guilt; a man who 
because of a calloused conscience can no 
longer feel this has become anti-social. 
The Japanese diagram the problem differently. 
According to their philosophy man in his 
inmost soul is good. If his impulse can be 
directly embodied in his deed, he acts vir­
tuously and easily. Therefore he undergoes, 
in "expertness," self-training to eliminate 
the self-censorship of shame (haji). Only 
then is his sixth sense free of hindrance. 
It is his supreme release from self-conscious-
ness and conflict (1946:250-251). 
The question arises, however, as to whether this extreme 
self-consciousness of the Japanese reflects true alienness. 
As we have seen in previous chapters, alienness per se is the 
feeling of not being a member of the human category stemming 
from a "negative essence" component of the self-concept. 
Modal self-consciousness results from this feeling of alien­
ness and is part of the alienness syndrome but is not neces­
sarily to be equated with it. Does the typical Japanese per­
son feel that he or she does not belong, and, if so, is this 
feeling based on a negative essence? 
Our answer must be yes, based on the assumptions of our 
theory, previously given (see Chapter I). Our position is 
that self-consciousness is a product primarily of the failure 
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to actualize self-conceptions, i.e., to affirm our ideal 
identity and image of ourselves. The attempt at achievement 
of muga so prevalent among the Japanese—in the theoretical 
framework of this study—is an attempt to achieve a state of 
being-cognition wherein the self as object disappears and a 
unity of self and environment prevails. The degree to which 
the Japanese strive for this state is, in fact, an evidence 
of the degree to which they are lacking in it and, concordant-
ly, of the degree to which they lack a sense of identity with 
others. 
In our theoretical framework, then, the Japanese may be 
characterized as a very highly alienated populace, their 
self-consciousness representing as it must a differentiation 
and contradistinction of the self and others. They seek above 
all to submerge themselves in the group, to attain muga, to 
attain a spontaneity and spiritual plane of existence that 
will release them from their almost constant self-surveillance, 
that will allow them to merge the I with the roles of the 
society so that they forget the possibility of shame and act 
habitually. 
As we have seen, and as we shall see further in the next 
section, the Japanese person's search for identity character­
izes the American person's plight also. However, they differ 
in the way in which they attempt to achieve this goal, the 
Japanese seeking to do so within the group, while the American 
seeks spontaneity and authenticity outside it. 
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The United States 
Like Japan, there can be little doubt that the United 
States is a thoroughly industrialized nation-state and has 
been for even longer. The industrialization of the United 
States has been accompanied by all of those characteristics 
representing the modernization process and the implementa­
tion of the gesellschaft socio-cultural context: extreme 
division of labor, rationalization, secularization, bureau­
cratization, urbanization, etc. 
Within this context the American family system may be 
characterized as neolocal, restricted, and as a democratic-
equalitarian structure of authority. It had never been en­
tirely confined to an extended type even during the early 
history of the society but existed as a variety of types. 
The extended form was modal, however, until industrializa­
tion and urbanization began to predominate in the twentieth 
century. The nuclear unit then became emphasized and the 
restricted form came to prevail, based upon love and affec­
tion between the spouses rather than upon family alliances. 
As has already been implied in the theoretical portion of 
this study, the American family's stability, as measured by 
the divorce rate, has declined accordingly. Compared to 1937, 
when it was 17 percent, in 1957 it rose to 25 percent, in 1977 
to 50 percent, and in 1980 it stood at 53 percent. These 
figures bespeak of a great deal of incompatibility in American 
marriages and it is the compatibility of the spouses above all 
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that is the basis for remaining married in this society. 
Marital compatibility, in turn, seems to be based, not only 
on the sheer diversity of the populace itself, but upon the 
changing structure of the family. According to analysts, 
the institution of marriage in America is in transition 
(Blackman, 1976:9) and "anything in transition creates insta­
bility." Furthermore, "the effect on marriages may be one of 
confusion and discontent, often resulting in divorce." 
Socialization in the American family is carried out pri­
marily by the mother, with the father often acting only as 
the primary disciplinarian (Fischer and Fischer, 1966:100). 
In a comparison of American childrearing practices to other 
cultures, Whiting and Child (1953:305-324) found these prac­
tices to be ". . . extremely low in average indulgence." 
They state that "the average degree of initial indulgence is 
found to vary from an average rating of 10 for the Tonala 
and Dobuans to an average rating of 17 for the Siriono. The 
median is at 13. Our American middle class group has an 
average rating of 10 . . . ." 
The studies done by Fischer and Fischer (1966) seem to 
confirm this observation. They report what appears to be con­
siderably less nurturant practices of childrearing when com­
pared to others in the sample of societies in this study. For 
instance: "Infants may be fed initially by bottle or breast. 
Ten out of our 24 sample children were nursed for a time by 
their mothers. The length of nursing ranged from a few days 
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to five months, at which time bottle feeding was substituted 
(1966:67). Furthermore, "Some mothers said they simply could 
not nurse their babies, while others expressed varying degrees 
of distaste or revulsion toward nursing" (1966:67). 
Less nurturant practices are also revealed in feeding. 
American children appear to be fed, for the most part, on 
demand. However, "Although mothers feel that feeding should 
be enjoyable and weaning an easy and enjoyable experience— 
they have read this and hear it many times—it is never­
theless true that anxiety is noticeable in both of these ac­
tivities" (Fischer and Fischer, 1966:71). 
American infants tend to sleep in a crib for a year or 
more and in a separate room. They also tend to spend a good 
deal of time in a playpen or in a fenced-in yard. The Fis­
chers state that "children learn early in Orchard Town that 
interaction with others is spaced, separated by periods of 
withdrawal" (1966:75). More to the point of our analysis, 
these observers report the following: 
In addition to tiring the baby, it is be­
lieved that too much social attention can 
"spoil" him. Certain types of unpleasant 
behavior, interpreted by adults to mean 
that the infant wants social attention, are 
deliberately ignored. Crying is often one 
of these. The value here is inculcated that 
people are ready to share time with a 
pleasant person and are unwilling to spend 
time with an unpleasant one. Unpleasantness 
must be hidden from others by means of a so­
cial mask or, alternatively, one can withdraw 
from others. 
Such contacts as the baby has with other human 
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beings are not marked by close bodily con­
tacts as in many societies. There are two 
opposing needs considered here—one the 
early need for warmth supplied by close 
bodily contact, and the other the pleasure 
in the free movement of limbs. In this 
society the second is highly satisfied at 
the expense of the first. Ample clothing 
also intervenes between mother and child. 
There are freedom and a certain privacy 
in this. These things continue to be valued 
in adult social life. At the same time there 
are often feelings that something desirable 
is missing from social relations. Perhaps 
what is missing is the satisfaction of the 
need for close contact with another human 
being. 
Non-nurturant, or self-disillusioning, practices are 
also manifest in childhood; 
. . . children are highly aware that they 
have graduated from the rank of "baby" 
and are likely to exhibit considerable 
scorn of babies, whether a neighbor's 
child or a younger sibling. This feel­
ing of superiority is the residue of the 
parents' praise for advanced behavior and 
their inciting the child by remarks like 
"Only babies do that. You're not a baby." 
The frequency of these remarks at this age, 
however, suggests that in adult minds, at 
least, there is concern lest the children 
lapse into babyish ways. 
Proper discipline is felt to be especially 
important for a preschool child, and physi­
cal punishment is used more often in this 
period than at any other time. Initially 
children respond to the stronger discipline 
by temper tantrums. With these there is a 
shift in the parents' feelings toward the 
child from indulgence to some hostility 
toward his anti-social acts. Negatives be­
come more common in the parents' speech 
with the child: "No! No!" (Fischer and Fischer, 
1966:77). 
These observations, as well as others cited in Appendix 
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III, lead to the conclusion that, in comparison to the other 
sample societies, American socialization of children appears 
to be low in nurturance and self-fulfillment. 
With respect to the degree to which alienness exists in 
American society, documentation of the high incidence of 
this phenomenon would hardly appear necessary. Indictments 
of American society on this score abound in its literature, 
plays, movies and other art forms. The observations of so­
cial scientists also confirm it. As Eric and Mary Josephson 
(1975:9) have put it: "Ours is a self-conscious age. Per­
haps never before in history has man been so much a problem 
to himself." And Lasch (1979:22) states that "Economic man 
has given way to the psychological man of our times—the final 
product of bourgeois individualism." He calls this man the 
"new narcissist" and describes him as ". . . haunted not by 
guilt but by anxiety. He seeks not to inflict his own cer­
tainties on others but to find meaning to his life. Liberated 
from the susperstitions of the past, he doubts even the 
reality of his own existence. Superficially relaxed and 
tolerant, he finds little use for dogmas of racial and ethnic 
purity but at the same time forfeits the security of group 
loyalties and regards everyone as a rival for the favors con­
ferred by a paternalistic state." And Schur (1977:1) writes 
that "Self-awareness is the new panacea. Across the country 
Americans are frantically trying to 'get in touch* with them­
selves, to learn how to 'relate' better, and to stave off 
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outer turmoil by achieving inner peace." 
The extent to which this search for inner peace pervades 
American society is reflected more factually, perhaps, in the 
burgeoning "consciousness movement" reported by Woodward 
et al.in Newsweek (Sept. 6, 1976:56-62): "According to one 
popular handbook on the consciousness movement," say the 
authors, "there are more than 8,000 ways to 'awaken in North 
America.' Although techniques vary widely (page 60), all are 
directed in some way toward releasing the self from the domi­
nation of the ego." The goal of the movement, says Newsweek, 
is "to put seekers progressively in touch with themselves, 
with others, with nature and—at its most ambitious—with 
the fundamental forces of the cosmos." Newsweek reports that 
a "widespread loss of faith in family, church and government" 
also lies behind the consciousness movement, whose members 
now number in the "millions," and which represents a "mass 
movement." 
All of these observations add up to a widespread alien-
ness and its associated characteristics in American society: 
of a high degree of self-consciousness, vague and diffuse 
anxiety, basic insecurity, meaninglessness and powerlessness, 
of sham and inauthenticity. Such alienness, however, is not, 
apparently, as deeply felt as it is among the Japanese for, 
unlike they, who have sought an institutionalized solution 
through Zen Buddhism, it is now expressed only as a movement 
in America. Nevertheless, it is probably true that a high 
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incidence of the alienness phenomenon prevails. 
Conclusion 
The data presented here, it must be said, are not the 
best that would be desired. A question of validity, as well 
as reliability, of course, arises. Nevertheless, these data 
provide some evidence of the incidence of each of the varia­
bles which they indicate in each of the societies measured. 
As indicated previously, my intent is to merely obtain some 
"feel" for the empirical basis of the theory. 
We turn, now, to a more systematic analysis of these 
data in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER VIII: 
A COMPARISON OF THE SOCIETIES 
Eight societies, ordered by structural complexity, have 
been described with respect to three variables : family sta­
bility, socialization, and alienness. We may now attempt an 
analysis of the data in a more systematic way to bring them to 
bear on the hypotheses. 
Analysis and Findings 
Using the operational definitions in Appendix I and the 
codes in Table 2, numbers were assigned to each variable in 
each society based on the author's judgments on the data, some 
of which was presented in Chapter VII. (The complete data 
sources are given in Appendix II.) It should be emphasized 
that these codes represent only an ordinal scale for each 
variable and only serve to place the society in a higher or 
lower position relative to the other societies with respect 
to that particular variable. If the Wintu have a score of 2 
on family stability, and the Ojibwa have a score of 1, it does 
not mean that the Wintu family is two times more stable, only 
that it is more stable than the Ojibwa in the judgment of the 
author. The scores assigned by the author to each variable 
within each society are shown in Table 3. 
Somer's d^^ was chosen as the appropriate ordinal level, 
asymmetrical measure of association to test the key hypotheti-
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Table 2. Variable Codes 
I. Structural Complexity: 
1 - very low 
2 = low 
3 = low-moderate 
4 = moderate 
5 = high 
6 = very high 
II. Family Stability: 
1 = very low stability 
2 = low stability 
3 = moderate stability 
4 = high stability 
5 = very high stability 
III. Socialization (non-nurturant vs. nurturant) 
1 = very low nurturance 
2 = low nurturance 
3 = moderate nurturance 
4 = high nurturance 
5 = very high nurturance 
IV. Alienness-Identity; 
1 = very low identity (very high alienness) 
2 = low identity (high alienness) 
3 = moderate identity (moderate alienness) 
4 = high identity (low alienness) 
5 = very high identity (very low alienness) 
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cal relationships given earlier.^ The matrix of association 
for each variable relationship is shown in Table 4. 
Hypothesis one, stated previously, predicts a negative 
association between structural complexity and family stability. 
Scrutiny of the ratings of family stability with respect to 
Table 3. Variables and Their Ratings in Each Society 
Society type Var. #2 Var. #3 Var. #4 Var. #1 
and name Structural Family Sociali­ Alienness, 
Complexity Stability zation Identity 
(Xl) (Xg) (X3) (y) 
Level 1: 
1. Wintu 1 3 4 5  
2 .  0j ibwa 1 2  3 2  
Level 2 :  
3. Cheyenne 2  5 5 5  
4. Hopi 2  3 2  2  
Level 3: 
5. Nootka 3 3 4 4 
6. Trobriands 3 4 5 5 
Level 6: 
7. Japan 6 4 4 1 
8. United States 6 1 2 2 
A description of the calculation and use of this measure 
is given in Loether and McTavish (1974:223-226). 
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structural complexity in Table 3 shows quite plainly, however, 
that the prediction does not hold. Calculation of the asym­
metrical measure of Somer's d^^ in Table 4 confirms this con­
clusion in a more precise way. This measure is, in fact, .04 
for this relation. 
This statistic implies very little if any relationship 
between structural complexity and family stability. A graph 
of the relationship shows this lack of association more vivid­
ly in Table 5. 
These findings raise serious questions about our theory 
of the effect of structural complexity on the family. It 
would appear from our data that instead of leading to instabil­
ity, structural complexity of society has little effect on the 
stability of the family. Yet such a finding flies in the face 
of much sociological research denoting the trend of instabil­
ity in the family within the more modernized societies. 
Table 4. Matrix of Association (d ) for Variables One 
Through Four 
Identity 
(#1) 
Complexity 
(#2) 
Family 
Stability 
(#3) 
Sociali­
zation 
(#4) 
Identity (#1) — -.36 .20 .64 
Complexity (#2) — — — .04 -.04 
Family 
Stability (#3) — — — .76 
Socialization (#4) — — — — — — — 
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The problem is a problem of theory. When this finding 
came to light I was forced to return to the sociological lit­
erature on the family and found there that, while indeed the 
more structurally complex societies showed lower family 
stability,.this lower family stability was also to be found in 
the least complex societies. Fëimily stability was highest in 
those societies of the middle ranges of complexity. Thus, a 
curvilinear relationship exists between these two variables 
rather than a linear one. My knowledge of family theory had 
simply been mistaken at this point. 
This curvilinear relationship is verified by the re­
searches of Nimkoff and Middleton (1971:131-134) and Winch, 
Grier and Blumberg (1971:134-137). Although these studies 
were not measuring family stability as I have defined it in 
Table 5. Graph of the Relationship Between Structural 
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this study, they were measuring family form, which I have in­
cluded as a major part of the definition of family stability. 
The nuclear, or restricted, family form was found to be prev­
alent among the less structurally complex societies while the 
extended family form was found to be most prevalent among 
those more structurally complex. 
The extended family form, as Winch, Grier and Blumberg's 
(1971) study has shown, is a function of other variables, 
such as low migration, property in the form of land, and the 
family as a unit of labor. All of these factors, moreover, 
are associated with agricultural modes of economy, and the 
agricultural mode is itself related to the middle levels of 
societal complexity. Hunting-gathering and industrialism 
are modes related to levels 1 and 6 respectively. It would 
appear that it is the form of economy that primarily affects 
family form, and hence family stability, rather than societal 
complexity. 
If a measure of curvilinearity such as Eta (Ey^) is ap­
plied to the data of Table 3, a .83 is obtained, showing a 
2 1 
substantial curvilinear relationship (E^^ = .69). Thus, 
the data of this table are more in concordance with the socio­
logical literature than with our theory, and the first, linear. 
Interval level assumptions, of course, are not met for 
this measure. Its use here, as with the various statistical 
devices generally, is merely for aid in the comparative analy­
sis and in the style generally familiar to most researchers. 
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hypothesis will have to be modified in favor of the second, 
curvilinear, one. 
With the modification of the hypothesis in this way we 
may note from Table 3 and Table 5 two cases which deviate from 
what this hypothesis would predict. These deviant cases are 
the Cheyenne and the Japanese. For the Cheyenne, a prediction 
of moderate family stability would have been in order but, 
as shown, a very high level of family stability is manifested. 
For the Japanese, a low level of family stability would have 
been predicted but they showed a high level instead. These 
cases, therefore, require some comment. 
The Cheyenne, as indicated earlier, have a hunting-
gathering economy, but it is not, like the Ojibwa and the 
Wintu, based on trapping or forest-hunting. The Cheyenne, at 
the time of the ethnography, hunted the buffalo, and their 
culture and social structure evolved around this mode of hunt­
ing. Such an economic mode requires coordination and cohesion 
in the society, including the family, even when the whole 
society was mobile as it followed the herd and even when it had 
no concept of real property. Thus, the expectation that the 
Cheyenne would have low family-stability, as predicted by the 
curvilinear relationship, is not borne out, due, possibly, to 
the fact that these other factors come into play. The Chey­
enne economy, therefore, is quite similar to agricultural 
economies in that it possesses properties molding the family 
into a more cohesive and stable unit. 
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Japanese family stability as a deviant case is perhaps 
more easily explained. The high stability of the Japanese 
family may be a result of the society's short history with 
industrialization. The forces of industrialization perhaps 
have not had time to have their full effect. There are indi­
cations that the Japanese family is becoming less stable as 
industrialisation proceeds. Eventually, Japan, too, will 
probably fall more nearly upon the regression line. 
Turning to hypothesis two, the prediction is made that 
family-stability will be positively associated with the mode 
of socialization. Calculation of Somer's d^^ shown in Table 4 
yields a value of .76 for this relationship, confirming the 
hypothesis. Considerable predictive power is gained for so­
cialization mode by knowledge of this variable for these eight 
cases. The relationship is graphed in Table 6. 
There are three cases which depart relatively radically 
from what would be predicted by the theory. The Wintu would 
have been predicted as manifesting very low to moderate nur-
turance in socialization yet show a highly nurturant mode. 
The Hopi would be expected to show moderate to very high nur-
turance but show a low nurturance instead. The Japanese 
would have been expected to show very low to low nurturance 
but a high nurturance was indicated. All other cases fall 
directly where they would be predicted (the U.S., the Chey­
enne) or fall within one level, plus or minus, of what would 
be ordinarily expected. 
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Explanations for these deviant cases are required of only 
the Wintu and the Hopi since the highly nurturant socializa­
tion process among the Japanese can be accounted for by their 
high family stability. The Wintu and the Hopi, however, 
represent exact opposite cases, with moderate family stabili­
ty apparently leading on the one hand to a high-nurturant 
socialization and, on the other, to a low-nurturant sociali­
zation. It is this opposition which needs to be accounted 
A major difference between these two societies that may 
account for the differences in their socialization modes is 
the presence of withchcraft among the Hopi. In the data pre­
sented in Chapter VII, it was noted that Aberle (1951) had ob­
served the belief in witches, or persons of "two hearts," 
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among the Hopi and that such witches could even be suspected 
among those of one's own family. As for the effects of this 
belief on the socialization process in Hopi society, it is, 
of course, passed on to the children as part of the belief 
system of the culture. Aberle (1951) observed a "grave diffi­
culty" of Hopi children in interpreting the intentions of 
others leading to their mistrust of others. And, according 
to Titiev (1971:57) fear and mistrust permeate Hopi life. It 
is this factor, therefore, not found among the Wintu, that 
might account for the low-nurturance mode of socialization 
among the Hopi. 
The witchcraft factor is absent, on the other hand, from 
the Wintu. Thus, it cannot enter into their socialization of 
children and the childrearing practices of these people are 
left to be shaped by other factors, including family stabili­
ty which, although only moderate, is enough, apparently, to 
promote a highly-nurturant form. It should be noted that the 
Nootka Indians represent a similar case and offer corroborat­
ing evidence. 
It should be observed at this point that the witchcraft 
factor offers itself as another possible explanation of the 
low-nurturant mode of socialization among the Ojibwa also. 
Although the Ojibwa possess low family stability, they also 
possess witchcraft. Whether or not this factor does so have 
this effect must also be taken into consideration. 
Hypothesis three states a positive relationship between 
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socialization mode and alienness-identity. The d^^ computed 
in Table 4 on this relationship is .64, again yielding con­
siderable gain in predictive power and confirming the hypo­
thesis. The relationship is shown in graph form in Table 7. 
The deviant cases for this hypothesis are: the Wintu, 
who would not be expected to rank this high on identity, but 
whose high ranking can be explained as a result of the high-
nurturant mode of socialization; the Hopi, who would not be 
expected to rank this low on identity but whose ranking can 
be explained also by their socialization mode, this time by 
its low-nurturance; and the Janpanese, who, while they would 
be expected to rank as they do on the basis of their ordinal 
level of structural complexity, would not be expected to on 
the basis of their socialization mode. 
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The only deviant case in this relationship which needs 
explanation, therefore, is the Japanese. This society, with 
a highly nurturant socialization process, would have been 
expected to show high identity. There has to be some inter­
vening variable or variables to produce the different effects 
that would be expected. 
Although it is problematical, conceptually, to see ex­
actly how it could do so, the most likely causal suspect ap­
pears to be structural complexity itself. As indicated by 
Table 4, there ^  a fairly substantial negative relationship 
(dy^ = -.36) between structural complexity and identity, 
suggesting the possibility of a direct effect on identity by 
this variable independently of family stability and sociali­
zation. The negative relationship indicates that low struc­
tural complexity will produce high identity, and high complex­
ity will produce low identity, irrespective of family stabili­
ty or socialization mode. Again, as to just how it could do 
this from a causal point of view is quite vague at this point. 
Nevertheless, the relationship points to some kind of causal 
relation, or the possibility of it, and it becomes necessary 
to check it out. 
To help determine if the structural complexity variable 
had an effect, the assumptions of interval level measurement 
were relaxed and the data were subjected to partial correla­
tion analysis. The correlation matrix is given in Table 8. 
Again, the relationship between structural complexity and 
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alienness appears to be fairly substantial at -.514. If 
variables three (family stability) and four (socialization) 
are controlled by partialling out their effects on the rela­
tion of variables one (alienness) and two (structural complex­
ity) , however, the variance of variable one explained by 
variable two is reduced from .26 to .05. This statistic 
indicates that structural complexity by itself has little 
direct effect, if any, on the alienness-identity variable 
for this set of cases, thus apparently ruling it out as a 
direct cause of alienness among the Japanese. 
In point of fact, this finding supports one of the major 
propositions of the theory--that the family is the mediatory 
agency of the effects of social structure. The forces operat­
ing on personality are, of course, diverse. Still, these 
forces, if our theory is correct, must have their impact 
through the family if they are to mold the character structure 
Table 8. Correlation Matrix 
Identity Complexity Family 
Stability 
(#1) (#2) (#3) 
Sociali­
zation 
(#4) 
Identity (#1) -.514 464 .703 
Complexity (#2) -.172 -.180 
Family 
Stability (#3) .805 
Socialization (#4) 
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of the individual. 
While our theory postulates that the effects of struc­
tural complexity are mediated through the family by altering 
its form of integration, reducing its stability, and initiat­
ing a non-nurturant form of socialization, the Japanese case 
would seem to refute this. On the other hand, our findings 
support the contention of the mediatory function of the family 
with respect to alienness. We are once again left with the 
question: How does Japanese society, with high family stabil­
ity and high nurturance, produce high incidences of alienness? 
Other factors must be sought as explanans of Japanese alien­
ness, yet it is clear that these must operate through the 
family group's members in interaction with one another. 
Turning to the data presented in Chapter VI, we find that 
"The Japanese are much more likely to operate in groups or at 
l e a s t  t o  s e e  t h e m s e l v e s  a s  o p e r a t i n g  i n  t h i s  w a y  . . . "  
( R e i s c h a u e r ,  1 9 7 7 : 1 2 7 - 1 2 9 ) ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e  J a p a n e s e  a r e  " . . .  
taught to think of [themselves] primarily as a member of a 
group—family, business firm, professional, and so forth. . ." 
(Langer, 1966:28). We also learn that ". . . there are pre­
scribed and 'correct' norms of behavior in all matters" and 
that "group interest[s] override that of individuals" (Langer, 
1966:29); that, furthermore, the Japanese "culture dins the 
need for circumspection into their souls" (Benedict, 1946: 
248-249), and that "as a child a person is drastically 
trained to observe his own acts and to judge them in the light 
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of what people will say" (Benedict, 1946:248). 
In Japanese society, then, alienness, as measured by the 
high degree of self-consciousness, appears to be transmitted 
to the child by the family simply as it mirrors the larger 
culture. The constant monitoring and comparing of the self 
to an ideal among the Japanese is not, then, the result of the 
early disillusionment of self during infancy but of socializa­
tion during childhood as it mirrors the culture of the society 
itself, of a culture which imposes this self-scrutiny upon the 
individual as part of its system of values and beliefs. The 
family is the mediator of this wider cultural characteristic 
even while, at the same time, it is very stable and its so­
cialization techniques are quite nurturant. 
The analysis of the data up to this point has involved 
the assessment of the relations of the variables horizontally. 
Where a case appeared to deviate from the causal model pre­
sented in Figure 5, I have tried to offer alternative explana­
tions. However, although I have not offered any formal hy­
potheses in this respect, it is perhaps more germane to the 
central issue of the study to do some comparative analysis of 
these societies also on a vertical basis. The central issue 
I refer to, of course, is the assumption in the sociological 
literature that it is within the modernized (industrialized, 
urbanized, rationalized, etc.) societies that alienness will 
be found. 
Scrutiny of Table 3 reveals clearly that this assumption 
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is not borne out. Two cases stand out as deviant from this 
expectation. Despite their being communal types of society, 
both the Ojibwa and the Hopi reveal an apparently high fre­
quency of alienness. Both cases, however, indicate that they 
do so because of low to moderate family stability, and low to 
moderately nurturant socialization. The causal process con­
forms to the hypothesized expectations even though the cases 
themselves represent unexpected results from the standpoint of 
classical theory. The implication of these findings for 
classical theory's central proposition is that it is not 
necessarily true. The mere fact that a society has not been 
modernized does not mean persons in that society will not 
become alienated. Under the condition of lack of a nurturant 
socialization mode, alienness may result, however this non-
nurturant socialization is produced. In both associational 
and communal societies non-nurturant socialization appears 
likely to be produced by a high family instability. High 
family instability, in turn, appears to be produced by the 
form of economy, being associated with hunting-gathering modes 
as well as industrialized modes. Low family instability 
appears to be associated with the agricultural mode. 
There is, however, another alternative explanation, al­
ready noted, that should be considered again here. It is 
possible that the source of alienness in these two societies 
is not in the effects of family instability upon the sociali­
zation process but in the effects of witchcraft upon this 
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process instead. As previously indicated, both societies, 
the Ojibwa and the Hopi, have the belief in witchcraft in 
common. It is, then, possible that this factor is the cru­
cial one in bringing about the alienness that has been ob­
served in these societies. 
By the same token, just as there is an alternative ex­
planation of alienness in the Ojibwa and Hopi societies, it 
must also be noted that there is an alternative explanation 
for the alienness observed in the U.S. As has already been 
noted in the review of literature in Chapter II, Erik Erikson 
argues that it is the introduction of rational procedures into 
the socialization process, interfering with the oral, anal 
and phallic stages of development of children, which produces 
problems of identity. Thus, although our data support the 
hypothesis of family instability bringing this about, Erik-
son's argument must nevertheless be considered also. 
Conclusion 
These findings seem to support the theory in general with 
the following major qualifications: 
First, a linear relationship between socio-structural 
complexity and family stability has to be rejected and a 
curvilinear relationship substituted in its place. This 
finding is in accordance with other studies and is thereby 
more strongly confirmed. The relationship between the family 
and the larger social structure is obviously more complicated 
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than I had at first assumed. 
Secondly, we must recognize that there are variables 
other than family stability which affect socialization. The 
cases of the Wintu, Ojibwa, and the Nootka show that a 
relatively nurturant form of socialization exists despite the 
relative instability of the family group, and the case of the 
Hopi shows that a non-nurturant form of socialization 
exists within a relatively stable family context. 
Thirdly, we must recognize that there are other variables 
besides that of a non-nurturant form of socialization which 
can bring about alienness, if not in the fullest sense with 
which it has been described here, at least with respect to 
a very basically associated trait, i.e., that of self-con­
scious control and monitoring of behavior. The Japanese, the 
Ojibwa and Hopi cases illustrate that this trait can be trans­
mitted to the child through socialization as a result of a 
particular normative or belief aspect of the culture. This 
finding would seem to have important implications for our 
theory, which has argued for the place of the family in the 
production of the alienness syndrome, but which has deempha-
sized the possibility that it does so by simply mirroring 
the culture. For the most part, the causal process has been 
borne out; nevertheless, these cases show how culture can 
contain within it various factors giving rise to those traits 
comprising the alienness syndrome and that this process is not 
the only way in which alienness arises. 
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A fourth qualification bears upon the central proposi­
tion of alienation theory, namely that the greater complexity 
of modern society causes alienness. Alienness appears to 
exist in folk or communal societies and gemeinschaft cultures 
as well as in the associational societies and gesellschaft 
cultures. We must recognize that high structural-complexity 
per se is not necessary to the occurrence of alienness. The 
causes of this phenomenon are perhaps as likely to lie in the 
cultural beliefs and norms of the society as these affect 
the socialization process in the family. 
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PART FOUR: 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
TO THE STUDY 
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CHAPTER IX: 
A SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 
From Chapter I through Chapter VIII, I have presented a 
theory of alienation and have offered comparative data for the 
purpose of exploring the empirical basis of certain key propo­
sitions in the theory. As has become quite clear, contained 
within the single term "alienation" is a set of very complex 
issues. My arguments have often been long and somewhat con­
voluted. Before attempting to draw some overall conclusions 
from the study, therefore, it is perhaps a good idea to pre­
sent a summary of the study at this time. With the outline 
and main ideas of the study in mind once again, we may then 
be in a better position to see just what has been accomplished. 
In this chapter, I shall present a summary of the major 
ideas comprising the theoretical portions of this study and 
will also summarize the findings in the empirical portions. 
The Theory 
The effort to build a theory of alienation involved first 
and foremost a clarification of the central term "alienation" 
itself. As Seeman's (1959) paper had shown, such disparate 
phenomena as powerlessness, normlessness, meaninglessness, 
self-estrangement and isolation had all been subsumed under 
the alienation term by various writers. In addition, there 
was confusion as to whether the term referred to psychological 
or sociological phenomena and, within these, whether it was a 
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state or process. Moreover, there was confusion as to what 
was alienated from what: man from man, man from "society," 
man from himself, man from labor, etc. 
Because of the normal usage and meaning of the suffix 
"ion," "alienation" has been construed in this study to refer 
to the social-psychological process by which an individual 
becomes alienated from some object of consciousness. Con-
cordantly, the individual's psychic state resulting from 
this process was referred to as a feeling of "alienness" from 
this object. The object from which the individual is alienat­
ed could be of any kind, but our interests, being sociological, 
construed the object to be some social category (race, reli­
gion, ethnicity, class, etc.) or social group (family, con­
gregation, corporation, etc.). The alienness state then, more 
specifically, was conceived to be a feeling of not belonging 
to, not being a part of, some social category or group, i.e., 
of self-exclusion from one (or more) of these. The opposite 
of this feeling was one of belonging to, or being a part of, 
one of these, i.e., self-inclusion within these. This latter 
feeling was designated by the term "identity," and, concor­
dant ly, the process by which the individual reached this state 
was called "identification." 
While it is possible and quite valid for sociological 
inquiry to be concerned with the alienation of the individual 
from any social group or category, it seemed obvious that the 
group or category from which the individual's alienation 
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could produce such a voluminous literature covering such a 
variety of phenomena could only be one of absolutely de­
cisive importance to his or her psychological well being. 
Most of the clinical literature indicated that this object 
had to be humanity itself. Alienness thus came to be the 
term designating the feeling of not being fully human, of 
self-exclusion from and lack of fellow-feeling with others. 
Alienation, in turn, became the process by which the individ­
ual came to feel his or her ahumanness, the process by which 
he was psychically transformed from an infantile identity 
with others in society to a feeling of alienness from them. 
It is this kind of alienness which seemed to be so lamented 
in the literature and which seemed to be capable of producing 
the variety of states that have been connected to the aliena­
tion term. 
From these definitions, it is obvious that self-processes, 
i.e., the processes whereby the individual attains self-con­
sciousness and the processes whereby the individual constructs 
his self-conceptions and thereby appropriates objects of the 
external world into himself, lie at the heart of the aliena­
tion process. Since, logically, the individual must exist in 
a state of identity prior to any alienation process, and 
since alienation involves the formation of self and self-con­
ceptions, it is thus obvious also that the alienation proc­
ess is one which must stretch over a considerable portion 
of the individual's lifetime and begins very early. The in­
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dividual was conceived to be in a stage of "primary identity" 
with others during his infancy, from which he was then "alien­
ated" when he became aware of himself as an object during 
childhood accompanied by an emotional insecurity. 
This first phase of the overall alienation process was 
called the "primary" phase. It consisted of the emergence 
of the subject-object dichotomy by the acquisition of lan­
guage, together with an emotional insecurity as a result of 
modal self-disillusionment. This primary phase of the alien­
ation process could simply continue into childhood as a 
"secondary" phase whereby the individual could not only 
distinguish himself from others as an object of his con­
sciousness but could perceive himself as contradistinctive to 
them. Again, this event transpired as a result of continued 
modal self-disillusionment by others. 
If, on the other hand, the individual's infancy was 
marked by modal self-fulfillment, then despite the fact that 
through acquisition of language he became self-conscious, he 
was not alienated from others but continued his identity with 
them. This was due to the development of an underlying emo­
tional security rather than an emotional insecurity. It was 
theorized that these emotional developments were the key to 
whether an individual took the route of alienation or identi­
fication. Repeated self-disillusionment established avoidance 
behavior, eventually culminating in modal self-consciousness 
wherein the individual constantly controlled the subjective 
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self in service to an idealized self-concept. Repeated self-
fulfillment established "approach" behavior wherein the in­
dividual's self-consciousness operated as an ebb and flow, not 
overriding and controlling the spontaneous self but acting as 
partner to it in preserving and pursuing the life process. 
With these formulations accomplished it was possible to 
work out in more detail descriptions of each of the alterna­
tive phases and stages as they occurred, i.e., of the original 
state of primary identity, of the primary alienation and 
identification process, of the secondary alienation/identifi­
cation process, and of the states of secondary alienness 
and identity respectively. 
The state of primary identity was conceived to be a state 
of consciousness in which the individual made no distinction 
between himself and others, or of the environment in general. 
In other words, he or she had no self-awareness. Conscious­
ness at this stage was a continuous, multi-phasic stream of 
percepts imbedded in images. The term "self" during this 
stage of consciousness can only refer to the "pure self" or 
the acting subject, the spontaneous, impulsive "I" of George 
Mead. The individual's consciousness is unidirectional, ir­
reversible, directed outward or, if upon its own internal 
states, only as a subject, not as an "object." 
The identification/alienation process is the process 
through which the individual finally achieves an identity with 
his fellows in society, or conversely, fails to do so. It 
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occurs social-psychologically in interaction wherein he 
attempts to actualize the self and is reacted to by signifi­
cant others positively or negatively. If these others act 
positively, i.e., if they confirm the actualized self, we 
speak of self-fulfillment. If the reactions of others are 
negative, or disconfirming, we speak of self-disillusionment. 
Self-fulfillment leads to identity, self-disillusionment leads 
to alienness. 
As indicated the alienation/identification process may 
be broken into two major stages: the primary and the second­
ary. 
The primary alienation process was said to consist of 
the process of the transformation of consciousness into a 
reflective, bidirectional, self-consciousness. This is the 
familiar process described by Mead. The individual acquires 
language, is designated by name by others and uses personal 
pronouns. His consciousness is now reversible. By use of 
symbols he carries the environment in his head and can 
manipulate the environment symbolically in thought or 
mental processes. He can take himself as an object from the 
standpoint of the other; he develops a "me" and can inhibit 
the "I," controlling and channeling the impulses leading to 
behavior. He becomes an object to his own consciousness and 
differentiates himself from the environment. 
This development constitutes an alienation process, how­
ever, only if it is accompanied by the development of an emo­
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tional insecurity. On the basis of this insecurity, the 
newly acquired consciousness of self may inhibit impulse and 
force it into the service of the externally enforced require­
ments of significant other persons. This is the beginning of 
true alienness, for, through their sanctioning of subjective 
self-actualization, others can force the individual to impose 
upon himself a control over the subjective-self by the objec-
tive-self in order to avoid self-disillusionment. Sanction­
ing patterns within the socialization process thus determine 
how the newly emerged consciousness of self may function. If 
these patterns are nurturant then emotional security is more 
likely and the individual tends toward identification with 
others. If they are non-nurturant, then alienation from 
others is more likely. 
The emergence of self-consciousness marks the beginning 
of the secondary stage of the identification/alienation proc­
ess. With further development into childhood, the individual 
begins to construct self-conceptions. Not only can he take 
himself as an object but he can endow the object with cer­
tain attributes (construct an image) and can consciously 
identify himself as a certain kind of person, i.e., a father, 
a brother, a teacher, a farmer, a warrior, a hunter, etc., 
(identity). He also carries the cultural ideals connected to 
these identities and measures his real self against this ideal 
self the differences from which he derives his level of self-
esteem. Self-fulfillment and self-disillusionment are now 
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contingent on the "presentation" of self, i.e., the indi­
vidual's actualization of the stereotypical or idealized self 
with respect to the status-role system of the society, and 
the sanctioning patterns of others ensuing such presentation. 
Again, if these patterns are nurturant, then the outcome of 
the secondary process is a state of identity while a non-
nurturant pattern produces alienness. 
Secondary identity, as a psychological state, was 
characterized as the feeling of belonging to, a fellow feel­
ing with, others of one's society. This feeling leads to a 
form of consciousness called "being cognition," after Maslow, 
typified mostly by its lack of modal self-consciousness. 
Secondary alienness referred to the individual's feeling of 
not belonging to or not being a part of his society and 
leads to a state of consciousness called "D-cognition" (again 
after Maslow), typified by a modal consciousness of and de­
fense of the self-concept. 
At the heart of secondary alienness is the development 
of a contradistinction between self and others, i.e., a feel­
ing of "negative essence," or of being subhuman or abnormal. 
It is this feeling which promotes modal preoccupation with 
the self-concept. Conceiving of himself as abnormal, un­
lovable, the individual cannot accept his "real" self but 
must strive to reach an ideal, be something else, admired, or 
feared, or loved, or attempt to rise above it in a form of 
stoicism. He is preoccupied with being something other than 
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what he sees himself to really be. 
From this basic trait, others, comprising an "alienation 
syndrome," emerge. These are the traits which occur over and 
over in the alienation literature: meaninglessness, power-
lessness, self-estrangement, sham inauthenticity, narcissism, 
being "on stage," "other direction," etc. They all stem from 
the basic feeling of negative essence and alienness and are 
connected in this way though they are not alienness per se. 
The detailed descriptions of these phases and stages of 
the identification/alienation process and their attendant 
psychological states laid the groundwork for the further 
development of the theory through an attempt at accounting for 
the socio-structural causes of alienation. The identifica­
tion/alienation process was considered to be a social-psycho­
logical process occurring within a socio-cultural context. 
The problem was to identify the context within which the 
alienation process arose and to describe the conditions 
giving rise to it. 
Borrowing from the already existing literature, the two 
socio-cultural contexts of communal society (gemeinschaft) 
and associational society (gesellschaft) were utilized. The 
alienation process was said to arise under associational 
society's conditions. This was in accord with the over­
whelming majority of classical, neoclassical and contemporary 
sociological theorists. However, in light of the prior 
theoretical work, modifications of the overall theory had to 
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be introduced. 
The first modification was with respect to the immediate 
locus of the alienation process. For the most part, socio­
logical theories of alienation, stemming from Marx, had 
located this process in the economic institutions of the so­
ciety. To do so, however, one must presume that such insti­
tutions can have the rather drastic and far-reaching psychic 
effects described in the alienness syndrome, or else one must 
be dealing with a different kind of alienness. With respect 
to the state of alienness described in this study, it seemed 
highly unlikely that changes in economic institutions under 
associational society could produce such effects except only 
indirectly. Only a long term process of self-disillusionment, 
starting in infancy, can produce the basic feeling of nega­
tive essence and alienness from others. As an adult—the 
only period in which economic institutions can have a direct 
effect—the individual can select, ignore or refract the self-
implications of the interactions of others. The only insti­
tution which has direct access to the individual during 
infancy and which can therefore have the drastic effects 
which the term alienness reflects, is the family. It was 
in the family that the alienation process was located. More 
specifically, alienation had to be a part of the socializa­
tion process within the family, for it is this process that 
accounts for character formation in the individual. Somehow, 
the socialization practice of the family had to have had 
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incorporated in it a pattern of disillusionment. 
Assuming that the family had not possessed this feature 
originally, and rejecting the possibility that disillusion­
ment would be a deliberate act on the part of parents, it 
was reasoned that the sources of disillusionment in the 
socialization process had to lie in the wider socio-cultural 
context beyond the family, specifically in the changing func­
tional relations between the family and other institutions. 
These changing relations, it was reasoned, impacted on the 
family in such a way as to introduce modal self-disillusion­
ment in the socialization of the offspring. 
To understand these changes and their impact on the 
family, a theory of socio-historical change was presented. 
This theory postulates six structural levels of society, each 
level more complex than the others. Although there is not an 
exact correspondence, the gesellschaft form of cultural values 
was theorized to emerge roughly parallel to the emergence of 
level 4 in complexity. The full development of this system 
of values occurs in the modern nation-state. 
It was theorized, again borrowing heavily from already 
existing theory, that with the rise of the nation-state and 
the gesellschaft culture the family was transformed from a 
patriarchal-authoritarian and extended type to a democratic-
equalitarian and restricted type. The latter was presented 
as less stable in the sense that its divorce rates would be 
higher, and that the husband-wife relationship would be 
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based almost solely on emotional attachments and therefore 
more volatile, than in prior states of societal development. 
This instability, in turn, was the key factor in bringing 
disillusionment into the socialization process. It dis­
rupted it, bringing about neglect. It presented the children 
with perceptions of unloving parents, a breech of the cul­
tural ideal. It produced anxiety and insecurity from the 
confusion and strife of conflict and the possibility of a 
change in parent relationships. All of these were postulated 
as fertile ground for self-disillusionment, from which arose 
the feeling of negative essence and alienness. 
The Cross-cultural Comparison 
A comparative analysis of the theory was devised by 
selecting a sample of eight societies which were classified 
into the structural categories. Societies representing level 
4 and level 5 which yielded data of face validity on the 
variables could not be found. Utilizing ethnographic and 
historical sources, the variables of family stability, so­
cialization, and alienness were measured. Three major hypoth­
eses, the disconfirmation of which would seriously discredit 
the theory, were examined. 
: The greater the structural complexity of a 
society the lesser will be the stability 
of the family. 
: The lesser the stability of the family the 
lesser the nurturance of the socialization 
process within it. 
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Hm: The less nurtarant is the socialization 
process, the greater the individual's 
feeling of alienness from others. 
The findings suggested that the first hypothesis had to 
be modified. Instead of a linear relationship between so­
cietal complexity and family stability, a curvilinear rela­
tionship was found. Family stability was found to be asso­
ciated more with the type of economy than with structural 
complexity. Agricultural economy accounted for family sta­
bility more than any other variable. 
The second hypothesis was confirmed. Only two cases out 
of eight, the Wintu and the Hopi, were deviant. An explana­
tion as to why these cases deviated from expectations was said 
to involve cultural variables rather than purely structural 
ones, witchcraft being the variable speculated upon, and said 
to produce the low-nurturance among the Hopi. 
Hypothesis three was also confirmed with only one deviant 
case. The Japanese were found to be very alienated from one 
another but were found to have a moderately nurturant form of 
socialization and a highly stable family. The alienness of 
the Japanese was also partially explainable as an effect of 
their culture. It was said that Japanese culture prescribes 
almost constant circumspection and self-surveillance, and is 
transmitted through the family and its socialization process 
without the necessity of family instability or low nurturance 
being present. 
It was concluded that these findings supported the theory 
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generally with certain qualification. First, a linear rela­
tionship between structural complexity and family stability 
was replaced by a curvilinear hypothesis. Second, both so­
cialization and identity/alienness were seen to be brought 
about by other variables than those hypothesized. These 
variables were, namely, cultural variables, but they were not 
entirely specified in any great detail. Thirdly, the major 
proposition of alienation theory was shown not to hold. 
Alienness did occur in two communal type societies. In both 
of these cases, either family instability or witchcraft could 
be posited as the causal variables. 
In addition to these hypotheses an analysis of the data 
with respect to the central proposition of alienation theory 
was undertaken. This proposition was that the structure and 
culture of associational society was the primary cause of 
alienation and alienness. While the hypotheses previously 
examined revealed the causal process by which this was to 
occur, and while they were in the main verified, the question 
remained as to whether this central proposition was true. The 
test of this proposition was in whether alienness could be 
found in other than associational societies. 
Two communal societies did show such alienness. Both, 
however, conformed to the causal process hypothesized. The 
conclusion was that associational society in and of itself is 
not necessary nor sufficient to produce alienness. Where 
there is non-nurturant socialization, individuals may become 
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alienated from others. 
This low nurturance was traced to the practice of witch­
craft among the Hopi. By the same token, since witchcraft 
was also practiced among the Ojibwa, this factor could have 
caused the low nurturance in socialization among them also 
and hence alienness. Witchcraft at least becomes a rival 
factor with family instability for the explanation of the 
degree of nurturance in these societies and therefore of 
alienness. 
These findings point to another possible alternative ex­
planation of the cause of alienness to the one presented 
here. Where the present theory postulates structural complex­
ity as the major cause of alienness through its effects on 
the family and socialization, an alternative explanation may 
be that it is the cultural values, beliefs and norms affect­
ing socialization directly that accounts for alienness. 
Among the Ojibwa and the Hopi, it may be witchcraft. Among 
the Japanese it may be the emphasis upon the group over the 
individual. Among the Americans, to use Erik Erikson's (1963) 
thesis, it may be the emphasis on rational and routinized 
child-care norms. 
With this brief summary in mind, we may now attempt to 
bring the study to a conclusion by assessing the degree to 
which its major purposes have been served. These assessments 
will be made in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER X; 
CONCLUSIONS TO THE STUDY 
The first purpose of this study has been to present a 
theory of alienation capable of bringing coherency and order 
to the field of alienation studies, a theory free of the crit­
icisms leveled by Feuer (1969) and others that the concept is 
so ambiguous and vague that it is scientifically worthless. 
As a major substantive area in sociology, such criticism of 
the alienation concept, if true, renders a great proportion of 
work in sociology as invalid. 
A second purpose of this study has been to present some 
comparative data on the major proposition of alienation 
theory, namely that it is the transformation of traditional, 
folk-type societies into modern, "àssociational" societies 
that brings alienation about. It has been Kaufman (1970) who 
has criticized alienation theory in this way, i.e., as being 
"historically blind." 
It is time now to bring the study to a close by making 
some assessments as to whether or how well these purposes have 
been accomplished. In this concluding chapter, I shall once 
again divide my comments into those concerning the theoretical 
portions and those concerning the empirical portion. 
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Conclusions to the Theoretical 
Portion of the Study 
Theoretical ambiguity and vagueness can be taken care of 
easily enough by defining one's terms carefully to refer to 
one specific phenomenon or thing. This has been done with 
regard to the term "alienation" in this study. But the crit­
icisms of Feuer and others imply problems in the alienation 
field requiring more complex solutions than a straight-forward 
nominal—or even operational—definition could effect. These 
criticisms imply a field in utter chaos, so amorphous and in 
shambles as to deserve the scrap heap. My purpose in this 
study therefore was more extensive than to simply define a 
term in a non-ambiguous and non-vague way for my personal use. 
It was also to derive a definition in such a way as to show 
how it would fit or be compatible with other definitions in 
the field and bring them within a common orbit. My purpose 
was to get at the essence of the alienation phenomenon, to 
reduce the concept to its bare bones, but at the same time re­
tain the richness with which it has been used. 
The attempt to do this was based on the belief that most 
of the problems in the alienation field continue to exist as 
the result of artificial semantical barriers and that there 
is in fact a single thread running through most alienation 
studies despite the way in which the term "alienation" has 
been defined or conceived. The isolation and tracing out of 
this thread is what I had in mind in the theoretical work. 
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In doing so» I hoped not only to solve the problems of ambigu­
ity and vagueness per se but to reach solutions to those 
problems which were themselves products of this ambiguity and 
vagueness and which continue to fragment the field and to 
elicit the almost derisive criticism of various writers. 
There were thus two sets of problems in this study with 
which the attempt to build a respectable theory of alienation 
contended. The first set had to do with certain semantical 
difficulties which plague the term. The second set had to do 
with certain substantive issues in the construction of the 
theory itself once these semantical problems were overcome. 
I shall try to draw some conclusions as to the success or 
failure, the strengths and weaknesses, etc., in the solutions 
put forward in this study to these problems, beginning with 
the semantical ones. 
As I have indicated, there are four such semantical 
problems: (1) the problem of whether the term refers to sub­
jective or objective phenomena; (2) the problem of whether the 
term refers to a state or a process; (3) the problem of wheth­
er the term refers to a single, unidimensional or multidimen­
sional phenomenon; and (4) the problem of whether the term 
refers to the relation between the individual and a particular 
object or a diversity of objects. The solution of these 
problems was seen as an absolute must, a first prerequisite, 
in bringing some coherency to the alienation field and thereby 
directing efforts toward more substantive theoretical issues 
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as well as toward empirical research and substantiation. 
The first solution put forward in the theory dealt with 
the subjective versus objective controversy. This issue ap­
peared to be the most volatile and therefore the most impor­
tant. According to the theoretical solution presented, alien­
ation phenomena are primarily social-psychological but these 
phenomena are products of objective social conditions and 
processes. Each area constitutes different levels of analysis. 
Thus, the Marxist oriented writers and the so-called empiri­
cist writers, if they adhere to this line of thought, can each 
take their respective places in the scientific study of alien­
ation. The Marxists will continue to work at a macro-level 
(and therefore a more abstract level) seeking the sociological 
conditions producing alienation.^ The empiricists, on the 
other hand, will continue to work at the micro-levels, analyz­
ing in a social-psychological tradition. Each, however, both 
the Marxists and the empiricists, must keep an interested eye 
on the other, recognizing the complementarity of their ap­
proaches and continually striving for connectedness. 
The problem of the reference of the alienation term to 
either structural or processual phenomena, a problem not so 
widely recognized as the others, was next addressed in the 
If they at the same time engage in social criticism and 
activism so be it. The brilliant social-scientific contribu­
tions of Marx could probably not have occurred had he not been 
animated by passions of a critical and bitter sort. 
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theory. This problem has lesser consequences than others, 
perhaps, because the usage to which the term is put is usu­
ally relatively clear in context. Still, it is inconvenient 
as well as sometimes confusing to have the term function both 
ways. The use of "alienation" to refer to the process, and 
the use of "alienness" to refer to the state, I believe, 
eliminates this problem. 
Another semantical problem is that of whether the term 
is unidimensional or multidimensional. Seeman's categories 
of powerlessness, normlessness, isolation, meaninglessness 
and self-estrangement have all been posited as dimensions or 
related aspects of alienness. This problem, too, is resolved 
by the theory, which shows how these various attributes, while 
not being alienness per se, are products of it and cohere 
around it. If researchers recognize these attributes as 
products of alienness, rather than alienness itself, much con­
fusion and futile work will be eliminated. At the same time, 
there is no reason to ignore studies involving these charac­
teristics done in the past, for their connectedness to the 
alienation phenomenon is assured. The effort to trace out 
just how these attributes are connected must continue. 
The problem, too, of the object from which the individual 
is alienated has, I believe, been adequately addressed. As 
shown in the theoretical work, the self extends to all ob­
jects in the environment which the individual appropriates as 
his own. No matter what object, i.e., whether labor, the 
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product of labor, other persons, etc., the same self-processes 
are involved as sub-processes within their alienation. This 
idea is crucial and central to the idea of alienation. In 
this study, I have selected other persons as the object of 
alienation, but all that I have said about alienation from 
persons may be said about alienation from other objects. The 
object selected is simply a matter of interest to the re­
searcher and the details of its identification with or alien­
ation from the self have to be worked out. 
The solutions to these semantical problems which I have 
advanced here, I believe, are capable of comprehending and 
unifying the diverse efforts of researchers in the alienation 
field, whether they are Marxist or empiricist oriented, wheth­
er they focus on statics or dynamics, whether they research 
alienness per se or some derivative thereof, or whether they 
focus on persons as the objects of the alienation process, or 
on labor, the product of labor, or culture, etc. Each partic­
ular study can take its place with respect to whatever partic­
ular facet of the alienation scheme it pertains to. 
The second set of problems with which this study con­
tended was of a substantive nature and was, in fact, shaped 
by the solutions to the semantical problems. It was only 
after these semantical problems were solved that the substan­
tive issues themselves were more clearly revealed. If we 
define alienation as a process, for example, and alienness as 
the state following this process, it would seem logical that 
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there must exist an initial state of identity between the sub­
ject and the object from which he is being alienated. By the 
same token, the process of this alienation must be delineated 
into its phases and the dynamics and interrelations of these 
phases described. The end result of this process, the alien­
ated state, must also be described. Finally, if we posit a 
socio-cultural and socio-historical context within which the 
alienation process occurs, this too must be described and the 
connections between these contexts and the alienation process 
must be specified. It is obvious, too, that the opposite side 
of the alienation process, i.e., that of identification, must 
be worked out in each of its corresponding aspects. 
Four major substantive categories have thus been created 
as a result of our previous semantical work: the category of 
primary identity; the category of the identification/aliena­
tion process itself; the category of secondary identity and 
alienness; and the category of the socio-historical context of 
alienation. A review of the literature revealed problems in 
each of these areas. Nowhere in the literature, for example, 
was there any description of the primary or initial state of 
identity or even, for that matter, any conceptualization of 
it. Although there had been some attempt at description and 
treatment of the identification/alienation process, it was 
too amorphous and not directly connected to alienation studies. 
The description of the state of alienness had been dealt with 
rather extensively in the literature but was mired in the uni-
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dimensional-multidimensional controversy. There was extensive 
treatment of the socio-historical context and causes of alien­
ation and alienness also, but these efforts were extremely 
abstract and diverse. 
What I have attempted to do in this study is fill these 
voids. Taking each problem sequentially, I tried to work 
them out, preliminarily in Chapters I and II, and more ex­
tensively in Chapters III through VI. From this perspective, 
a brief review is again in order. 
First, I have attempted to describe the original or 
primary state of identity of the subject and object. Because 
the individual is not objectively self-conscious at this stage 
of development a state of identity obtains. Secondly, I have 
tried to describe the identification/alienation process. Pri­
mary alienation occurs through acquisition of language by 
which the subject object dichotomy arises. The self is now 
seen by itself as separate and differentiated in an object-
sense from other objects. But the self can now reappropriate 
these objects into itself and they can become once again 
identified. 
In this study, I have designated the object as the status-
role. Reappropriation of the status-role integrates the indi­
vidual into society, uniting him with other persons either as 
a member of the same status-role or as a member of a recipro­
cal social-relationship. The reappropriation of the status-
role occurs via the self-actualization process in which the 
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individual is self-fulfilled, i.e., confirmed by others that 
he this kind of person. Conversely, he is kept from re-
appropriating these status-roles (is further alienated) by 
self-disillusionment, i.e., a disconfirmation of his attempt 
to this kind of person. 
Thirdly, I have tried to describe the alienated and 
identified states. Continued self-disillusionment results in 
a contradistinctive self-conception, the core of which is a 
feeling of negative essence, i.e., the feeling of abnormality, 
of defective humanness. This feeling engenders a constant 
self-preoccupation and an attempt at overcoming it. It also 
engenders feelings of isolation, powerlessness, meaningless-
ness and self-estrangement. The core of the feeling of iden­
tity, on the other hand, is that of positive essence. It 
promotes the opposite kind of traits than those of alienness. 
The fourth substantive problem I have tried to solve is 
that of the causal connection between the wider socio-histor-
ical context and the alienation process. I have tried to 
preserve the major proposition of alienation theory by tracing 
this cause to the structural transformations of society, but 
I have tried also to make the causal connections clear. Thus, 
the theory postulates that as societies become more complex 
the family becomes less stable, socialization becomes less 
nurturant, and alienness more frequent. This causal process 
was seen to remedy certain defects in alienation theory stem­
ming primarily from Marx's emphasis on productive activity as 
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essential to self-actualization and fulfillment.^ This em­
phasis rather severely limited the self-actualization and 
fulfillment spheres and attributed to productive activity far 
more importance than seemed warranted. It also limited the 
effects of social structure to the late adolescent and adult 
years since this is primarily the time in the life cycle when 
the economic institutions can have their effect. Although 
these institutions must certainly be given their due, to 
invest them with this much psychological import is to fall 
into the over-socialized-conception-of-man error and fail to 
acknowledge the importance of the family, the church, the 
school, etc., in character formation. Economic, political, 
and other institutions were seen as having their effects in­
directly, through the family. 
I believe the solutions put forward in the four substan­
tive areas of alienation theory have the potential, at least, 
of rescuing alienation theory from the criticisms of vague­
ness and ambiguity, of being unscientific, normative and mere­
ly social criticism. I believe, moreover, that if these 
ideas and conceptualizations are adhered to, they will serve 
as the framework within or around which the vast diversity of 
the literature on alienation may be organized and related. 
They are not the final answers but they can perhaps serve as a 
^This is one of Marx's major criticisms, i.e., that he 
posits a certain essential need for work in man's nature. 
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start toward a fully developed social-psychological, and 
sociological, theory of alienation. 
I shall now make some final comments upon the empirical 
portion of this study. 
Conclusions to the Empirical 
Portion of the Study 
The purpose of the empirical portion of this study at 
its beginning was to "test" the major proposition that the 
transformation of communal (or traditional or folk) society 
into associational society brought about alienation and alien-
ness. The causal process postulated in the theory was that, 
through increasing structural complexity in which functions 
originally performed by the family were transferred to other 
groups, the family was transformed into a companionship 
type, its stability depending primarily upon the love and af­
fection felt between the spouses rather than upon functional 
necessity. This social-bond, being weaker, reduced the sta­
bility of the family. This instability led to a non-nurturant 
form of socialization which led to alienness. 
Because only eight cases could be found which provided 
measures of alienness with some face-validity, a comparative 
method was used. Control of extraneous influences, therefore, 
was quite limited. This portion of the study, in other words, 
suffered from all the shortcomings of comparative methodology 
and thus a true test, in the scientific sense, could not be 
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accomplished. 
For this reason, this portion of the study should be 
viewed primarily as exploratory and illustrative. My intent 
was to obtain some "feel" or "notion" of the empirical basis 
of the theory and not necessarily to verify it strictly ac­
cording to the canons of science. As soon as I began perusing 
the ethnographic and historical accounts of these societies 
I knew this was going to be impossible. 
I believe that some feel for the empirical basis of the 
theory has been established. The criticism of the lack of 
historical perspective put forward by Kaufman has been ad­
dressed. It may be said that, from our sample, it appears 
more likely that alienness will be found in associational type 
societies than in communal type ones with notable exceptions. 
The causal process by which this occurs has been, also with 
notable exceptions as well as with at least two alternatives, 
illustrated and, within the sample, supported. It remains, 
of course, to support these hypotheses in a more scientifical­
ly rigorous way, and, as for myself, my intention is to do so. 
I would hope that this study might be a stimulant to such 
efforts on the part of others as well. 
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APPENDIX I: 
DEFINITION AND OPERATIONAL!ZATION 
OF CONCEPTS 
There have been many concepts used in this study and each 
has been to a greater or lesser extent defined in the body of 
the study where they were used. For purposes of replication 
of the empirical research portion of the study, however, the 
following definitions and operationalization of the four 
major concepts and variables measured are offered. 
Concept Number One ; 
Structural Complexity 
This concept is defined as the degree of specialization 
and differentiation in, for example, the economy, the polity, 
the religion, art, etc. Service (1971:490-491) states that by 
"structural complexity" he means "simply . . . more parts to 
the whole, more differentiation or specialization of these 
parts within the whole." In this study I have used Service's 
system of classifying societies into structural categories, 
though I have not used Service's labels for these societies 
and have substituted elements of my own. To some degree, 
the categories have been defined already in the text (see 
Chapter VI) but for purposes of replication the following, 
more precise definitions are given. 
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Level 1: 
Societies classified into the first level of structural 
complexity in this study are distinguished from other levels 
by the absence or very insignificant incidence of any form of 
structurally integrating mechanism other than kinship. This 
form of structural integration is shared by all societies 
but it is the major one at this level. As Service (1971:492) 
has said; "... the integration is primarily personal and 
largely familial. . . ." He states further (1971:493): 
A residential group of cooperating 
families can establish ties, by means 
of intermarriage, with other residen­
tial groups so that amiable relations, 
consistent forms of etiquette, and 
perhaps cooperation in economic endeav­
ors and warfare is engendered. Thus 
kinship ties structured by various 
marriage rules are the integrating 
mechanism .... The social bodies, 
the parts of the society, the differ­
entiation of persons into statuses, 
and so on are all familial. There 
arise, of course, certain persons like 
curing shamans, "mighty hunters," and 
"dangerous men," but each one of these 
statuses is personal and idiosyncratic, 
disappearing when the person disappears. 
Social differentiation makes parts and 
statuses in the society that exist ir­
respective of the particular personnel 
who fill them. In [level 1] . . . so­
ciety these are familistic differentia­
tions; every person is one or another 
kind of consanguinal or affinal relative. 
Level 2: 
Societies classified as level 2 have larger populations, 
more subdivisions and additional forms of structural intégra-
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tion. Whereas the structure of level 1 societies consists of 
a simple, physically aggregated, or residential, familial 
unit, at level 2 there are multiples of these units, com­
posing "segments" of the total society. These segments are 
united, not only by a common culture, but also by new social 
categories which serve to commonly identify members of the 
society located in different geographical areas. We may 
refer to these specifically as "clans," "age grades," "kin­
dreds," "secret societies" or ". . . clubs for such single 
special purposes as the curing of illness or the performing of 
particular ceremonies. These all serve to unite persons who 
are members of different residential units" (Service, 1971; 
494-495). 
According to Service (1971:495), the rules of exogamy 
and marital residence operative in level 1 societies cannot 
serve to hold the population together as the residential units 
are increased. At the same time, there is no domination of 
one unit over another; therefore, the new social units are 
the only mechanism by which the residential units remain 
tied together in a socio-structural sense. 
According to Service (1971:495), even though societies 
classified as level 2 in this study are more structurally 
complex, they remain "... egalitarian in that no one of the 
families or residential groups is politically superior or 
more powerful in hereditary rank than any other." Further­
more, the differentiation of structure "... has not been 
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carried to the point where there are separate bodies of 
political control, full economic specialization (other than 
that based on the universal age-sex differentiation), or 
even true religious professionals like members of a priest­
hood as distinguished from shamans." Service (1971:495-496) 
states that these societies consist of segmented, corporate 
residential units "... which are alike, largely economically 
self-sufficient, generally equivalent in size and organiza­
tion, and autonomous in large measure." While these societies 
are more structurally complex than level 1 societies in terms 
of the multiplication of their parts, "... they are not 
strikingly advanced in specialization of parts." 
Level 3^; 
The classification of a society into this structural 
level depends on its possessing a truly specialized division 
of labor such that the new units formed are not merely seg­
mented but differentiated. This development constitutes the 
major integrating device in these societies. Service (1971: 
496) states: "Differentiation and specialization, creations 
of functionally discrete rather than identical parts, have 
an enormously integrating effect because the various parts 
become interdependent." 
But this development, i.e., specialization and differ­
entiation is not the only characteristic demarcating this 
structural level from others. There is also the existence of 
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a different social-status, i.e., that of the chief. It is 
through this status-role that the products of the specialized 
division of labor are distributed throughout the society, and 
it is through this status-role that additional integration is 
achieved. 
Service (1971:496) makes the point that exchange of goods 
at levels 1 and 2 complexity is ". . . typically reciprocal; 
gifts are given from person to person and group to group with 
the expectation of return gifts sooner or later. An important 
feature of this latter kind of exchange is its directness; 
there is no intermediary." But at level 3 there ". . . is a 
kind of delayed, indirect movement of goods from producer to 
the redistributional center and later to the consumer" (Ser­
vice, 1971:496-497). 
This redistribution function of the chief's role devolves 
upon him a certain amount of power, though still minimal when 
compared to a state's power (which marks the next level of 
structural complexity). This differentiation of power demarks 
another important characteristic of these societies. As 
Service (1971:496) has put it: 
The rise of centralized leadership involves 
a rise in the prestige of the person hold­
ing the office of chief. This prestige at­
taches to relatives of the chief, depend­
ing on genealogical nearness; and as time 
goes on, the status becomes hereditary. 
Thus, we find that not only unlike parts 
have arisen in the society but also unlike 
persons. This is to say that chiefdoms 
are typically nonegalitarian; they are 
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characterized by differences in the hered­
itary rank, permanent higher and lower 
status of persons and their families, in 
addition to the universally human age-sex 
status differentiation. 
Level 
The distinguishing characteristic of the next level of 
structural complexity is the existence of a state structure, 
i.e., an institutionalized system of status-roles and groups 
which monopolizes coercive power. Service (1971:498-499) 
states that this level of structural complexity is distin­
guished from the other levels ". . .by the constant threat 
of force from an institutionalized body of persons who wield 
it. A state constitutes itself legally: it makes explicit 
the manner and circumstances of its use of force, and it out­
laws any other use of force as it intervenes in the disputes 
between individuals and groups." 
Another distinguishing structural characteristic is the 
formation of politico-economic classes within the society. 
Service (1971:498-499) states that at lower structural levels 
there are differences in rank and that the society may be 
". . . conceptually divided into two or three broad social 
ranks . . ., but these are merely social." These social 
distinctions among such less structurally complex societies 
are "... fostered by sumptuary rules, certain items of dress 
and ornamentation? and perhaps certain kinds of food are 
reserved for one . . . [social rank] and tabooed in another" 
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(Service, 1971:499). But at level 4, rank . . become(s) 
an aspect of political and economic differentiation as well 
as social. Thus the aristocracy are the state bureaucrats, 
the military leaders, and the upper priesthood. Other people 
are the producers." Full-time professionalization in arts 
and crafts also develops, and the artisans can be regarded 
as still another socioeconomic group" (Service, 1971:499). 
Level 
Level 5 is the civilizational level and is distinguished, 
among other things, by the presence of writing and mathematical 
notation. This category is reserved for such ancient social 
entities, therefore, as China, India and Mesopotamia, and, 
for those entities following after these, historically, such 
as Egypt, Crete, Greece, and Rome. Such social entities are 
more complex than those of level 4 in terms of size, territory 
and the sheer heterogeneity of the population. Also, new 
status-roles are added, such as scribes, which have to do with 
the advent of writing and other developments in jurisprudence, 
theology, military science, etc. Perhaps one of the more 
important distinctions at this level is the presence of truly 
urban areas, though they are still preindustrial. Neverthe­
less, at this level the society manifests a true distinction 
between an urban and a peasant culture. Agriculture, however, 
is the prevailing mode of economy. 
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Level 6 :  
This level is marked off from the others by the existence 
of a much larger population, though the territory may be 
smaller. Also, at this level there is the existence of an 
industrialized economy which is the primary cause of an 
extreme division of labor. Bureaucratic structure is the 
reigning form of organization and the society is controlled 
and integrated by a highly institutionalized political state. 
The concept of "nation" is used and applied by the members of 
the society and it is thought of as a "sovereign" state. 
Generally speaking, at this level, the population is mostly 
urban and a large class of blue-collar and white-collar labor­
ers make up the bulk of the work force. 
Concept Number Two : 
Family Stability 
To be considered as most important in the assessment of 
family stability is whether the family household is of an 
extended or restricted type, i.e., whether three or more 
generations make up the household or whether it is comprised 
of only two generations and whether these generations are 
geographically proximal to one another or distant. The 
reasoning here is that an extended household is more stable 
because the family's functions are more easily retained the 
larger is the number of persons in the household or at least 
the greater is the physical proximity to one another so that 
297 
the labor comprising these functions can be shared. 
Of importance also is the divorce rate as well as the 
degree of conflict in the husband-wife relationship. Thus, 
statements as to the quality of the spouses' relationship, 
i.e., as to their love and respect for one another, their 
loyalty to one another, their acts of kindness or of cruelty 
toward one another, are to be assessed and given their due in 
the rating of this variable. 
Also to be considered as part of this concept, especially 
as it is related to the divorce rate and the quality of the 
husband-wife relationship, is the degree to which family roles 
are well defined and unchanging, or, as Burgess and others 
(1971:8) have said, the degree to which the family roles remain 
clearly perceived and cognized as determined by the existence 
of traditional norms, specified duties and obligations and ex­
istence of strong social pressures. The existence of a clear 
set of norms comprising the roles of the husband and wife are 
thus important indicators of family stability and statements of 
the observers to this effect are to be considered in the as­
sessment. 
Concept Number Three : 
Socialization 
Socialization in this study is conceived to vary as to 
the degree to which it is self-fulfilling or self-disillusion­
ing, i.e., the degree to which it provides the individual off­
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spring with experiences which confirm or deny his or her 
actualization of self. We restrict our measurement in this 
study to the observations made during infancy (about the first 
two years to three years) and during childhood (from about two 
years to twelve years), based on our theory that these are 
the crucial years for personality development. 
"Self-actualization" is used in two senses here: Since 
we theorize that the infant, prior to his or her acquisition of 
language, has no objective self-awareness, the actualization of 
self during this phase of the life-cycle can only refer to 
the attempts to gratify the needs of the organism through the 
impulsive "I" component of the self. During the childhood 
phase of the life-cycle, of course, we can refer to the attempts 
to fulfill the self-motives proper, i.e., to the attempt to 
establish and confirm an identity and image and a certain level 
of esteem by way of the "me" component of the self. 
Because it is somewhat traditionally improper to speak of 
self-fulfillment in the first sense, I have substituted the 
terms "nurturant" and "non-nurturant" to refer to socialization 
of a self-fulfilling type in both senses, and to socialization 
of a self-disillusioning type, respectively. In point of fact, 
however, the terms are equivalent. 
The measurement of socialization is based on statements 
by the original observers as to the degree of warmth and af­
fection generally provided by socializing agents to the infant/ 
child. Of great importance for infancy are statements about 
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tactility, weaning and feeding, cleaning, disciplining, and 
of the acceptance of or hostility toward offspring. State­
ments about the "tenor" of the parental relationship with 
their offspring during childhood are important to this assess­
ment. Also, any statement indicating the attitude of parents 
toward their children as well as any actions toward them which 
imply to the child in a very explicit way something about him 
or herself. 
A nurturant form of socialization is indicated when: 
(1) there is a significant amount of tactility during sociali­
zation; or (2) when weaning is not imposed early but allowed 
to cease at the will of the infant/child; (3) when feeding is 
by breast rather than by other means; and (4) when food is 
given on demand rather than on schedule or arbitrarily at the 
whim or caprice of the socializing agent; (5) when a high 
degree of concern for the child's physical welfare is indi­
cated by attending to its physical cleanliness and warmth; 
(6) when the child is not subjected to ridicule or duped, or 
is not frightened; and (7) when discipline is not overly harsh 
and is lacking in hostility toward the child but is intended 
to correct "bad" behavior. 
This list of indicators is not presented as an exhaustive 
set but as merely suggestive of the kinds of observations to 
look for in the historical and ethnographic materials. 
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Concept Number Four: 
Alienness/Identity 
Alienness is an individual's feeling of not being a 
bonafide member of some social category or group based on a 
perception of himself as being unlike the members of this 
category or group in some way. In this study, alienness is 
conceived to be a person's feeling of not being a full member 
of humanity based on his or her perception of himself or 
herself as being different in some way so as to disqualify 
him or her from full status as a human being. I call this per­
ception a "negative-essence." 
While they are to be distinguished from alienness per se, 
several attributes appear to be highly coordinate with this 
feeling; (1) self-préoccupâtion, i.e., a constant conscious­
ness of self and how one is presenting oneself, a high degree 
of affectation, a high degree of contrived, non-spontaneous 
behavior, engagement in shcun and "inauthentic" behavior; (2) 
a feeling of powerlesçness, i.e., a feeling of not being the 
source of one's own actions, of having these actions determined 
by others. This is a feeling, essentially, of a lack of au­
tonomy, of being pushed or pulled by others' expectations or 
by the need to please others such that one does or says 
things for their benefit rather than for the intrinsic pleas­
ure of the behavior or for one's own benefit; (3) a sense of 
meaninglessness, i.e., a diffuse anxiety, or vague dissatis­
faction with life without being able to pinpoint the source, 
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a feeling of "emptiness," or of a sense of life as a void, a 
sense of depression the reason for which the individual cannot 
state. 
Identity, as the polar opposite, is the individual's 
feeling of being a member of humanity based on a perception 
of oneself as being like others in the requisite ways. It 
leads to a lack of self-consciousness or self-preoccupation, 
to authentic, spontaneous, non-affectatious, non-contrived 
behavior. It is coordinate with a sense of purpose and mean­
ing to one's life. It manifests a lack of anxiety based be­
havior, a lack of vagueness and of emptiness. Moreover, the 
individual indicates a feeling of autonomy and power over his 
actions, a sense of control over his or her own destiny. 
Indicators of alienness per se are not a usual part of 
the ethnographer's reports and so a great deal of reliance 
upon indicators of these other collateral traits, i.e., modal 
self-consciousness, powerlessness, meaninglessness, etc., is 
necessary as a part of the measurement of this concept. The 
basic thrust remains, however, to assess the degree to which 
individuals in a particular society are "extricated" from 
their society in their own consciousness. Dorothy Lee's 
(1959:131-132) statement that "when speaking about Wintu cul­
ture, we cannot speak of the self and society, but rather of 
the self i£ society" is extraordinary in its clarity, whereas 
Malinowski's statement that the average Trobriander has 
". . .no knowledge of the total outline of any of their 
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social structure" and that ". . . he is it, and cannot see 
the whole from the outside" is probably adequate but certainly 
provides less confidence in the validity of its use in reach­
ing a conclusion of the state of identity for these people. 
303 
APPENDIX II: 
THE SAMPLE, ETHNOGRAPHIC 
SOURCES AND PAGE NUMBERS 
Below are listed each society comprising the sample, the 
ethnographic or historical source from which the data were 
extracted, and, for each variable, the page number where the 
original citation(s) may be found. Persons desiring to 
replicate this study may use these data sources, or the 
sources are available from the author in collected form. Each 
source is quoted here only sufficiently enough to allow the 
reader to obtain the full information from the bibliography. 
Variable and Page Number 
Society 
Name 
Ethno­
graphic 
Source 
Var. No. 2 
Structural 
Complexity 
(x^) 
Var. No. 3 
Family 
Stability 
(XG)  
Var. No. 4 
Sociali­
zation 
(XG)  
Var. No. 1 
Alienness/ 
Identity 
(y) 
Wintu Dubois, 
Cora; 
(1903-1935) 
p.1J p.28, 
p.29 
pp.47-48, 
p.55, p.56, 
p.59, p.64 
p.46, p.47, 
— 
Newcomb, 
William . 
(1974) 
p.198 p. 199 
Lee, 
Dorothy 
(1959) 
pp.131-132, 
pp.138-139 
0j ibwa Hallowell, 
A. Irving 
(1974) 
p.112, 119 
— —— 
p.14,p.143, 
p.145, 
pp.147-149 
304 
Variable and Page Number 
Society 
Name 
Ethno­
graphie 
Source 
Var. No. 2 
Structural 
Complexity 
(Xj) 
Var. No. 3 
Family 
Stability 
(Xg) 
Var. No. 4 
Sociali­
zation 
(X3) 
Var. No. 1 
Alienness/ 
Identity 
(y) 
0j ibwa 
(Cont.) 
Landes, 
Ruth: 
(1969) 
p.l p.18, p.53, 
p.76 
p.13, p.15 
Landes, 
Ruth; 
(1971) 
— p.61,pp.66-
67, pp.82-
83, p.85, 
p.91 
——— p.178-179 
Densmore, 
Frances: 
(1970) 
pp.48-49 
Cheyenne Hoebel, 
Edward: 
(1960) 
p.31 p. 24 p.91, p.92 p. 90 
Hopi Eggan, 
Fred; 
(1950) 
p.8 p.34,pp.52-
53, p.56, 
p.338 
Titiev, 
Mischa: 
(1971) 
— — —  
p.7—A, 7—B, 
p.l0—B, 
p.40—A, 
p.40-B 
— — —  
Titiev, 
Mischa; 
(1972) 
— 
—— 
p.12 
Talayesva, 
Don; 
(1942) 
p.276 
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Variable and Page Number 
Society 
Name 
Ethno­
graphie 
Source 
Var. No. 2 
Structural 
Complexity 
(x^) 
Var. No. 3 
Family 
Stability 
(Xg) 
Var. No. 4 
Sociali­
zation 
(Xg) 
Var. No. 1 
Alienness/ 
Identity 
( y )  
Hopi 
(Cont. ) 
Aberle, 
David: 
(1951) 
p. 14 p.16, p.22, 
p.30, pp. 
122-123 
p.77,p.123 
Nootka Service, 
Ellman: 
(1971) 
pp. 213-218 p.221 p.218,p.219 p.226 
Drucker, 
Philip : 
(1951) 
p.276,p.287, 
p.299,p.302, 
p. 303 
— —  p.279 
Gunther, 
Erna: 
(1962) 
p. 544 
— 
Swan, 
James : 
(1870) 
p.11, p.13, 
p. 53 
— 
Colson, p.137 — 
(1953) 
Sapir, 
Edward : 
(1955) 
— p.236, pp. 
242-243, 
p.356-357 
Trobri-
ands 
Service, 
Ellman: 
(1971) 
pp.231-232, 
pp.238-239 
— 
Malinowski, 
Bronislaw: 
(1922) 
— —  p.54 p.71 p.52, p.83 
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Variable anc Page Number 
Society 
Name 
Ethno­
graphie 
Source 
Var. No. 2 
Structural 
Complexity 
(Xj) 
Var. No. 3 
Family 
Stability 
(XG)  
Var. No. 4 
Sociali­
zation 
(XG)  
Var. No. 1 
Alienness/ 
Identity 
(y) 
Trobri-
ands 
(Cont.) 
Malinowski, 
Bronislaw; 
(1935) 
p.80, p.82, 
p.201,p.204, 
p.314-315, 
p.352 
——— p. 11-B 
Malinowski, 
Bronislaw: 
(1926) 
p.9, 
pp.150-151 
p.29,p.57, 
p. 58 
Malinowski, 
Bronislaw: 
(1929) 
p.21,p.ll2-
114,p.142, 
p.146,p.147 
p.6, p.20, 
p.81,p.523 
p.391, pp. 
395-396, 
p. 494 
Japan Langer, 
Paul : 
(1966) 
p.172,p.173 
p. 175,p.176 
p.177 
p.177 p.28, p.29 
Ishida, 
Takeshi : 
(1971) 
p.52 pp.51-52 pp.lOO-lOl 
Reischauer, 
Edwin; 
(1977) 
pp.129-130 pp.127-129, 
p. 230 
Benedict, 
Ruth 
(1946) 
p.264-266 pp.253-254, 
p.255, pp. 
256-257, 
p.258, pp. 
260-264, 
pp.266-267 
p.248-251 
United 
States 
Fischer 
& Fischer: 
(1966) 
p.15, p.16 p.58, p.64, 
p.67,pp.68-
69, p.71, 
p.74, p.75, 
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Variable and Page Number 
Society 
Name 
Ethno­
graphie 
Source 
Var. No. 2 
Structural 
Complexity 
(x^) 
Var. No. 3 
Family 
Stability 
(XG)  
Var. No. 4 
Sociali­
zation 
(XG)  
Var. No. 1 
Alienness/ 
Identity 
( y )  
United 
States 
(Cont.) 
Fischer 
& Fischer; 
(1966) 
(Cont.) 
U.S. Dept. 
of Commerce: 
(1980) 
p.2, p.3, 
p.5 
p.77, p.96, 
p.97, p.98, 
p.99,p.102, 
p.103,p.126 
Williams, 
Robin: 
(1970) 
p.92 
Blackman, 
Ann 
(1976) 
pp.9-10 
Lasch, 
Christopher: 
(1979) 
—-
— p.22, p.23 
Josephson, 
Eric and 
Mary: 
(1975) 
— 
p.9 
Schur, 
Edwin; 
(1977) 
p.l 
Woodward, et 
al.:(19765" 
pp.56-62 
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